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The project of a scientific biosemiotics has been met for the past few years with 
a multiplicity of branches, theoretical options, complements from fields outside 
of semiotics and reworkings of older positions that have found new relevance 
either as heuristic devices or as possible theories to be fully developed. The idea 
that semiotics can be scientific is not a radical one. From its more institutional 
foundations in Saussurean linguistics to the later developments brought together 
by the Tartu-Moscow school, semiotics has strived for a systematized, em-
pirically reasonable and (rather) verifiable field for the study of meaning – what 
it takes for meaning to come about – and its different expressions across 
systems where meaning can be apprehended. Biosemiotics is no different to 
other prefixed varieties of semiotics in that it follows the idea that signs are 
relevant to our understanding of meaning. However, it is fundamentally diffe-
rent from other varieties of semiotics in that it can also be construed as a re-
working of what semiotics can mean considering our current scientific under-
standing of the world. In a way, biosemiotics is a combinatorial aim at under-
standing why there are signs in the first place, how it is possible for us to talk 
about signs, what are the evolutionary reasons (if any) for their relevance to our 
knowledge, and so on. In other words, biosemiotics aims to naturalize the idea 
that signs are important to the life of beings with cognitive capabilities.  
What that doesn’t mean, however, is that we should base all of our under-
standing of semiotics as an epiphenomenal offshoot of scientific inquiry below 
the special sciences. That is, a scientific biosemiotics is not simply a scientific 
characterization of theories that allow us to talk about signs, nor should it be 
considered as a method of ontologically characterizing semiotic universals that 
give rise to the rest of possible descriptions of the world.  
In the following section we will examine the question posed for the present 
work – what it takes for us to talk about minimal semiosis in a biosemiotic 
setting – and the relevant perspectives related to it from within biosemiotic 
enquiry. Then we will introduce the structure of the work to see what has been 
done to address our question.  
 
 
1.1. A question of minimality 
The guiding question behind this work is that of conceptualizing minimal 
semiosic capabilities within the modeling framework of biosemiotics. Behind 
this question is, however, a specific philosophical concern. We inquire about 
the viability of a metaphysical discourse when dealing with the assumed 
scientific outlook of biosemiotics as a branch of general semiotics, and ulti-
mately what it means for a naturalized semiotics to deal with questions of the 
simplest possible expression of semiotic functions.  
In this vein, the work deals with the construction of a framework from which 
to tackle the issue of a potential minimal semiosis, an issue intimately related to 
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the concepts of semiogenesis, emergence and biosemiosis. We make the 
assumption that semiosic activity finds its ground in biology, but we charac-
terize it further in order to make claims about the necessary components of 
semiosic activity in simple systems. In this we find the need for the proposal we 
begin with: That biosemiotics makes claims about the use of signs in the 
biological world, and that such claims need to be construed in units of analysis 
that respond to the view that semiosis in organisms is relative to their en-
vironmental relations. In the specifics we are treating here, we want to theorize 
a parsimonious form of biosemiosis, an abstract point of simplicity that can be 
complemented further in claims about evolutionary scales of semiosis – if at all 
possible – and complex systems analyzed from a semiotic point of view. 
 
 
1.1.1. A brief overview of biosemiotic parsimony 
Earlier we mentioned the relation of the present work to concepts such as 
semiogenesis, and the reason for that lies in the fact that finding a minimal 
expression of semiosis has been treated as part of a diffuse research program on 
the building blocks of semiosis, its point of origin, emergence and precursors. 
The concept of semiogenesis, one that has been phased out of current bio-
semiotic parlance, plays a prominent role in the naturalistic framework of Koch 
(1984; 1986) in the construction of an all-encompassing semiotic model across 
different scales. This perspective is taken by Nöth as a starting point in the 
investigation on the origins of semiosis (1994). The relevance of this lies in that 
Nöth opens the discussion on institutionalized semiotics about the potential 
origins of semiosis, the fundaments on which we must build our theories. The 
origin of semiosis is what leads to the investigation of basic conditions in which 
one can talk about semiosis. However, this view leads to a predominantly 
‘syntagmatic’ understanding of such research. The evolutionary view of 
semiosis encompassing, quite possibly, universal origins and leading towards 
cultural expressions is, however, a difficult position to hold, and it is not one 
that finds a strong footing in the current biosemiotic paradigm, at least not to the 
degree that it can be fleshed out in concrete terms as Koch does in his work on 
cultural evolution.  
However, this is a particularly important starting point in that it creates the 
conditions for us to talk about minimal expressions of semiosis by way of 
arguing for an abstract origin or emergence situations. Beyond semiogenesis as 
the emergence of semiotic processes in any given system, we begin to see the 
problem of the emergence of semiosis. In the biosemiotic landscape delineated 
by Hoffmeyer, we find more tangible expressions of the problem (Emmeche 
1992: 78), for the understanding of semiosis as a biological phenomenon at the 
cellular level makes the question of origins of sign usage possible with specific 
concepts and units of analysis, such as the cell as the basic organism capable of 
sign action and signs as the units of analysis of life (Emmeche et al. 2002: 13–
24). In this vein, the most relevant work on emergentist accounts of semiosis 
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can be found in the works of Queiroz, El-Hani and Emmeche (2009 in parti-
cular), but as we will later see, biosemiotic investigations related to complexity 
can be construed as proper emergent accounts as well.  
The prospect of an emergent account of semiosis in the biological world 
finds a relevant place in the more theoretical areas of biosemiotics, and the 
question posed by this perspective is of the utmost importance for our particular 
research, as establishing the basal theoretical conditions on which one can talk 
about the emergent processes of semiosis gives us an important place to 
consider what the minimal expression of semiosis may be. The conceptual 
approach here is very much perfused by Peircean terminology, and it is easy to 
see why: Peircean concepts lend themselves much more easily when referring to 
processual sign conceptions and the organization of conceptual necessities to 
present signs in some form. The strong Peircean hold of biosemiotics gives the 
field thus a particular flavor to its ontological commitments and analytical 
requirements. That is not to say that the field is exclusively Peircean in its 
conception of the sign, but in any case we must remain clear that sign concepts 
are both informed and compatible with standard Peircean talk on signs.  
There are certainly other related terms that have been used in approaching 
our subject to some degree of specificity, and one in particular that stands out as 
functionally relevant: The idea of protosemiosis, first introduced by Prodi “to 
investigate the natural foundations of semiotics” (Petrilli 2013: 36). The 
concept, originally applied “to molecular processes in the cell” (Sharov et al. 
2015: 6), serves as a different illustration of the research on the issues of 
emergence and basic constituents for semiosis. Here we see another level of 
investigation that deals with minimal or presemiosic capabilities and the value 
they have for a fully-fledged semiosis in more complex levels of organization. 
In fact, when referring to protosemiosis, we will only deal with Prodi’s concept 
as developed later in biosemiotics, but it is worth noting that one could construe 
protosemiotic features as part of non-linguistic signification systems (Zappa-
vigna 2011: 259) in an understanding of semiotic features as those related to 
complex sign systems.1 However, given that in accepting the premise that sign 
action is valid in simpler biological forms than mammals, it makes sense to 
come up with a formal argument for some less developed sign types or sign 
action when semantic information is hard to describe beyond simpler reactive 
mechanisms. While the number of examples utilizing the concept of proto-
semiosis is very limited, a biosemiotic conceptualization can be made in a 
couple of different ways. De Albuquerque Vieira (1994: 829) uses the concept 
of protosemiosis as “semiosis possibility in inanimates [involving] the open 
system’s thermodynamics and the Peircean classification of interpretants” in an 
                                                          
1 Wąsik (2014: 48–49) puts protosemiosis and physiosemiosis in the same prebiotic bag, 
but terminologically speaking, these two represent different positions in biosemiotics, 
one related to basic or pseudosemiosic activity and the other to signs entailed by physical 
systems (including physical interpretants). At the same time, Petrilli and Ponzio (2011: 
311) warn us about conflating the concept of protosemiosis with ‘quasi-semiotic’, with 
the last one being constituted by physical interactions. 
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earlier approach to the concept through a Peircean framework, much reminding 
us of other Peircean approaches such as Brier’s (2008). Perhaps the most 
concrete proposal for a protosemiosis comes from Sharov and Vehkavaara 
(2015), who first define it as a “primitive ‘mindless’ semiosis” (104), but flesh 
it out as signaling, and more specifically, “as a kind of sign processing, where 
agents (i.e., active systems guided by natural self-interest) initiate or modify 
their functional activities in response to incoming signs directly, rather than by 
associating signs with objects” (107).  
In many ways this approach is compatible with our point of view, but the 
differences in their theoretical constitution prove wide enough that their con-
ception of protosemiosis doesn’t equate to the picture of minimal semiosis that 
we are trying to achieve here. This particular concept of protosemiosis maps 
sign types to “signal molecules” (116–117) based on internal functionality. At 
the same time they distinguish between protosemiosis and eusemiosis in that 
they see eusemiosis as the processing of semiotic functions through object 
association (108), a step further in evolution from their conceptualization of 
protosemiosis.2 This conception of protosemiosis explain behavior with the 
assumption that bacteria do not know that there are nutrients outside so much as 
their observation is limited to the state of their receptors. However, this is not 
enough to sustain a categorization of internal states because of the assumed 
indirectness of perception. In this way, they specify that protosemiotic signaling 
networks are simple and non-redundant (111–114).  
This particular view on protosemiosis is informative in that it sets some 
conditions to be used when considering a potential evolutionary trait of semiotic 
capacities (Sharov 2012). But as it stands, it describes a more precise idea 
altogether, something we can call an implementational framework for semiosis, 
that is, a segmentation of a more concrete set of conditions to talk about the 
simplest form of expression of semiosic capacities. Having a continuum of 
evolutionary possibilities is itself a claim we will not explore in this work as 
supporting it would need an exploration on specific developmental scales that 
can only come as a complement of the concepts we are using. That does not 
mean we cannot have a form of compatibility with Sharov and Vehkavaara’s 
view on protosemiosis, but the scope of their work is both more limited and 
with assumed implications that we cannot cash out directly from either their or 
our models.  
Finally, the concept of a proper ‘minimal semiosis’ has not appeared in 
many biosemiotic formulations. In fact, one of the few mentions comes from 
Arnellos and Moreno (2012) in an abstract regarding the asymmetry between 
the organism and its environment, their interwoven nature and how this 
asymmetry “is created and maintained by the functionality of the system 
through the establishment of internal constructive relations that organizationally 
differentiate the system from its environment” (153), further specifying the 
                                                          
2 In fact, they correlate protosemiosis to the origin of life and eusemiosis to the origin of a 
“minimal mind” (Sharov; Vehkavaara 2015: 109). 
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autonomy and identity of the organism. A more concrete claim, however, comes 
from the concept of functional differentiation as a prebiotic constraint that 
opens the possibility of signification (Arnellos; Moreno 2012a: 3). This 
functional differentiation is theorized to be self-maintained (5), leading to the 
constitution of more robust systems with signification processes involved in 
their development. This view is close to some conceptions of minimal cogni-
tion, which will play a fundamental role in our argument.  
Minimal cognition deserves a special mention here as well, presenting a 
paradigm that will help in making points about minimal semiosis clearer in the 
present work. The conception of a minimal cognition in simple organisms 
becomes formalized in van Dujin et al. (2006), finding some clearer roots in 
Müller et al. (2001), but also spelled out in Calvo Garzón and Keijzer (2011). 
Briefly, the idea is that cognition at the level of simple organisms is built 
environmentally in a parallel expression of embodied cognition. This will be 
treated more concretely later in this work, as it helps flesh out our view of 
semiosis more clearly. 
Within a more expanded field beyond semiotics and its close boundaries, it 
is also possible to make a case about the relation of the contributions made by 
Rosen regarding anticipatory systems and its impact to the core assumptions on 
minimality in biosemiotics. In this regard, Rosen’s modeling of organisms has 
been of certain influence to biosemiotics (Kurismaa 2016: 179), construed 
either as an anticipatory requirement for meaning generation in organisms or as 
a complement to a Peircean understanding of meaning (Fernández 2010), that 
is, a relational type of characterizing life, and thus, semiosis (Kull 2010: 48). If 
anything, the parallel lines that can be drawn between Rosen’s project and bio-
semiotics can give us a clearer insight on the intellectual place of biosemiotics. 
Take, for instance, the idea that an organism “contains coherences that cannot 
be expressed in terms of syntactical structures” (Goudsmit 2007: 2428), an 
assertion that follows the assumed directedness (or rather, finality) of an 
organism. This resonates profoundly with the classic biosemiotic conception 
that stem from Uexküll’s research paradigm (Kull 2001). While terminological 
differences exist, they coincide in pointing the relevance of meaning making for 
biological processes. This, in fact, is considered an essential enough trait that 
the formulation of a relational biology (Rosen 2000: 259–265) depends on 
organization, but assigns no ontological value to this organization and only 
makes claims about evaluation maps, the constituents of causation in the 
organism. At the heart of the relational biology championed by Rosen and 
Rashevsky is the idea that the nature of biosystems lies not in the elements that 
constitute them, but in their (functional) structure, that is, their system of 
relations (Rashevsky 1954; 1965; Rosen 1958; see also Louie 2009). This is 
also one of the core statements of the semiotic view of life (cf. Fernández 
2010), which certainly has some critical ontological implications, because the 
organism is described not on the basis of molecules or any kind of matter, but 
on mappings, correspondences and functions (what is meant by structures). 
Rosen (1958) formulated a minimal model for a relational biological system in 
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his description of a metabolic-replication system, and this view has been of 
certain relevance to biosemiotics (Kull 2007a), but this particular topic would 
require a separate work and will not be analyzed here. 
Another potential candidate for a similar object of research can be found on 
the notion of ‘minimal self’ as presented by Zahavi (2010), but the boundaries 
of the properly phenomenological are, in our opinion, beyond the scope of this 
work. 
 
1.1.2. Biosemiotic parsimony and naturalization 
The naturalization of semiosis and the intuition that there must be something of 
a relation across different levels of complexity is perhaps one of the drivers of 
this research on minimal cognition. When I refer to parsimony in this sense, I 
mean that in construing a hypothesis of simple semiosis we aim for the simplest 
expression of its constitution. In semiotics, parsimonious explanations are 
perhaps not always the norm because of the amount of elements needed to get a 
strong sense of meaning in complex creations with highly involved conceptuali-
zation apparatuses, but we see a commitment to significance within the cellular 
world even from the more foundational approaches of Hoffmeyer (1997, 2000), 
Deacon (2011) or Barbieri (2007). Many of the semiotic explanations detail 
possible internal significance for simple organisms, either by corresponding 
notions of protosemiosis (or endosemiosis), autonomy (Deacon 2012), the usage 
of codes or even the idea of microsemiosis (Yates 1997). This approach has 
been partially set aside for our purposes as we are trying to come up with an 
analytical possibility of an assumed minimal model of semiosic capabilities. In 
the construction of the hypothetical model we have described we assume a 
different type of description that does not search to explain the origins of life or 
the evolution of semiosis towards mental phenomena, a much wider and more 
complex set of results that cannot be obtained from explanatory values of 
parsimony, and part of the assumed explananda of the biosemiotic theories we 
have just mentioned. We must remember that cells, for all their assumed 
simplicity, present an incredibly complex organization, and part of the bio-
semiotic literature that treats the subject of cellular semiosis does so with this 
caveat in mind, explaining semiosis as a phenomenon of complexity.  
In the abstract notion of semiosis, however, we can also find Stjernfelt’s 
contribution (2007, 2014) to the debate on cognition with the implementation of 
a Peircean framework to characterize the dicisign as an expression of cognition. 
This has been taken into account in the work, but our approach is less com-
mitted to a Peircean vision of semiosis to the extent that it is even possible to do 







1.2. Outline of the thesis 
The current work is comprised of seven sections (starting from Chapter 2) and 
conclusions. Chapter 2 opens the discussion on the metaphysical under-
pinnings of biosemiotics, and whether it is a discussion worth having at all. The 
relation between metaphysics and biosemiotics is, in our view, clear, and a 
necessary point to make when constructing our theories on biosemiosis. This is 
of particular relevance to the present work in that the expression of biosemiotic 
concepts and their consequences are hinged on certain metaphysical assump-
tions and claims, and the biosemiotic project of naturalization of semiotic 
concepts is still highly dependent on our philosophical positions.  
Chapter 3 refers to one of the first metaphysical problems we face when 
developing a model of minimal semiosis, that is, the concept of physiosemiosis. 
The concept itself is a philosophical argument about the standing of semiosis, 
one that can hinder the ontological standing of biosemiosis if left unchecked. 
Chapter 4 takes the discussion of naturalization as essential to the problem of 
conceptualizing minimal semiosis. This is partly carried from the issues of 
physiosemiosis as a way to delineate the particular possibilities of a naturalized 
biosemiotics versus the more sweeping claims about universals that cover all 
levels of sign action. Here we try to distinguish the role of semiotics as a special 
science that does not deal with such general claims as the ones made by 
philosophical positions like the ones that espouse physiosemiosis.  
Chapter 5 moves to the problem of the emergence of semiosis and tries to 
account for different views of emergence within the biosemiotic framework. 
This is also important because it constrains the setting for speaking of a possible 
minimal expression of semiosic capabilities. This discussion also proves to be 
of certain relevance for current biosemiotics as the exploration of emergence 
deals with complexity while giving a naturalized constitution to the sign as an 
emergent of specific processes in nature. Chapter 6 deals with the conception 
of minimality for both models and objects of those models, allowing the 
discussion of parsimony in the act of modeling within semiotics. As we are 
trying to develop a hypothesis on minimality and biosemiosis, this is a relevant 
point to develop.  
Chapter 7 then lays the more specific groundwork for our proposition by 
bringing the discussion on models from the previous chapter towards a more 
biosemiotic-centric approach, including a general notion of semantics. Many of 
the concepts used in this chapter set the theoretical focus for the model of 
minimal capabilities proposed in the next chapter. Chapter 8, finally, presents a 
proposition for a model of minimal semiosis based on the underlying theory 
used earlier as well as complements from minimal cognition. The proposal we 
make at this point is construed within the limits of the scope we have set before, 
that is, without claims about its extension beyond the idea that the model could 
lend itself to more complex proposals in the description of systems requiring it. 
We make extensive use of Pattee’s special conception of semantics in order to 
describe our position. The conclusions cover the construction of the argument 
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and discusses some of the problems that may be associated to the model, as well 
as tentative answers to these problems.  
It is impossible to claim a full understanding of semiosis and account for it 
in all its complexity. This work has tried to use a complementary approach to 
the issues of describing semiosis, a bottom-up view of the metaphysical stan-
ding of semiosis with a top-down approach on certain aspects of cognition. 
However, there is a certain limit to how much a model can say about semiosis, 
leaving ultimately many gaps in our understanding of the specificities of sign 
action in even the simplest of organisms. This work is not an attempt at telling 
the whole story of semiosis; instead, it is, I hope, a way to set a background 
theory for making claims about semiosis in a minimal condition, approachable 
as philosophical discourse and useful in the discussion of the biosemiotic 
standing of semanticity at a level in which it is hard to speak of a proper 
conception of semantics.  
Ultimately, speculation at the roots of the phenomenon of semiosis is an area 
of certain usefulness in the development of our theories of biosemiotics, even if 
its nature is frightfully hypothetical. Biosemiotics, as a special – and founda-
tional, in our opinion – form of semiotic research, is one of the main fields in 
which the discussions on the ontological standing of semiosis should take place, 
and it is our hope that this work contributes to the landscape of biosemiotics in 
its discussion about both the requirements for something to pertain to sign 
action and the background philosophical theories of biosemiotics. 
The biosemiotically informed reader may, however, find the language em-
ployed uncommon within the discipline. The intention to scrutinize the elements 
that conform the theoretical basis of biosemiotics is better suited to what can be 
characterized as the technicalities of philosophy, which may lead to some 
terminological incongruence at face value. I have tried to expand on the con-
cepts meriting a more thorough explanation for the biosemiotician in order to 
make them compatible with the more general idea of what biosemiotic concepts 
do. When this has not been possible, the acknowledgment of a paradigmatic 
difference has been made in order to mitigate possible conflicts in the reading of 
the work. Yet, the stylistic difference accounts, hopefully, for an attempt at 
making biosemiotic claims more accessible for analysis, for when biosemioti-
cians try to say something about semiosis, very often we find ourselves stranded 
by the enormous complexity that comes from understanding just what the 
implications of our theories are, and how these may be related to other areas of 
investigation that deal with overlapping subjects, such as the way to treat 
cognition in simple organisms or the origins of life itself. This way of tracking 
our understanding of semiosis and the logic behind it can help us overcome 
some problems related to unexpected commitments we make when, say, we 
accept a physiosemiosic account of the sign, and while this manner of 
addressing the problems of biosemiotics is rather uncommon, it is my thought 
that it provides a suitable and fertile ground for examining the more abstract 
areas of the discipline. 
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2. METAPHYSICS AND BIOSEMIOTICS 
Does Biosemiotics need metaphysics? That may be a redundant question. After 
all, no one really needs metaphysics. In fact, the question implies a certain 
number of other related questions, so it is not quite straightforward as it may 
seem. We do not really get to ask if metaphysics is indeed necessary, but rather, 
the theories we deal with are construed under some metaphysical stipulations.  
The problem we face can be stated like this: When you choose a hat, you’re 
not limited by your taste in hats, but to which hats fit your head (if it is in your 
interest buying a hat for wearing it, of course). If you have a big enough head, 
chances are you won’t be able to wear all of the hats you like. In the same way, 
you do not get to simply choose the metaphysic underpinnings of a semiotic 
theory, but instead these are appended inextricably to the definitions that appear 
on the preferred theories of semiotics that someone may espouse.  
One thing we may be concerned about, before starting to wonder about the 
need for metaphysics, is whether we actually need to worry about metaphysics 
at all. If the internal consequences of a theory do not collide with the results, 
there seems to be no need for making a fuss about how it works as long as it 
works. But this is not the argument I am willing to make. It would seem to me 
that deciding to commit ourselves to some degree of naturalization of semiotic 
concepts implies a lesser dependence on metaphysical devices, and this by itself 
holds some value in that our explanation of semiotic concepts will not depend 
on seemingly inconsequential, invisible metaphysical machines. This chapter 
will particularly focus on the concept of semiosis as central to biosemiotics, its 
ontology and the consequences of Peircean thought when considering the 
specificity of biosemiosis. It will be argued in this chapter that metaphysics in 
biosemiotics takes an inflationary pattern, positing entities necessary to explain 
the tenets of sign action, and that constraining the ontology that comes from this 
practice, that is, limiting the description of causes and potential entities that take 
part in forming the elements of our theories, can be a good measure for the 
long-term prospect of naturalization in the sense of its compatibility with a 
scientific worldview3 and what this entails for the concepts in semiotics. While 
this chapter will set the tone for the philosophical explanations given, it is 
important to note that not all terms map to current biosemiotic concepts. This 
being the case, I will try to provide a compatible account of concepts that may 
be unfamiliar to the biosemiotician while also accounting for those concepts 
that may be incompatible with the biosemiotic view. 
  
                                                          
3 Broadly speaking, this would qualify as Quinean naturalism. This type of naturalism 
does not, as Leng notes, “imply that we ought to be realists about all of the objects 
indispensably posited by our best scientific theories” (Leng 2010: 20) in any case. While 
I wish to retain this as the main sense for this chapter, it is only used in a broad manner. 
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2.1. Metaphysics and Biosemiotics 
Dealing with the metaphysics of biosemiotics is not an easy task in that 
threading through the philosophical assumptions made in biosemiotics can 
result in individual positions with little resemblance between one another. This 
does not mean it is impossible, but rather that there is a lack of literature 
documenting the different metaphysical positions between the possible views in 
biosemiotics, with a wider focus on tackling problems concerning the already 
explicit biosemiotic aspects that stem from underlying philosophical assump-
tions, as for instance the idea of an emergent semiosis (Emmeche et al. 2000) or 
the possibility of semiotic scaffolding (Hoffmeyer 2008), to name just a couple 
of them. The more philosophical bent of biosemiotics allows a greater deal of 
openness with regards to the possibilities that may come from reframing bio-
logy through a different lens, as it has been suggested by Hoffmeyer (2008a), 
and this openness makes the discipline more prone to explore options that may 
not necessarily find correspondence within other areas of the discipline itself. 
The fact that Peircean ideas and concepts are so relevant to biosemiotics is a 
testament to both Peirce’s contributions to philosophy as it is to biosemiotics’s 
capacity for incorporating elements that will count with a great variation when 
interpreted under different perspectives. But Peircean philosophy will turn to 
have various outcomes. For instance, Vehkavaara (2008) proposes a diffe-
rentiation between the biosemiotic endeavor and Peircean metaphysics, a 
distinction that must be made in order to retain the cohesion of older and newer 
paradigms when integrated. Brier, on the other hand, uses the Peircean para-
digm to develop his own metaphysics aligned with cybernetics (2006, 2008). 
Deely (2009), uses Peirce as an extension of scholasticism in a different system 
of metaphysics that leads to the necessity of semiosis.  
Pattee (2005), on the other hand, covers some of the problems of meta-
physical assumptions outside and inside biosemiotics, while Favareau (2008) 
provides some descriptions to the philosophical issues in biosemiotics. Ratta-
sepp (2013) describes a broader alternative for general semiotics when it comes 
to considering ontology and metaphysics. More recently, Champagne (2015) 
and  Chevalier’s comments (2015) have presented opposite points of view on 
what the necessary metaphysical assumptions and systems must do within the 
framework of Peircean semiotics. This is not an exhaustive review, so it should 
be taken as a way to exemplify the state of the discussion in the field. The aim 
of this quick survey though is not to show whether we should commit to 
Peircean philosophy or to endorse a certain type of materialism, but rather to 
open the dialogue on the need to be careful about our metaphysics.4 
                                                          
4  More generally, the Peircean bent of general semiotics has some Aristotelian foundations 
that are made explicit by Peirce himself (Tiercelin 2006: 158; Pencak 2010: 25) and that 
can be reflected across different views, either minor and general, such as Budrevičius 
(2012), or of definite relevance to the discussion of biosemiotics, such as the historical 
discussion presented in Favareau (2010). These foundations, however, will not be treated 
here. 
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One issue that must also be mentioned is that when talking about meta-
physics, the concept itself lends to various interpretations, many of which may 
not be charitable considering the more scientific expectations of biosemiotics. 
While the more precise definition we will use can be found in 2.2.1., it is 
important to keep in mind that the concept itself is only limited here in its use to 
more or less explicit questions on the ontology of semiosis. In that sense, the 
ontological questions of biosemiotics – the properties of biosemiosis, its origins 
and its relation to other types of semiosis, if there are any – are here considered 
to be essential to the discipline, but answering them will depend on how we can 
develop metaphysical systems to support them. In this regard, we can see at 
least in general lines that for (bio)semiotics to explain semiosis there must be a 
couple of lines of reasoning, either following the path of a universal evolutio-
nary scale (Koch 1986; Brier 2008), a type of universal law (Deely 2009), an 
emergent in cognition (Emmeche 1992; Deacon 2011) – all of these following 
some variety of Peirce –, or through the connection of two different ‘worlds’ 
through a code (Barbieri 2009).5 Evidently, the working assumption here is that 
biosemiosis takes precedence in the landscape of general semiotics. It is also 
more than clear that Peirce himself developed a well-documented system of 
metaphysics6 that exerts great influence on current biosemiotics, and that Jakob 
von Uexküll had some specific underlying conceptions about the world that 
complemented his work.7 It would seem however that in its extension, most 
biosemioticians lie on the vast camp of antireductionism, some form of 
naturalism and universal evolutionism, as it were (Favareau 2007; Kull et al. 
2009; Nöth 1994). This is simply a rule of thumb, but in general it seems to 
cover the paradigm of biosemiotics and its project to a large degree.  
In what follows we will attempt to provide a more general account of the 
relation of the description of biosemiosis and the consequences that are ex-
pressed at the metaphysical level inside biosemiotics. Taking into account what 
has been already mentioned with regards to possible metaphysical assumptions, 
the discussion will focus on some specific possibilities of Peircean metaphysics 







                                                          
5 Krampen (1997) provides a thorough description of models of semiosis from different 
perspectives that goes beyond this little overview inside biosemiotics. 
6 Many volumes have been written on this specific topic, but the particular influence of 
Peirce’s metaphysics on biosemiotics can be seen described in Romanini et al. (2014). 
7 The idea that “Nature plays her symphony of meaning beyond time and space” (Uexküll 
2010: 208) has specific undertones that can be better examined when considering 
Uexküll’s own philosophical and biological thought. Kull (2001) describes Uexküll’s 
paradigm extensively. 
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2.2. Propositions of being 
For the sake of brevity, and to establish some common ground, we have to con-
sider the following: semiotics in all its different flavors posits the being of signs 
to some degree or another. The mere positing of signs, however, does not imply 
anything in particular about their ontology, and thus our interpretation of this 
proposition needs to be fine-grained according to how we build our own 
theories. As a matter of generalities, the proposition that there are signs is 
trivial, because signs can be categories, properties or even shorthands to make 
our models work. The assertion that signs exist is vague enough that we can 
consider at least a couple of different ways to account for the being of signs, 
these being ontological properties of objects, shorthands for epistemological 
processes or instrumental descriptions of other processes. While the difference 
may seem sketchy, it can be better explained in terms of how the ontology of 
the sign is taken. If we consider signs as individual elements or instantiations, 
we will find problems with our particular accounts of sign properties. Thinking 
of the ontology of signs as being a property instantiated by an object in the sign 
relation will provide us with a way of stating that all things can be perceived 
because they have the property of being a sign. If we go the other way round 
and insist that the being of signs is but topology as considered by the senses, we 
will have functional signs that do not depend on a particularly deep exterior 
substance. The instrumental alternative bypasses this problem by not declaring 
any sort of realism about signs. This is also problematic because there is a case 
to be made that if signs are not exactly real, then perception is impossible.8 
If, with Peirce, we characterize signs as relations (despite the numerous 
definitions given to signs), the difference is seemingly eschewed, replaced by a 
formal codependent constitution, where apparently the sign is dependent on the 
object, its perceiver and its perception.9 This amounts, again in general terms, to 
a large explanatory capability which, taken at face value, does not seem to be 
extremely vague, and thus as a normative principle for semiotics, it seems to 
work quite well. The problem however is that this explanation amounts to little 
                                                          
8 However, an instrumentalist semiotics does not need to care for the metaphysical 
proposition at all for as long as the usage of signs can be accounted for. There is more to 
be said about this possibility and its extraneous consequences, but I will not go into 
detail about it here. 
9 Instead of pigeonholing Peircean definitions, it seems to be the case that for Peirce, signs 
always imply a relation considering its subdivision in three parts. This is consistent with 
CP 1.346, CP 2.242 and CP 8.346, to name only a few possible references. I will favor 
the object-representamen-interpretant triad to refer to the parts of the sign. I will not 
dwell into the universal categories, but these also amount to developing Peirce’s system 
of metaphysics and as such should be kept in mind in the general panorama of things. 
Peirce’s synechism and tychism, both also important parts in the development of the 
philosophy of biosemiotics, will play a specific role in the views taking an evolutionary 
or causal standpoint for semiosis, such as Deely's (in the case of causality) and Koch's 
(in the case of evolution). My focus here is on the sign and semiosis, which should 
provide the most foundational ground to biosemiotics in all its different flavors. 
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when considered solely under its own terms. In other words, the methodology 
for the analysis of signs constructed on this premise alone amounts simply to 
the indication that a sign is present in a situation, and then we are bound to find 
the same problems described above. The case is that semiotics doesn’t exactly 
need to deal with the notion of the sign as excluded from a wider context (cf. 
Kull 2002). That is, the functional aspect of the sign cannot be isolated from the 
fundamental notion of semiosis, and at the same time these concepts require a 
more precise exploration of both a typology and a contextual condition. In fact, 
arguing for the sign requires us to consider a more in-depth approach than what 
might be taken from its tripartite articulation at face value.  
The first thing to mention is that if we do consider the sign as something 
instead of nothing – or rather, if we are realists about signs10 – we will also need 
to consider a certain ontology that comes along with it. Now, with basic pro-
positions of things that stand for other things there doesn’t seem to be a big 
mystery, but at the same time it is hard to say much if our whole method of 
semiotic research is just stating that indeed sometimes some things stand for 
other things. This instrumentalist view of the sign does not provide us with 
much more than this indexical. The upside, however, is that in most cases, 
terminological developments allow us to explore what those signs are, typo-
logically speaking, what they entail and how they are organized. My concern 
here is not exactly with sign specification though, for their descriptions do not 
refer necessarily to the ontological/epistemological divide. Simply put, as 
semiotics studies semiosis (Deely 2009), it bases its theories on the fact that 
semiosis is, depending on the academic variety, a process or condition of the 
action of signs. However, there is a certain depth to the problem when con-
sidering that semiosis is “an action, or influence, which is, or involves, a 
coöperation of three subjects, such as a sign, its object, and its interpretant, this 
tri-relative influence not being in any way resolvable into actions between 
pairs” (CP 5.484) in the Peircean description because such definition requires us 
to see semiosis as conceptually true.11 If we are realists about the Peircean sign, 
then we must acknowledge the fact that signs are irreducible in this variety and 
what that implies for the rest of the theory. To put it differently, in order to have 
this variety of semiosis, our theories must be consistent with the ontological 
                                                          
10  In other words, if we are realists about signs, we want to characterize them more strongly 
than as an instance of a process that may as well be described in a different way without 
having to mention signs. This counterpoint ultimately doesn’t need signs, but uses them 
out of necessity. A realist about signs would, on the other hand, deny this and accept that 
signs exist in a more relevant capacity, or that sign relations take form, instead of simply 
being mentioned as such. 
11 This can be construed as a form of metaphysical or logical necessity. Logical necessity in 
this sense should be considered as conceptually true and true throughout all possible 
worlds (Chalmers 1996: 50). Peirce's description of semiosis is quite strict in its 
indivisibility and so describing it as logically or metaphysically necessary makes this 
condition more precise, conceptually. It would seem that thinking of Peirce's concepts in 
modal terms is quite close to some of his aims according to Ramharter and Gottschall 
(2011). I will argue this position further in the following sections. 
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form that is introduced by its definition.12 This claim should not be seen as 
strange, as the mere fact that semiosis is postulated as a triadic metaphysically 
necessary claim establishes already a metaphysic ground. As we follow this line 
of thought, it will become clearer that the metaphysical aspect is relevant.  
 
 
2.2.1. Metaphysical underpinnings 
In a general sense, when we argue about something being metaphysical, we are 
referring to the causality and ontology of the phenomenon in question (Chakra-
vartty 2013) and thus the claim that semiosis works as an irreducible triadic 
relation does not seem so far removed from an ontological principle, especially 
following Peirce’s system of metaphysics. Peirce considered general metaphysics 
as the study of ontology (CP 1.192), which at least as an implication means that 
we are on the right track in the presumption that semiosis entails some 
metaphysical stipulations that should be clearer. But by having irreducibility here, 
do we really need to consider semiosis as a necessary relation of elements, as I 
earlier presumed? What does that mean in particular for the elements involved on 
the triads where we can consider semiosis as actual? These questions seem to 
apply if we are dealing with apparent necessity in the logical sense. Semiosis is 
defined primarily as a metaphysical construct that works as a base-level 
assumption for biosemiotics after taking the Peircean turn. Again, as we have 
seen, most metaphysical positions in biosemiotics will depend on some inter-
pretation of Peirce. While this fact does not entail a specific way to consider the 
ontology of signs in any detailed way,13 the point is that Peirce’s starting position 
makes semiosis definable under the previously discussed terms. 
A way to see this condition in more straightforward terms is to understand 
that if semiosis is logically necessary, as it would seem to be from the inter-
pretation of Peirce’s definition, we will be able to define it as the impossibility 
of perception in situations where further mental representations cannot be en-
tailed by the same act of perception. The main problem with this view however 
is in specifying what we mean with each of the terms, that is, in how we limit 
the necessity of the relation to specific classes.14 I am using the term of mental 
representation loosely here though, for the sign and the further mental represen-
tations do not require that particular concept to be applied in full force. In fact 
some theories,15 may regard the perception bit rather problematic, but con-
                                                          
12 As a way to think about this, semiosis cannot be conceived in situations where the 
conditions do not apply in all of its terms. 
13 In fact, the more philosophically inclined biosemioticians will have very different 
accounts of what they mean by ‘sign’ and ‘semiosis’. 
14 A different way to phrase this broad reformulation of the concept of semiosis is that 
objects cannot be perceived if they cannot produce a mental representation that leads to 
subsequent mental representations. 
15 Deely, for instance, regards perception as unnecessary because he conceives of the 
possibility of establishing relations only physically, a dinosaur bone being his prime 
example for the concept of physiosemiosis (Deely 2009: 119). 
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sidering that signs at least comprehend the relation between object and per-
ceiver one would imagine that it is a fair trade, if anything. 
Instead of analyzing the particular terms used for any specific definition of 
semiosis, it seems more useful to consider that all the aspects of the relation still 
imply a particular set of ontologies. That is to say, no matter how we consider 
relations, the fact that they are included as an integral part of biosemiotics 
grants them with a certain ontology as long as we are not limiting ourselves to 
an instrumentalist account of the sign.16 Objects, for instance, have as their main 
attribute across different possibilities the fact that they are presented in a certain 
fashion through a representamen. This doesn’t imply a specific take on the 
object as a concretely defined object, such as apples or magazines, but rather 
includes train wrecks, wizards and vacuum cleaners. This also includes objects 
in absentia, which opens a whole set of different possibilities and little onto-
logical constraint if we are not careful with the limits of description. However, I 
will refer to this later. Suffice to say for now that objects are no real concern of 
ours (for now) except when construed as part of semiosis, instead of a separate 
category for indexicals to work.17 The moral to take home here is that semiosis 
is not necessarily a clear-cut method for mentioning that signs exist in a bio-
semiotic framework,18 but rather it is a metaphysical hypothesis that establishes 
further conditions that shape the theories of semiotics.  
 
                                                          
16 In those cases, the ontology would shift to a different paradigm, and while the general 
idea of the chapter would still apply to the removal of a Peircean ontology and the 
implementation of a code-based semiosis, the outcome will be different in its specificity. 
Barbieri (2008) presents a picture where Peircean concepts are devoid of their more 
entrenched ontology, but the case is that the talk about code still includes an important 
Peircean background. 
17 Peircean objects “involve two kinds of objects: immediate objects, which are just what 
signs represent them to be, and dynamical objects, which are instrumental in the 
determination of their signs but are not immediately represented in them. Signs cannot 
express dynamical objects but can only indicate them and leave it be to interpreters to 
find them by ‘collateral experience’.” (Houser 2010: 278) I mention this partly as an 
example of the treatment of objects as an abstract designator, but also as a potential 
conflict with some views on perception. Briefly, the indirect relation object-perceptor via 
sign is yet another problematic situation when it comes to dealing with the processing of 
signs and access to the so-called external world. This may not be so obvious at first 
glance, but eliciting reactions in simpler organisms is not the same as stating that there 
are actual mental representations in them. 
18 Hoffmeyer claims, for instance, that “semiosis is an emergent property of the universe” 
(Hoffmeyer 1997: 355), and according to Brier, the concept of semiosis was used by 
Peirce and Sebeok to refer to ‘signification’ (Brier 2003: 107). The problem that remains 
however is what the ontological status of such ‘emergent property’ is, or to what degree 
the idea of signification can be traced to specific metaphysical devices working behind 
the scenes in this possibility. While Brier has developed an explicit metaphysical system 
explained more thoroughly in his Cybersemiotics (2008), it remains that the concept of 
semiosis depends on extra legwork for making it work in current biosemiotics, as it will 
be shown later. 
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2.3. Ontological constraints 
We might be tempted to ask whether constraining the ontology of semiosis is 
necessary, that is, limiting the identity description of sign elements to causal 
roles,19 and I would argue it is. The reason appears to become clearer when we 
consider that if we do not put some limits to the potential ontology of semiosis 
in this sense, it is quite capable of extending towards pansemiotism (and 
pansemioticism), a common criticism to Peircean biosemiotics (Barbieri 2015: 
156). But one cannot apply constraints arbitrarily, for if a theory is functionally 
construed to allow pansemiotism, then it is through its own merits that it has to 
be considered with its corresponding metaphysical machinery. This just means 
that the constraints have to be set by marking limits that are necessary instead of 
arbitrary, in the sense that semiosic phenomena need only that specific measure 
to work and nothing else. More generally speaking, we can agree with Arm-
strong’s view that all the entities we postulate should have causal roles (Arm-
strong 1978), but to that we must add that the causal roles we postulate should 
nevertheless be parsimonious when there is a possibility to be so. 
This endeavor may seem appropriate, but still needs some argumentation to 
demonstrate its general application, because insisting on constraints without 
providing a methodological stance is only begging for arbitrary constraints. And 
I will argue that this problem meets with the need for naturalization of semiotic 
concepts. I have previously mentioned the commitment to this naturalization, for 
an implicit premise of biosemiotics – as might be understood from its prefix – is 
that there is a sense in which semiotics is taken with a degree of “scientism”, so 
to speak.20 By this I mean that biosemiotic concerns should give “science 
priority over domesticating conceptual analysis” (Ross et al. 2007: 5) while still 
being concerned with the ontology of its object. Some degree of naturalization 
appears to be necessary in grounding our views, and the import of this often 
innate trait is that it would seem that biosemiotic properties (whatever they may 
be) are to be anchored in our conceptualization of actual organisms and their 
relation to the world.21 I am not advocating a specific type of naturalization 
                                                          
19 In the naturalist paradigm that I favor, ontology is constrained by natural laws. The 
problem of how we define natural laws at this point will, however, be left for another 
occasion. 
20 This particular word, while terrifyingly pejorative, is not intended as a marker for an 
unnecessary commitment to reductionism, but rather as an implication of the synthetic 
condition of biosemiotics. Brier (2008) presents a reflection on this particular topic. 
21 A clever reader may ask: “And what if it is the other way round?” to which we could 
simply answer that there is no need to go that way. This particular reader may retain 
Sebeok’s premise that it is theories that do the convincing instead of facts, but the 
premise is already subsumed under the idea that we are using a philosophical apparatus 
to approach our subject matter. Long story short, the reader would be right in thinking 
that theories do the convincing, and the grounding of biosemiotic properties comes from 
the hope that organisms can entail them. 
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here,22 only a view that responds to the prospects of a constrained ontology for 
semiosis.  
 
2.3.1. Alternatives and denaturalization 
There are some viable ways to fulfill the task of defining the ontology of 
semiosis that do not require a constrained description of what there is when we 
talk about sign properties and such. For instance one may argue, contra the 
naturalist position that I have described above, that Peircean metaphysics pave 
the way for a maximalist ontology of causal phenomena involving signs. A 
maximalist ontology would be characterized by the preference to postulate more 
causal entities to explain other possible causal entities. For instance, we would 
be talking of a maximalist view if it considered that the possibility that some-
thing would ‘cause’ semiosis would be good enough to postulate it as a robust 
entity in its own system.  
Biosemiotics seems to be readily able to shift towards the direction of maxi-
malism, which stands diametrically opposed to the project of a constrained 
ontology as defined earlier. Maximalism is a way to express the project of an 
inflationary ontology, that is, claiming  
 
the existence of things unknown to ordinary sense perception and to common 
sense, indeed things that are invisible. [...] Moreover, these invisible things 
which the inflationary ontologist claims to have discovered are supposed to be 
supremely important” (Putnam 2004: 17).23  
 
As a matter of example in biosemiotics, we can consider Salthe’s personal 
‘naturalization’ program entailed by a hylozoic perspective (Salthe 2008), 
ascribing semiosic properties to basal levels by assuming property similarity 
between emergents and their causes. The hylozoic premise, however, already 
carries a large baggage that must first be explained away satisfactorily in order 
to proceed with set descriptions of reality. This premise is an a priori that shapes 
the whole theory.24  
Other forms of what I refer to as inflationary ontology can be seen in Nöth’s 
recent account of an ontologically robust symbolic growth based on “the Peir-
cean theory of semiotic evolution” (Nöth 2014: 184), postulating new properties 
                                                          
22 An example of that can be seen in Vehkavaara (2002) regarding Peircean concepts. This 
particular discussion strikes a chord with the discussion on the naturalization of 
phenomenology, as one can see in Roy et al. (1999) and in the criticisms by Zahavi 
(2004). The parallel cannot be followed in this space though, but our focus is much 
narrower. 
23 Putnam notes here that modern physics acts in a similar fashion, yet the things postulated 
by the inflationary ontologist are unknown to modern physical science, such as “Platonic 
forms” (Putnam 2004: 17). The caveat however is that realism also falls pray to forms of 
inflationary metaphysics (Van Fraassen 1980: 73). 
24 It is important to note that this particular view has found some adoption in emergent 
accounts of semiosis such as (Queiroz et al.: 2006). This is treated further in chapter 5. 
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for signs against what he calls the ‘culturalist’ objection (Nöth 2014: 180); 
Deely’s causal ontology of semiosis that derives in physiosemiosis (Deely 
2001), and in general, all accounts that attempt to construe sign relations within 




2.3.2. Laws and speculation 
I deem the view I am advocating in general terms as relevant not for the pro-
spect of naturalization of biosemiotic concepts itself, but because biosemiotics 
is already part of the process of a naturalized semiotics. There is no redundancy 
here, for this progress, if we can call it that, responds to the same logic with 
which perception and cognition are explored. That is, for semiosis to remain 
coherent, it cannot be taken outside of experience in any degree. The reasoning 
for such an assumption is that reducing the ontological baggage of presumptions 
such as the ones just described we end up with a reduced account of semiosis, one 
that may, again, reduce the categories of the Peircean sign to its bare bones –  
the logical subsumption of triadicity. That is, instead of postulating that since 
Peirce declared ‘Mind’ to be a property of all matter, we can embrace semiosis 
in its more conservative flavor as, for instance, grounds for (mental) represen-
tation in similarity and causation (Von Eckardt 2012: 35) or simply a wide 
ethological perspective on semantics. This way we would avoid extraneous 
forms of potential representations and limit semiosis and sign usage to grounded 
limits in biology.  
It would seem that a priori metaphysics,26 despite its explanatory power, 
cannot report credibility in the arena of biosemiotics without creating a 
conflicting situation between the idea that our causal entities lie one step below 
sign usage (giving it a robust composition and existence) and the weaker sense 
of representation or action. More specifically, if semiosis is taken to signify an a 
priori condition that subsumes all other conditions related to signs, we need a 
good argument to sustain our position that does not include the final ontological 
conclusion in its premise. By analogy, if we want a good-looking hat, we can 
only think it will look good on us for as long as it fits, perhaps considering that 
an oversized or an extremely small hat will be an inscrutable choice.  
To explain the ontology of semiosis, as we have seen thus far, some may feel 
the need to postulate additional entities for its actuality, or different hierarchies 
for it to work. However, if we assume that semiosis can be experienced and 
modeled (be it as mental causation via synechism, behavior or even in 
instrumental sign descriptions), its ontology is still up for grabs. Attempts at 
creating a consistent picture with the more complex aspects of Peircean thought 
                                                          
25 Synechism is seen by Deledalle as the metaphysical version of the three phaneroscopic 
universes (Deledalle 1978: 11). 
26 A discussion on the opposition of this type of metaphysics and naturalized metaphysics 
can be found in Allen (2012). 
26 
are nothing new,27 so instead of dealing with such specifics, we can imagine 
that the main strategies for postulating different ontologies of semiosis can 
move from teleological pertinence – that is, directed evolution towards 
anthroposemiosis (Koch 1986) –, causality (Deely 2009), emergence (El-Hani 
et al. 2009) to pansemioticism (Merrell 2010; Salthe 2007) and so on. It is hard 
to argue whether the metaphysical backgrounds are more or less contrived, but 
if anything, aiming for a reduction of these metaphysical devices helps in 
justifying our theoretical choices.28 Again, if semiosis can be explained as an 
experiential relation, there seems to be little reason to resort to fancy a priori 
apparatuses to explain relations beyond ontologically trivial descriptions. This 
doesn’t imply that the task of any (rather) naturalistic endeavor is simple. Quite 
on the contrary. In any case, it seems reasonable to think that, even when we 
impose semiosis as a radical fact for theories that deem sign usage as basic, we 
probably need to frame our explanations to be constrained on a specific, 
fundamental law, but “it is in the nature of fundamental laws that they are the 
end of the explanatory chain (except, perhaps, for theological speculation)” 
(Chalmers 1996: 74). 
The question is then, why should we accept an inflationary ontology such as 
the options that have been already presented when we can do without it? Maybe 
we can’t, and the attempt would be futile, but if this is the case, then bio-
semiotics becomes only a moniker for such high-level speculation. Accepting 
highly complex metaphysical mechanisms simply takes away from the highly 
complex base-level mechanisms in semiosis, even when we have reduced its 
definition and causes.  
 
 
2.3.3. Peirce’s expansion 
One possible reason for the preponderance of highly complex deliberations on 
an expanding ontology of semiosis may stem from Peirce’s own dedication to 
his cosmology and the ample body of work containing his system of meta-
physics. The project of unifying the Peircean system – from synechism and 
tychism to all forms of complexity and everything in between – towards a 
“more complex” type of semiotics has enough relevance for general semiotic 
and biosemiotic theory29 that it dominates the philosophical discourse, making 
                                                          
27 I have talked elsewhere (Rodríguez Higuera 2012) specifically about physiosemiosis 
with respect to Peircean elements. 
28 The other option being the expansion of metaphysical explanations in a maximalist 
sense. The limit is apparently arbitrary. As Putnam (2004) warns us about these “in-
flationary ontologists” (17), he also warns us about deflationary metaphysics such as 
reductionism and eliminationism (19). Balance, it seems, is hard to come by. 
29 Scholars of Peircean inclination such as Kruse (1990), Santaella (2001) or Houser 
(2013), to name just a few, take an integral approach to Peircean metaphysics and its 
central role in semiotics. This would, by virtue of its system, extend into a type of 
inflationary ontology, but each author would present a different account of the 
particulars. 
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‘Peircean’ metaphysical devices of the order when ascribing causal roles to sign 
elements and the organon connecting hierarchies, classes and possibilities, all of 
which can contain an extended ontology on their own.30 The dominance of 
Peirce in the field is positive to the degree that it creates analytical tools for its 
philosophical discourse, giving a coherent picture of potential concepts to 
explore. However, this dominance cannot bring the majority of explicantia for 
biosemiotic theories. As a matter of example, ancient atomism can be seen to 
have provided hints for scientific enquiry, but giving Democritus’s atoms the 
same ontology as that of current atoms in physics would be a disservice to both 
paradigms. This is not to say that Peircean metaphysics do not contain any 
insight worth exploring, but rather to show that with the changes that come 
from further developments, we need to see that the elements of our theories can 
also allow change in their philosophical characterization. Revisiting our beliefs 
regarding the inner workings of semiosis can accommodate further parti-
cularities we may bump into without having to ascribe our positions to hard-line 
Peircean metaphysics. Surely this can be contested too by pleading to either 
tradition or obscurantism, and while those options may be viable to some, they 
are hardly a final solution. On the other hand, it is not necessary to throw out 
the baby with the bath water, but we can surely provide more clean water for 
hygienic purposes. The question here is not specifically about Peircean cosmo-
logy in the end,31 but rather about the consistency of whatever we value as the 
ontological constraints of biosemiotic concepts.  
 
 
2.3.4. Conceptual issues 
Realizing that the concepts of metaphysics do not always lend themselves to a 
common and conclusive usage within biosemiotics, we have to be careful in 
how we try to understand the compatibility of exploring the metaphysics of 
biosemiotics and the concepts as used by biosemioticians. What must be made 
clear though is that theories contain assumptions, with biosemiotics being no 
different. More explicitly, even if we assume Peircean metaphysics to be both 
correct and providing the background for biosemiotics, we can still observe the 
‘inner workings’ of the theories by seeing how the concepts play out when put 
together. This is not to mean that semiotics is, ultimately, metaphysics, because 
that would be wrongheaded.32 Still, the concepts used in the more philosophical 
direction of the debate can have a relevant impact in how we do biosemiotics, 
informing the field about its own interpretative frameworks and how these may 
act when assuming, for instance, that biological functions are semantically 
                                                          
30 This is also one of the general criticisms Barbieri raises when it comes to institutio-
nalized biosemiotics (2015: 168). 
31 Vehkavaara (2007) presents a discussion on the problems of the application of Peircean 
metaphysics in biology. 
32  Chevalier (2015: 558) drives the point home when stating that there is no reason to assu-
me modality corresponds to sign triadicity in that the latter does not define the former. 
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efficient. The discussion the degree of interpretation that is given to bio-
semiotics is something that will remain pending, but for now we can at least 
focus on trying to put the analysis of biosemiotic models and the analysis made 
by biosemiotic models closer together. In this, then, the project of describing a 
clear, constrained ontology for semiosis is of the order. 
 
 
2.4. Causal closure 
An idea to explore, in the form of a thought experiment for analyzing the 
possibility of constraints, is considering the causal closure of the physical vis-à-
vis semiosis. It may be a charitable beginning, but it seems safe enough as a 
starting ground to discuss some issues concerning the establishing of the 
metaphysical background of semiotics. This is a good place to start as a rather 
intuitive assumption on the physical that creates some interesting situations for 
semiotics, at least for the sake of discussing the impact of these issues within 
the field. 
The causal closure of the physical states that “every physical event has a 
sufficient physical cause” (Van Gulick 1992: 160), which puts the idea of 
semiosis in an extraneous dimension, having the possibility to either assume 
thus that semiosis is sufficient physically speaking or that causal closure is not 
the whole story and that semiosis provides a different, unrelated layer of 
existence, as it were. The point is, if we think that semiosic properties, whatever 
we want to define them as, are not entirely physical yet dependent on basal 
conditions that by themselves are not entirely physical, then we have a paradox 
in our hands, and this incompatibility must be explained away in adequate terms 
with respect to the scientific knowledge of natural laws.33 The paradox, how-
ever, would be fatal to the monism implied by the Peircean ontologist as it 
would require the institution of a different substance that wouldn’t necessarily 
be physical. Even if we are committed to a deep synechistic principle, this 
gradualism will not save us from the difference between point A and point B 
and the causation of B by A.  
If we still want semiosis to be an element of our metaphysics, we need to 
state how it can be entailed given a causally closed world.34 In response, we 
could state that semiosis holds because the being of signs is a stable property of 
the physical, making either purely physical relational systems35 or removing 
monism from the equation. We could also state that there may be more funda-
mental laws than what can be gathered from the physical, making thus semiosic 
causality work as a base-level law. And we could also state that given a causally 
closed world, there must be a parallel, causally open world where semiosis 
                                                          
33 Note that this holds only if we ascribe semiosis or the entities that cause it to a basal 
position. 
34 Emmeche (2000) sketches an explanation to this problem. 
35 I will not delve into the problem of defining relation versus interaction for now, but it is 
a problem that demands some attention. 
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comes from. The problem is basically setting constraints to act in a logical 
manner.  
In general, ontological constraints should respond to the base-level laws that 
are already in place. Postulating a new base-level law requires both an enor-
mous effort and an enormous argument.36 The ontology of semiosis should aim 
at covering the gaps from this particular conceptual scheme, but aggrandizing 
its status ad absurdum leaves little to work with.  
Returning to causal closure and semiosis, while it may seem that there is no 
need to pit the two against each other, there are reasons to do so as well, for 
considering the former as a base-level suspicion and the second as a different 
base-level necessary fact, we can see that in the more specific issues of semio-
genesis this is far from a trivial matter, and a good enough reason to use it as an 
example of the problems of semiotic metaphysics, despite the self-evident 
problems of the premise of the causal closure of the physical. It is quite valid to 
ask ourselves if semiosis is causal, emergent or epiphenomenal, and what 
matters in this case is that the assumption of the causally closed physical world 
could set a strong limit on semiosic causality and a robust sign ontology. In fact, 
if we deal with semiosis as epiphenomenal, then we are left with a trivialized 
proposition on the need of a semiotic approach, a point that we are not willing 
to pursue.  
 
2.4.1. Objecting the principle 
If we retain the previous consideration of a causally closed world, a quick 
objection that may be raised can be found in the application of a ‘quantum’ 
model of semiosis in the way it is entailed.37 But not only is this highly specu-
lative, it doesn’t really answer to any question about the ontology of semiosis.38 
Of course this is mostly an issue about hard-line materialism not holding, and 
there is no need to discuss it here. What needs to be stated however is that 
objections pro obscurantism will not take us far. That is, the awe-inspiring 
complexity of physical phenomena cannot be used as an excuse to assume the 
inexplicability of semiotic phenomena, nor can it be used as the explanation to 
it. And we hardly need to base all of our theories on a priori principles. All a 
priori concessions have to be taken with the utmost care. The same physicalist 
principle of the causal closure of the physical, problematic as it is, provides a 
double case about why we should not necessarily accept wide ranging para-
                                                          
36 We can create base-level laws for everything, from economy to vacuum cleaners, but it 
will be hard to retain them as ontological base-level laws in the grand scheme of things. 
It is not plausible, for instance, to have a base-level law that only applies to vacuum 
cleaners while being in the same category as, say, gravity. 
37 Voetmann Christiansen (1985) presents a synechistic approach to quantum mechanics. 
More recently, Fernández (2014) has offered some generalizing ideas on habits and 
causation against a quantum backdrop.  There are certainly more examples of this trend, 
but these two, I believe, are representative enough. 
38 In a similar fashion, “when it comes to the problem of experience, nonalgorhithmic and 
algorithmic thought are on the same boat” (Chalmers 1996: 117). 
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doxical premises and why in the face of conflicting principles, our metaphysics 
should not expand towards uniting as many causes as possible (in the fashion of 
causal overdetermination), but limit the inferences by parsimony.  
 
 
2.5. Semiosis entailed 
I have avoided going into detail with regards to specific accounts of the onto-
logy of semiosis for the reason that detailed criticisms of each position would be 
a task of enormous proportions. There are no clear a priori cuts in the con-
struction of a semiotic theory, as semiosis may be evidenced by the fact that 
signs are indeed experienced. This makes matters more complex, for some 
elements may be ostensibly taken in support of a posteriori truths regarding the 
ontology of semiosis. If this is the proposed case, it is even harder to support 
any ontology of semiosis, considering that its triadic constitution may be taken 
as a random set, making the assumption fall again in the field of the a priori.  
Another issue that hasn’t been mentioned enough is that by assuming 
constraints over our particular object, we are making implicit metaphysical 
assumptions about the world. All theories must make base-level assumptions 
about the nature of the thing it studies. While in no way this is a decisive stance, 
it seems like a good policy to stop the escalation of issues with grounding our 
ontological constraints. It is not a matter of chance, evidently, and this is related 
to the commitment to the naturalization of concepts. Stating that Peirce was a 
realist does little in this respect though, and being vocal about this commitment 
is not in and by itself enough to provide a naturalized account of semiotic 
concepts. The point here is that despite the fact that we do make metaphysical 
assumptions when we accept some base-level laws, we should strive to reduce 
the extension of the metaphysical landscape of our added devices in semiotics.39 
The ontological commitments in different theories of (bio)semiotics should 
always be taken with a measure of caution. Surely the ontology of semiosis is 
and will remain open, constraints notwithstanding, and the methods for arriving 
at a certain metaphysical conclusion will vary wildly, considering the inter-
disciplinary nature of this particular perusal. But taking semiosis seriously 
requires some commitment to naturalized concepts. I am still taking this 
premise in a relativistic way, for it is hard to deny that semiotics has the 
                                                          
39 Without being an absolute guiding point, it still seems that “the entities of any special 
science are complex aggregate structures of the entities dealt with in physics, and there 
inevitably will be structural/compositional differences among entities falling under a 
single kind in any special-science taxonomic system” (Kim 2010: 300). The ‘laws’ in 
semiotics may not necessarily be rigid laws, but rather they are specified by the 
constitution of the discipline. But this point brings a different controversy, for semiotics 
in some forms does strive for universality through its particular perspective. The caveat 
in the end lies in whether we think that semiotics can discover anything about the world 
that happens to be at the same level as physical laws. 
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instruments to arrive at some ontologically significant conclusions,40 but when 
it comes to choosing a hat, we should see that it fits and hesitate at the offer of a 
dunce cap as a practical alternative.  
In the next chapter, we will examine the particular case of physiosemiosis as 
a working theory of semiotics and how it can be construed as an inflationary 
ontology that may prove challenging for a more parsimonious perspective on 
semiosis. This should present a relevant picture of a committed philosophical 
view from within semiotics that has some bearing on what biosemiotics can say 
about its object of study and, consequently, about what its premises are. 
  
                                                          
40 Putnam’s critique of Quine (2004: 84) is quite fair in that ‘our best scientific theory’ 
cannot be the end of the story and we can still provide some relevant insights from a 
theory that doesn’t occupy the base-level of all assumptions (avoiding supervenience as 
an explanation for the phenomenon), but I remain attached to the specific ontological 
constructs in semiotics as, at least, placeholders and support in the gaps that halt the 
progress of its theories. 
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3. THE PROBLEM OF PHYSIOSEMIOSIS  
FOR A THEORY OF MINIMAL SEMIOSIS 
The contentions for a semiotic threshold have been useful in the constitution of 
disciplinary boundaries when it comes to semiotics. But the general clarity of 
the issue of the threshold cannot be arbitrary. Eco’s introduction of the concept 
(1979) appears with more clarity in Nöth (1994) following an evolutionary 
premise. The relevance of the concept here is that it appears fundamentally as a 
way to give a more robust constitution to the study of semiosis as a fundamental 
object of semiotics, its origin and development. The semiotic threshold is a 
methodological instrument for establishing the potential boundaries of studies 
that proclaim the sign as its concern, and while it seems that “there can be no 
search for one origin of a field as broad as this one” (Nöth 1994: 1), this con-
cern is by itself a contentious approach in that semiosis can be a fundamental 
principle from which the disciplinary development stems. This is not to say that 
there can only be one type of semiosis, but rather that semiosis as a principle 
has to be taken seriously in the constitution of a disciplinary threshold. This 
particular problem brings out all sorts of related complications when dealing 
with what seems to be more developed layers of semiosis, such as those 
appearing as cultural aspects, thus this exploration will retain the biosemiotic 
aspect as foundational, that is, taking into account the so-called lower semiotic 
threshold instead of the higher distinction of the symbolic threshold (Deacon 
1997) or the possibility of an emonic threshold (Kull 2016). A particular 
problem that we find here is arguing for the exactitude of the claims at the lower 
threshold, however. This chapter will deal with the problem of physiosemiosis, 
the validity of the concept of threshold and the first steps to take towards a 
theory of minimal semiosis. The reason to take physiosemiosis as a claim to be 
examined comes from the way the claim is grounded as initial for all semiosic 
possibilities and because, as we will see, it counts as a developed metaphysical 
background – and one of the most developed systems at that – for some form of 
semiotic exploration. This is significant because when referring to how semiosis 
works at its most basic level, we deal with theoretical assumptions that can 
shape the outcome of our theories of biosemiotics, as we will see. 
 
 
3.1. Causality and causation 
The main normative principle I will use to describe theories of physiosemiosis 
is the distinction between prebiotic and postbiotic (Rodríguez Higuera 2012). 
Briefly, a theory of physiosemiosis is prebiotic if it assumes that sign action is 
effective without having to depend on actual organisms to be instantiated before 
even the existence of organisms, whereas a postbiotic perspective assumes that 
sign action can be possible based on organization, but modeled after them. I 
will only focus on prebiotic physiosemiosis here, as I think this is the area that 
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brings the most important discussion on the foundations of a theory of minimal 
semiosis. In particular, the hypothesis espoused by Deely (2001; 2009) is the 
main relevant axis for discussing the idea of physiosemiosis.  
In general, Deely’s theory can be described by the concepts of semiosic 
causality and virtual relations, the first being the causality proper to signs (2001: 
27)41 and the second being the specific instantiations of semiosic potentiality 
without any actual cognition.42 Both of these concepts give way to Deely’s 
assertion that semiosis can happen in nature before the existence of actual 
cognitive agents. Semiosic causality needs to be seen in the larger discussion of 
causality and causation.43 A descriptive stance of this causality is that it “speci-
fies vital activity but specifies also the causality at work in chance interactions 
of brute secondness [...] making present what it itself is not” (Deely 2009: 115) 
bringing thus signs to action. It is just as important to add that semiosic 
causality is seemingly distinct from physical causality and not necessarily 
teleological (115). This sets semiosic causality as an effective base-level law. 
The question whether semiosic causality and semiosis refer to one and the same 
thing needs to be explored further. If semiosis consists in the action of signs, 
and semiosic causality refers to the causality proper to signs, we may be in 
overlapping grounds terminologically, but this does not imply that one refers 
exactly to the other. A way to conceptualize this is that, given that there are 
potentially different types of specific semioses, there might also be a more 
general type of semiosis that predisposes the existence of said specific 
semioses. However, that doesn’t do justice to such a strong concept as semiosic 
causality. In order to clarify this particular issue, we might rely on the idea that 
semiosic causality works as the base-level law that allows semiosis to be an 
ontological property of the universe. A problem that comes from the previous 
formulation is that this causality implies a sort of dualism, for if semiosic 
causality is opposed to the physical, then it must lie on a second realm of exis-
tence. This perspective solves pretty much all of the problems of semiogenesis, 
for considering it as a base-level law implies that it is a principle that cannot be 
explored further. I am not convinced of this formulation because it seems like 
an unnecessarily powerful element, and while it does have large explanatory 
capabilities, postulating semiosic causality as a base-level law requires of 
something more telling than the fact that signs exist. But this is a point that 
needs further explaining.  
 
  
                                                          
41 I will use the concept of ‘semiosic causality’ to refer to this formulation. 
42 Nöth (2001) describes this as “the thesis that physicosemiosis is the potential of natural 
objects to be taken as signs” (17). 
43 I make this distinction in what I assume Deely (2001) implies, that is, causality appears 
to be a sort of passive situation while causation is an active stance. Since semiosic 
causality appears to be a type of universal (Rodríguez Higuera 2012), the difference has 
to be taken on the way causality is used as a measure of difference from causation. A 
similar point is made by Hulswit (2004). 
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3.1.1. Semiosis and laws 
Semiosis is the core element in all theories of semiotics, even if only implicitly. 
The problem of extending the powers of semiosis towards semiosic causality may 
not seem evident at first. In order to see these problems, it is necessary to observe 
the recourse taken in this extension. While the triadic formula of the sign 
apparently remains consistent, the fact that signs can exist indicates that there 
may be something about signs that needs to pertain to a base-level law for its 
effectiveness. The proposed evidence for this is the fact that elements in nature 
may introduce meaningful indications of something related to its past. Such would 
be the case of a dinosaur bone as proposed by Deely (2009: 119), bringing about a 
virtual relation. If this is possible, then there must be something about the 
universe that causes it, and being that interpretants are real and yet not physical, 
semiosic causality must lie on the opposite side of physical causalities.  
I mentioned that the triadic formula remains consistent, but this is not 
entirely certain. A reflection on the terms will lead to pointing out some 
identification of sign, interpretant and object with elements in nature that could 
perform those functions (even in a completely random setting one could apply 
this identification and conclude with some success that the elements have 
indeed been identified), but problems become evident once we attempt to verify 
these claims. If we take Deely’s previous example we have the dinosaur bone 
performing the role of the sign, its object being the actual dinosaur and its inter-
pretant the geological stone formation which used to be a bone (2009: 119), but 
upon closer inspection, it seems unlikely that a geological process per se 
consists of an interpretant given its mental nature. A number of options have 
been put forth in order to provide support for this idea of the interpretant,44 
namely the Peircean conception of mind from synechism (Santaella 2001: 49) 
and the claim of a “natural Mind” (Taborsky 2001: 92), which work as an 
attempt to present a viable variety of monism. In both cases the metaphysics 
involved require instituting a base-level law to explain another base-level law. 
In general terms, even if we are charitable towards this inflationary ontology, 
we are bound to face important issues. Most importantly, an extreme onto-
logical synechism such as the one required for the interpretant to work in a 
purely physical setting would require a series of mental operations that are 
actualized without any access to (complex) mental capabilities. In the case of 
the ‘natural Mind’, we face a similar twofold problem. First is the conflation of 
terms such as mind as it appears in different branches of cognitive psychology 
and philosophy with the idea of a different set of properties that resemble the 
more ‘standard’ conception of mind that is called ‘natural Mind’; and second is 
the insistence on such property being capable of embodying semiosis. What can 
be said about both cases is that they argue for mental functions to be natural, 
which sounds like a good bet. But they also argue for the existence of these 
functions in the non-living in an axiomatic form.  
                                                          
44 Though not necessarily supporting Deely’s hypothesis. 
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3.1.2. Panpsychism and pansemiotism 
In extremely general lines, panpsychism is simply “the view that everything is 
conscious” (Chalmers 1996: 150). Similarly, pansemiotism can be construed as 
the idea that “every process in our world is defined as a process of semiosis” 
(Nöth 2001: 15) or that “every thing or process in the universe as such is 
semiotic, that the universe consists of nothing but signs.” (Deely 2006: 162) 
Both concepts are necessarily interrelated, but do not overlap completely. This 
is important in that pansemiotism and panpsychism have very different out-
comes when considered ontologically. In the case of panpsychism, pansemio-
tism would most likely be an unavoidable result as a matter of reaction towards 
environments considering that if everything is conscious, there will be some 
type of perception and experience in everything, causing the possibility of per-
ceiving signs in everything. But if we take pansemiotism as the base assump-
tion, there seems to be a reversal of roles: The universe becomes intrinsically 
meaningful and reality becomes fundamentally noumenal. One idea that appears 
in pansemiotism is that interpretants can be implemented by physical systems 
without the need of cognitive processes.46 Taborsky goes on to state that 
 
The triad, as an irreducible process, includes codal processes that act to promote 
symmetry or cohesion. This is the referential focus, the representamen. And, it 
has two processes that measure instances or asymmetrical actualities; there is the 
measurement of the input energy, known as the object, which then becomes 
measured as the output, the interpretant. (Taborsky 2003: 11)  
 
Despite the more idiosyncratic concepts used in this interpretation, it seems that 
its implication is that the physical composition or appearance of an object will 
become its interpretant. It is necessary to stress that this relation is meta-
physically necessary in the way that it has been postulated. That is, no matter 
can appear to have a cohesive structure if it is not part of this relation. In other 
words, all matter comes to be because of semiosis. I have already dealt with the 
                                                          
45 Deely criticizes the concept (and the proponents) of pansemiotism because he does not 
believe that “signs are the whole story of everything” (2006: 162) so this does not apply 
directly to his argument, but it is still necessary to explore the possibilities of some 
potential supporting arguments. In this case, panpsychism provides a framework for 
physiosemiosis, even if it is not the variety that Deely himself espouses. 
46 A hint here is the quote that Taborsky takes from Peirce (2001: 88) stating that 
interpretants do not need to exist as long as they are taken for granted with regards to 
their future existence. This is certainly coherent with Deely’s statements about virtual 
relations as we have seen already. In any case, it is quite different arguing for nonexistent 
but future interpretants and for physically implemented interpretants, as we will see. 
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specifics of such an argument47 so what I will focus on here is in how this can 
be framed more generally under the concept of causality.  
 
 
3.1.3. Pansemiotism and semiosic causality 
Semiosic causality is not necessarily pansemiotic in that it does not require to be 
the only basic ontological constituent of reality. A different way to state this is 
that semiosic causality may be one of the basic causes of reality without 
excluding the possibility of others. Pansemiotism can be understood, however, 
as the conception of semiosic causality as primary, considering radically that 
semiosis is the foundational basis from which other elements come to be. How-
ever, a pansemiotic account can be taken as a variety of semiosic causality 
given its status as a base level law.  
In this way the general idea would be that semiosic causality is the essential 
law of existence, assuming that triadic elements can be implemented in purely 
physical interactions. But it would be the fact that semiosic causality is a base 
level law what would allow physical interactions to be fully implemented triadic 
relations. The premise itself appears described under the idea that the universe 
consists of energy, and as such “Energy is stabilized as a dimensional substance 
by being organized within codes of measurement. As measured in such patterns, 
energy is operative as “informed or interpreted” matter. The architecture of this 
transformation of energy into informed matter is semiosis or codification, which 
operates within a series of ontological and epistemological cuts that increase the 
asymmetrical gradients of energy which are then mediated or ’sewn back 
together’ by complex semiosic relations.” (Taborsky 2003: 5). This means then 
that, at least under this particular variety of pansemiotic semiosic causality, the 
only necessary condition for things to come to existence is that semiosis acts on 
energy.  
A pansemiotic account of semiosic causality will necessarily move the goal-
posts by reworking semiosis as a physical process (such as the ‘encoding’ seen 
here) and so the primary assumption becomes normative, depending on an 
extended approach to semiosis – usually attributed and defended as a Peircean 
claim – to articulate the base level law. The question whether applying triadic 
models to different situations and calling them by the same name is not 
whimsical, and this doubt may appear clearer if we are to consider how imple-
mentations may or may not work in this particular argument. One of the most 
important claims is that the concept of mind should be seen as natural law 
(Taborsky 2001: 92) instead of a cognitive disposition, a natural universal. This 
would be akin to renaming the process of walking ‘gravitation’ and further 
assuming that since there are two related concepts the both of them must be 
causally equal.  
                                                          
47 In Rodríguez Higuera 2012. 
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The first and more evident problem with pansemiotic semiosic causality is that 
it insists on an unnecessary base-level law. To this we must add the conflation of 
concepts and imposition of triadic models with whatever seems to suit the idea 
that semiosis causes things to be (in) the world. The resultant model simply 
contains too large a metaphysical apparatus to sustain its own claims.  
 
 
3.1.4. Non-pansemiotic semiosic causality 
A non-pansemiotic variety of semiosic causality as the one that was mentioned 
before has more strengths when construing an argument for extracognitive 
semiosis. Framing a more logical variety of causality, where something enacts 
some power over something else, the variety espoused by Deely does not 
construct a metaphysical apparatus that reworks all base-level laws, but adds to 
them. Semiosic causality here is a necessary aspect of base-level laws, but by 
being complementary to them – that is, at the same level – it does seem to be in 
a more acceptable condition.  
In general lines then, this semiosic causality relates to how a triadic relation 
can be implemented with the interpretant being only virtual and actualized later, 
bringing about a series of possibilities of description of the past and reference to 
a change in the future. This formulation is quite different to the pansemiotic 
semiosic causality, but the differences need to be further explored.  
The element of the vis a prospecto (Deely 2012: 12) provides part of the 
groundwork in making the action of signs effectively causal, but beyond issues 
related to time,48 it seems that the main application to this variety of semiosic 
causality lies in that referentially, the relation established in signs has the 
property of being implemented unrestrictedly by relatively independent means. 
That is, given that virtual relations are not actual but entailed in time, they do 
not need a present form to be considered semiosis according to this point of 
view. A different way to understand it is considering that elements inside virtual 
relations have the property of being able to cause an interpretant.49 
 
 
3.1.5. Things and objects 
Deely uses the concepts of things and objects as differentiated to relate them to 
an external reality and things that have become signs. Things are explained as 
"anything as existing whether or not any organism has an awareness of it" 
(Deely 2003: 8) whereas objects are defined as "anything cognized or known as 
                                                          
48 I will simply skip the temporal implications of the proposition because I do not think 
their application as a specific subset inside the typological construction of the hypothesis 
provides much in the way of an explanation and taking it at face value works for the 
most part in a straightforward manner, as I will try to show. 
49 This is akin to Nöth’s interpretation as it has been mentioned before. 
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such (anything apprehended in whatever way)" (Deely 2003: 8),50 which is 
coherent with aforementioned concept of virtual relations. The leap from thing 
to object could be explained by the advent of virtual relations. What this 
relation between things and objects doesn’t say though is where the limits of the 
things as translated to objects are set. If we are to work with these concepts as 
part of semiosic causality, then we must make the assumption that while things 
and objects cannot be the same, because perception is relative to the perceiver, 
they necessarily overlap to some extent, for if things can become objects that 
are related both to the thing and the interpretant, then there must be something 
about things that allows this process to happen. At a certain moment in time 
thing X may be perceived as object Y because of virtual relations, but since 
there’s no need for a cognitive agent to entail Y, X must has the property of 
being perceived as Y (as long as it happens to be in relation to a specific 
interpretant). Roughly, things have the property of being able to be perceived. 
This may sure not be an elegant way to put it, but it seems necessary to continue 
with the argument for semiosic causality.  
In order to make the assumption that one of the base level laws pertains the 
action of signs, and that the triadic relation cannot be active at all moments in 
time (because cognitive powers are not necessarily present in all situations), but 
that it must still hold in some way, then we need to either assume some specific 
and complex time relation that is not attractive not because of its counter-
intuitivity – this is not good enough a reason – but because of the implied 
requirements over other base-level laws that render them inviable; or we need to 
focus the proposition on the corresponding elements that allow it to be viable. I 
am of the opinion that this second option is less problematic when dealing with 
the argument, and so it would make sense to talk about semiotic properties as an 
ontological characteristic. If such is the case, then semiosic causality is partly 
entailed because semiotic properties would be part and parcel of the constitutive 
elements of reality. The relation goes then as follows: Given that all elements of 
reality have semiotic properties, that is, can be perceived as signs, it follows that 
semiotic properties are fundamental and shape their perception by a perceiver in 
a relation to the perceiver’s capabilities and the properties themselves. The idea 
is that “the sign determines the interpretant but determines it as a determination 
of the object. The interpretant as such is determined by the object insofar as the 
interpretant itself is determined by the sign” (Santaella 1999: 515).  
Semiosic causality needs to be thought of under the premise of semiotic 
properties to make sense of its status, and ascribing semiotic properties solves 
some conundrums related to virtuality. In this sense, we would be speaking of a 
noumenal reality whose connection to phenomenology comes to be via semiotic 
properties. However, the attempted distinction here is only a terminological 
shorthand because one of the attempts of the hypothesis on physiosemiosis and 
                                                          
50 A more complex treatment of this distinction can be found in Deely (2009a). 
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3.1.6. Phenomenal properties and supervenience 
One important point here though is that semiotic properties are not independent. 
That is, semiosic causality as a whole depends on semiotic properties and 
phenomenal properties of some sort,52 this being then the metaphysical neces-
sity implied by virtual relations. If we take the strong formulation of virtual 
relations under the condition of vis a tergo, it follows that phenomenal pro-
perties are necessary for semiotic properties to have an effect. In fact, there 
cannot be one without the other because of the temporal implications and 
metaphysical necessity as expressed above. These phenomenal properties need 
not be strong to work in the theory, and they certainly cannot simply emerge 
because of semiotic properties, for they are interdependent. If these phenomenal 
properties are not of a strong variety,53 we can talk about protophenomenal 
properties, which “are special properties that are not phenomenal (there is 
nothing it is like to have a single protophenomenal property), but that can 
collectively constitute phenomenal properties, perhaps when arranged in the 
right structure” (Chalmers 2015: 259).  
Something that stands out here is that by this argument semiosic properties 
entail some degree of panpsychism, which is clearly something not intended by 
the non-pansemiotic variety of the hypothesis. If we are to entertain this 
position, then we end up with two sets of non-physicalist ontological properties, 
and a serious case of property trialism. But the most important aspect to take 
home in this case is that phenomenal properties can take part in semiosis 
without the need of semiotic properties, which is a big drawback for arguments 
favoring semiosic causality. The problem stems from the fact that semiosic 
properties cannot entail phenomenal properties, but phenomenal properties do 
not need semiosic properties to be effective.  
To put it in perspective, we would need to consider the following: Semiosic 
properties need phenomenal properties to be positive in order to exist as a 
relation, but if we invert the order, phenomenal properties do not need of 
semiosic properties to cause a relation unless we deny the world except as a 
condition of the necessity between semiosic and phenomenal properties. If we 
consider phenomenal properties first, semiosic properties could be taken as an 
emergent process from the fact that there are phenomenal properties but they 
would not have the same ontological character. What’s even more troubling is 
                                                          
51 This attempt is also attributed generally to Peirce’s “radical antidualism” (Santaella 
2001: 50). The connection between mind, matter and causality from this perspective is 
further explored in Santaella (1999). 
52 I am considering phenomenal properties here as “properties characterizing what it is like 
to be a subject, or what it is like to be in a mental state.” (Chalmers 2002: 271) 
53 Even in this sense it would be hard to make sense of them from an outside perspective. 
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the fact that there is no need to have such properties because the characteristics 
of the external world are perfectly supervenient on physical facts. Semiosic 
causality cannot be nomologically necessary.  
The implication of this point is that perception, and thus semiosis, does not 
need to be established via a different fundamental law beyond the fact that there 




3.2. The association to a theory of minimal semiosis 
The main problem posed by physiosemiosis to a theory of minimal semiosis in 
biosemiotics is that the concept is too far-reaching and, as a base-level law, it 
simply doesn’t need to be considered in terms of minimal.54 It is nomological 
and that’s where it ends, for its explanatory capabilities can also comprehend all 
dominions under the same guise. But the fact that phenomenal properties do not 
need of semiosic properties to establish a relation towards the environment 
poses a bigger problem for physiosemiosis, hinting at the idea that semiosic pro-
perties are either not necessary or emergent from the physical in relation to the 
phenomenal, not the other way round. With this in mind, it seems necessary to 
explore the issues of emergence and supervenience to consider the way a model 
of minimal semiosis might work. As it stands, physiosemiosis is not only 
problematic, but it doesn’t bring answers with regards to the necessary con-
ditions of semiosis either, and it faces enough internal contradictions that 
prevent it to be a suitable candidate for both a base-level law and a condition to 
establish minimal semiosis in its current formulation. 
In the following chapter we will examine some questions on the description 
of semiosis once we have moved past the idea that semiotics describes fully 
fledged meaning from a prebiotic position. 
 
  
                                                          
54 Or maximal, for that matter. 
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 4. DESCRIPTIONS AND THE TASK  
OF NATURALIZED SEMIOTICS 
When confronted with the question of what you had for breakfast, you may 
reply, unfazed, that you had toasts with butter and a café au lait. You may also 
say that you had bread and coffee and leave it at that. This is hardly a proble-
matic situation, but it exemplifies an important characteristic of the academic 
endeavor. Our theories about the things we want to talk about will be defined by 
the way we frame our objects of study, and the act of framing implies a certain 
underlying theory we ascribe to when dealing with a particular field of 
knowledge. This is uncontroversial, and it is an important cornerstone of the 
special sciences.55 In the case of biosemiotics, however, the postulate that 
semiosis is central to the discipline seems at odds with the difference the 
concept receives in its description, with disparate properties and predicates that 
may pick out more (or less) than what might be expected from such a central 
object. And even though idiosyncrasies are not undesirable, there is a great gap 
between the core concepts of different theories of general semiotics that affect 
the way biosemiotic explananda are developed.  
The objective of this chapter will be to analyze what goes into describing 
semiosis from a general semiotics that accept biosemiotic premises, whether the 
concept of semiosis can be individuated, and whether we can exclude some 
forms of description based on their explanatory powers. 
 
 
4.1. The idiosyncrasy of the description of semiosis 
At its core, semiotics does not possess strongly fixed concepts because a great 
deal of semiotic terminology depends on the adherence to or rejection of some 
arguments based on the quandary of whether some concepts are compatible 
with some other concepts, mainly the Peircean and the Saussurean. This has 
been repeated ad nauseam throughout the history of semiotics as an established 
discipline,56 but for biosemiotics, this dilemma appears in a completely different 
way.57 When I talk about general semiotics, I wish to convey the idea of a 
semiotics directed to different applications, yet having as its basis the bio-
semiotic, that is, the “theory of semiosis in living systems” (Emmeche et al. 
2002: 26), which is an extremely wide guideline that provides a robust enough 
ground to intuitively consider it foundational, but this is an issue I will return to 
later. For a general semiotics that considers the validity of biosemiotics, the 
                                                          
55 In the sense of Fodor (1974). 
56 Take, for instance, Jakobson (1980 [1975]). 
57  However, some current efforts on consolidating and cataloguing the usage of relevant 
concepts to biosemiotics have provided an initial understanding of relevant differences in 
such concepts as agent and agency (Tønnessen 2015a) or Umwelt (Tønnessen; Magnus; 
Brentari 2016). 
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problem does not lie so much on the compatibility of founding schools, but 
rather on the way the elements of the theory of a general Peircean inclination, if 
we are to believe the extensive references in most of the current literature fit 
and provide explanatory power. That is, different perspectives in the area of 
biosemiotics will differ in how they treat the more general concept of semiosis. 
My claim, in any case, is that the core concepts of biosemiotics are necessarily 
the core concepts of any theory of semiotics, but this is something that can and 
will be disputed. It is because of that that this will not be a rundown of the 
different concepts of semiosis, but rather it will be directed to talking about the 
principles and properties that delimit or expand the concept.58 
It is important to note how the concept of semiosis is introduced though. 
Peirce, as we’ve seen before in Chapter 2, describes semiosis as “an action, or 
influence, which is, or involves, a coöperation of three subjects, such as a sign, 
its object, and its interpretant, this tri-relative influence not being in any way 
resolvable into actions between pairs” (CP 5.484).59 In a more modern setting 
though, a simpler (but perhaps just as ambiguous) way to put it is talking about 
semiosis as “the action of signs” (Cobley 2010: 318). General concepts serve 
the purpose of grounding some general categories and possibilities of the 
research program, but this doesn’t put an end to the discussion and starts with 
direct applicability, because the metaphysical underpinnings of different 
semiotic programs provide different frames that can (and should) be discussed 
according to what we may consider as their adequacy or necessity.  
In that sense, the first questions to ask are, why is the concept of semiosis 
necessary, what are the properties of this semiosis we speak of, and what does it 
explain. Core concepts of a metaphysical nature will tend to be idiosyncratic in 
that our definition of them will depend on what properties we want to accen-
tuate or even propose in order to make our theories work. And while abduction 
in the Peircean sense may make that idiosyncratic propensity a regular matter 
for our definitions, the inferences we make for our concepts could benefit from 
a context-based approach.  
In the conception of semiosis, we may want to use the original Peircean 
formulation to address the phenomenon of individuated apprehension of certain 
elements in the world. We may also want to consider whether this ‘tri-relative 
influence’ is in any sense nomological, that is, lawful, or we may want to justify 
our theories of reference by construing semiosis as a mechanism of cognition. 
                                                          
58 For a review of different possible conceptions of semiosis, even in the case of authors 
who never used the concept, Nöth (1990) provides a wide range of explanations. As 
mentioned earlier, Krampen (1997) also provides a thorough overview and represen-
tation of definitions. 
59 On the conception of the semiotic endeavor, Peirce considers it as “the doctrine of the 
essential nature and fundamental varieties of possible semiosis” (CP 5.488). It is im-
portant to see how this echoes with the division between general semiotics and the rami-
fications of the field. And it is more relevant when we consider that this basic formu-
lation can be construed as supporting the role of biosemiotics on at least the level of 
general semiotics. Talk on the semiotic threshold, however, has to be put aside for now. 
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While all these conceptual forms may share some points, they pick out different 
properties. In other words, they refer to different aspects of things that may not 
always correspond to the totality of a certain phenomenon. And this takes us to 
a different question about the nature of semiosis, whether it can have such 
properties at all. Deeper metaphysical considerations aside, a theory of general 
semiotics that accepts some level of biosemiotic premises has already made 
some commitment to specific grounds, these being the fact that signs are part 
and parcel of the natural world60 and that there is something about the world 
that allows us to speak of semiosis.  
 
 
4.2. Semiosis and the natural world 
The commitments that come from accepting biosemiotic premises can then 
inform our descriptions of the phenomenon of semiosis, but what matters is 
reaching a concept of semiosis that makes sense in the light of these com-
mitments. That is, if we accept biosemiotic premises, then we need to make sure 
semiosis is effective in different types of living organisms. In any case, semiosis 
is not detached from signs, not only because general definitions dictate it so, but 
also because it would make no sense to individuate them without considering 
the intersection between the elements composing our definitions. But can we 
individuate semiosis? The answer is nothing short of ambiguous. If we take 
relations to be the defining characteristic of semiosis, we will be able to state 
that it is the relations that form semiosis, and thus we may construe semiosis as 
a phenomenon that emerges from the elements that compose the relations. We 
may, however, oppose this and state that it is because of semiosis that such 
relations are possible, or we may consider relations as processes and take them 
to be ontologically sufficient.61 We may also consider ‘the action of signs’ as a 
causal matter, for if there is an action, there must be some formal entailment 
from signs to topology and not vice versa,62 a rather counterintuitive assertion 
that seems to invert a more minimalistic naturalist view, depending on more 
metaphysical devices. I have already argued for a commitment to deflationary 
ontology when dealing with semiosis, but it is important to state how necessary 
it is for the same naturalist commitment of biosemiotics. If a theory of general 
semiotics accepts as true some of the principles of biosemiotics, then the same 
commitment to naturalization has to be accepted as true, eliminating the 
unjustified a priori conditions that could explain other facts about the world. 
More generally, I think this point is valid as a way to deal with our context-
                                                          
60 This should not be confused with a full naturalization of the elements in semiotics, as 
some of the elements in these explanations may retain aspects that are beyond the scope 
of naturalization with regards to base-level laws. 
61 Bains (2006), following Deleuze, offers a discussion on the topic of the modality of 
relations against apparently ‘essentialist’ philosophies. 
62 That is, when the material conditional S → T is true and it is not the case that S is true 
and T is false. 
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based assumptions regarding the nature of semiosis. If we allow that semiosis 
exists in some form, we also have to consider what properties it has, and if we 
allow that at least some biosemiotic premises are true, then we have already 
made some assumptions regarding semiosis.  
It is important, still, to avoid mistakes in categorization, for if semiosis hap-
pens to be a process of signification in perception of living organisms, we cannot 
call semiosis a mode of existence of signs as well, for both definitions, if they are 
part of the same theory, will not amount to the same, picking out different 
properties that only have some things in common without necessarily referring to 
the same object. It seems that the form of the widest possible definitions imply a 
specific type of action, and whether we are dealing with prefixes or not, we 
cannot ascribe the same object to different definitions without running into one or 
more problems. Let’s say we consider the ‘action’ definition as the basic property 
of semiosis. By stating that semiosis is the action of signs and giving it a causal 
form, we may wonder what the parts are in this causal relation. If semiosis holds 
as a sign causing a sign, we may be tempted to give some agentive power to 
signs. Notwithstanding the seemingly correct formulation, there is a lot left out 
when taking this at face value. By assigning agentive power to signs, we are 
putting a weird form of an argument that says that a sign has, on its own, power to 
act on the world. So not only does the sign exist, but it is also an independent 
entity (that is, non-relative and non-relational) that has the power to influence the 
world according to the previous claim of entailment. This brings a lot of 
questions, many of which do not seem well focused, especially those related to 
the modality of the sign. If at the same time we argue that there’s a prefixed type 
of semiosis (such as, say, the semiosis of TV ads), how is this supposed to make 
sense under a literal form of the ‘action’ definition? Not that this argument cannot 
be construed, but it makes little sense to explore it by making two independent 
concepts work as if they were one and the same.  
 
 
4.3. Semiotics and the special sciences 
An important question that could possibly help in dealing with such definitions 
is considering the role of semiotics among other ways to know about the world. 
This evidently refers to how deep semiotics goes in the chain of disciplines. 
Does it explore laws over which allegedly everything else can be construed 
from, much like physics? This issue has more to do with how we perceive 
reduction and reductive explanations in semiotics.63 We will talk more about 
reduction later on, and for now we will focus on the possible levels of 
explanation given to biosemiotics. Again, the significance of this discussion is 
that it allows us to understand the implications that follow from assuming, for 
                                                          
63 We may reject this idea, but that would entail rejecting the biosemiotic commitment to 
the naturalization (at least to some extent) of the ideas applied in semiotics, which would 
imply scrapping any deflationary ontology in favor of an inflationary perspective. 
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instance, that semiotics describes something so fundamental as to stand as a 
measure of the coming to being of things, or the limits of biosemiotic expla-
nations when taking the concepts we use seriously. First we will explore a 
‘causal’ level to ask whether it is justifiable to talk of a fundamental semiosis 
much in the way we explored it in the previous chapter, and then proceed to a 
‘non-causal’ level that is more limited in its explanatory power. 
 
 
4.3.1. Causal level 
The first matter to explore is, if we consider semiosis to be a fundamental 
element of the world with other elements explainable through it, then that 
means we may be able to reduce other matters to semiosis. On the other hand, 
we can also wonder whether semiosis itself can be, at least partially, reduced to 
some sort of physical truths. If semiosis corresponds to a base level law, we 
may have to adhere to the necessity that can be inferred from Peirce in his 
statement about semiosis. In order to analyze the plausibility of this claim, we 
need to consider how higher order phenomena can be reduced to signs. Intuiti-
vely, this implies a type of pansemiotism, that is, the reduction of everything to 
signs. The poverty (or extreme explanatory power) of this alternative makes it a 
less plausible claim. However, we may try to salvage the claims if we construe 
this theory not as a singular causality but as one among others, such as some 
sort of physical causality. But a justification can be hard to find in this particular 
case. If we consider that “any instance of a higher-level phenomenon occurs by 
being realized by a lower-level phenomenon, and it can therefore be explained 
in terms of its underlying realizer” (Kim 2010: 210), then we should be able in 
principle to explain higher-level phenomena through a semiotic explanation,64 at 
least to a certain extent. We need to make this compatible with the metaphysical 
claim that comes form Peirce, this meaning that in order to achieve a semiotic 
explanation under this account, we would need to secure the nomological 
ground of the “tri-relative” influence. Things get all the more complex here, for 
taken at face value, the Peircean predicate seems to be extremely general, thus 
making the task of securing truth fairly easy. Yet, if we try to protect the 
unresolvable tri-relativity, then we need to find a way to avoid reducing the 
elements of any of its element to other type of causal relation. 
In order to see if this holds, we may imagine any sort of relation in the 
physical world and then invert this and see if it is possible to do so in a ‘semiosic 
world’. If we take the implementation of semiosis first proposed by Deely (2010: 
119) and assume this unresolvable triad to be ‘dinosaur’-‘dinosaur bone’-
‘geological stone formation which used to be a bone’, we need to see how these 
elements can be held as a necessary law. But this implementation fails to 
represent a law, for even if we agree that the elements present at some point can 
be seen to need each other in a way that we could call nomological, the elements 
                                                          
64 We may also be aware that a higher-level phenomenon may receive more than one 
reductive explanation (Kim 2010: 210). In principle, this doesn’t harm the argument. 
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in the alleged relation do not need the other elements.65 The objects in the relation 
are not metaphysical simples and can be realized purely physically at least in one 
part of the relation. But even more importantly, not all dinosaurs and their bones 
have become such geological structures. It is highly plausible that many of the 
bones left by dinosaur corpses did not become the same type of geological 
structures, exemplifying interference from below and precluding so the 
construction of a law based on this relation. In other words, “conditions at lower 
levels such that were they to occur, the law would not hold” (Kim 2010: 295). 
This, however, may be obscured talk on paleontological generalizations and as 
such we may not find truths regarding semiotic facts. A different example may be 
of use using simpler elements. Say, we may want to follow the lead from the first 
example, but applied to microphysical entities. Maybe our example could include 
individual photons, assuming such entities to be metaphysical simples.66 But how 
can we conceive of such a relation when dealing with microphysical truths or 
metaphysical simples? The problem with attempting this exemplification is that 
metaphysical simples will not be precluded from existence if they are not under a 
relation.67 At a glance, it seems hard to sustain a perspective like this, and in many 
cases it would depend on higher-level objects to make the relation sustainable, 
falling again to the previously mentioned issues.  
 
 
4.3.2. Non-causal level 
At this point the desire for a different way to deal with this situation seems 
completely natural, and so we would do good in considering a higher-level type 
of interaction, so to speak, in order to get either some form of reductive 
explanation of semiosis, if that is what we are after, or a type of regularity that 
does not need to be as strong as a causal law, which is as good an alternative as 
any. For this to work, we need to construe semiosis without the constraint of 
ontological irreducibility of the “tri-relative influence”, for even though this 
would apparently go against Peircean doctrine, it is not that radical a change. 
The indivisibility that is presupposed in the formula does not need to be part of 
the ontological plane. In fact, doing away with this principle from an onto-
logical perspective does not affect multiple possibilities of implementation of 
semiosis in the natural world. I say implementation, however, because if 
semiosis cannot be construed coherently as a base-level law, then it must 
                                                          
65 Or rather, it is conceivable that we can remove one of the items without destroying the 
others. 
66 This follows the assumption made by Kim (2010: 301). 
67 One alternative to this is accepting that no metaphysical simples are possible; or that all 
metaphysical simples are triads. This seems unlikely for at least some level of reduction 
is intuitively apt to break the relation, returning to the ‘interference from below’ argu-
ment. A second alternative would be accepting some for of idealism, as it would make 
the mental instantiation of signs necessary even in these cases. 
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supervene on at least some microphysical facts,68 instead of causing them. If 
this holds, we may then have to give up the idea that semiotics deals with laws, 
for semiosis is not only supervenient on such facts, but given this, it is also 
multiply realized. Thus semiotic properties are higher-order properties,69 that is, 
causally heterogeneous because of its realizers, making the object of semiotics 
then “ineligible to enter into projectible generalizations, that is, laws, thereby 
failing to represent a homogenous causal kind” (Kim 2010: 308). From a 
different point of view, we may consider siding with a commentator of Peirce in 
the supposition that “all hypothesis somehow involves seeing a resemblance 
between the case to be explained and some general rule” (Rosensohn 1974: 95), 
especially if we consider that “what is supposed in hypothesis is that the 
explicandum is an instance (case) of a certain general rule” (95). If this is the 
case, then we have a reason to reject the previous arguments, perhaps stating 
that we do not have access to the adequate vocabulary to achieve ontologically 
unresolvable triads, but as we will see later, this is just as problematic. 
The tension between these positions is related to nomothetic considerations, and 
we have not completely ruled out the discovery of laws from within semiotics, but 
considering the plausibility of the claim of multiple realizability when it comes to 
semiosis, then the chances of finding laws are marginal. To put it differently, the 
problem lies with the implementation of semiosis and the way the elements in 
semiosis do not have a single principle in their constitution. Elements taking part on 
the sign relation can be achieved through different means, and this will be even 
clearer when we consider the variability of the interpretant.70 What is interesting is 
that this does not preclude any form of odd implementation of semiosis without any 
cognitive capacities. We have only moved from the claim that it is a base-level law 
to the claim that it is a higher-level phenomenon.71 
But if semiosis is indeed a higher-level phenomenon, does this imply the 
possibility of reduction? Not necessarily. Yet this needs some explanation. We 
may have the tools to argue for a partial supervenience of semiosis on the 
physical, but this does not imply that the whole of the relation or relations is 
univocally so. Since we are not talking about causal phenomena in the sense of 
base-level laws, we might find ourselves in conflict with the possibility that 
semiosis could be implemented only through physical means. When we 
consider, however, the mental (or cognitive) aspect of the description of signs, 
we seemingly end up with something that is over and above the physical, thus 
irreducible in the previous terms. In any case, we have not made any particular 
                                                          
68 However, as we’ll soon see, this is not a definitive claim, for semiosis could not be 
reduced nor identified solely with those facts. 
69 In other words, special-science properties. 
70 Collier (2014) presents a discussion on this point. 
71 I have not factored in matters of time in the discussion, because I believe these can be 
discounted from the analysis without actually affecting the conceptual outcome. Co-
unterintuitive claims that deal with changes in the time flow have to be taken carefully, 
though, and they can be taken to work as a type of a posteriori necessity. For the sake of 
brevity I have considered the intuitive view on time to be correct. 
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statement with regards to nonphysical entities in the world, leaving some 
ground for inflationary ontologies to take place. However, following Chalmers 
and Jackson, we could stipulate a “minimal world” (2001: 317) satisfying the 
conjunction of microphysical truths. This would make purely physical triads a 
viable alternative, but if we couple that with perception in cognitive agents, then 
it is not the case that semiosis can be fully explained in those terms, because 
then we would have to argue for the coherence of having two different pheno-
mena as one. That is, a postulated physical interpretant72 would necessarily have 
to be the same as a mental interpretant. That, in turn, would open a new set of 
problems with regards to the reduction of the phenomenal. 
If we set aside the so-called physical interpretants for now,73 we are left with 
mental interpretants (of the cognitive type). This matters because it allows us to 
envision the description of semiosis without an expanded metaphysical machi-
nery to make it work, in a way closer to an expanded theory of mental 
representation, an ethological perspective or a wide hypothesis of perception. 
Since the idea of this chapter is not bringing a specific description, but rather 
the theoretical problems and principles of this task, it seems that making this 
assumption presents the right opportunity for descriptions to take place.  
 
 
4.4. Talking about descriptions 
After considering the first problems of trying to argue for a fundamental 
semiosis and the situation with semiosis as a higher-level phenomenon, we may 
feel compelled to accept the second one as a more viable alternative for the 
descriptions to use in our semiotic theories. The implications then are, first, that 
semiotics can count itself among the special sciences, if that’s how we decide to 
call them. This grouping is desirable for the intent of critically assessing the role 
of biosemiotics when set within the larger crucible of related research.74 On a 
hierarchical aspect, this is far from a “downgrade”, as it allows for more 
cohesion when considering general semiotics and its prefixed varieties (though 
this does not close the gap between them). But it is also a disciplinary reality 
check, and quite a needed one. A second implication is that by limiting 
ourselves to a higher-level description, we are making more grounded bio-
semiotic assumptions that are coherent with our commitments to some degree of 
naturalization in the discipline.  
                                                          
72 I use this as a general idea derived from the type espoused by Deely (2001a: 657), for 
instance. A different account linking the physical interpretant to Peirce’s energetic inter-
pretant can be found in Sarbo et al. (2011:43); however, the two concepts are not to be 
exchanged freely. 
73 In order to reconsider this we also have to examine the possibility of instantiating 
semiosic relations in physical systems, and there is a difference between prebiotic and 
postbiotic possibilities. 
74 A criticism to the concept of special sciences can be found in Millikan (1999), but I 
believe lumping biosemiotics with the non-physical sciences, be those special or 
historical, instills the same point I am trying to make here. 
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There are some things that have been left aside in this chapter. One of them, 
as it has already been mentioned, is the issue of time concerning base-level law 
theories. It may be the case that this “tri-relative influence” is not meta-
physically contingent and that assuming it so means falling for a modal illusion, 
but this would have severe consequences that would be better captured in 
determinism of a wide spectrum of phenomena.75 As it is though, there is not 
much we can take from this area to solidify the counterintuitive view.  
Another aspect that has not been touched is the discussion on sign cau-
sation,76 so to speak. While the Peircean framework seems apt to work as a 
theory of reference, the question about the action of signs leaves another way to 
investigate the problem of semiosis as a lower-level phenomenon, for we can 
contrast sign causation with mental causation, and it would seem that there 
could be an opening for agency in signs or objects to cause signs. But roughly, 
this view would be incorrect, for topological aspects of the world need not be 
construed through an agentive stance. By having a cognitive element in the 
description of semiosis, there is no need to propose an actual ground of sign 
causation (from the side of signs) if the minimal conditions for signs to exist 
can be given without it. A different, but related discussion could take the argu-
ment towards the expansion of semiosic properties, but this would also be a 
mistaken enterprise, for if we follow the previous idea of topology, said 
semiosic properties would not have any precedence over, say, phenomenal 
properties, with the latter being sufficient to dismiss the former.77 
A final aspect that could be expanded is the problem of implementation of 
semiosis in nature, the specific forms of description and its requirements. The 
point has been to give an explanation of the forms that the description of 
semiosis can take and how biosemiotic premises seem to be of the essence for a 
general theory of semiotics. The boundaries we use in our theories must 
correspond to the explanatory possibilities of the discipline, and the expansion 
ad absurdum of said explanatory possibilities can only be detrimental to the 
health of the discipline. 
In the following chapter we will focus on the concept of emergence as a way 
to make sense of the point of origin of semiosis. The philosophical explanations 
that come from the concept and its tradition should be examined in the light of 
their relevance to biosemiotics as a means to describe a possible basal con-
ception of semiosis, essential to the continued discussion on some of the 
essential topics of biosemiotics. 
                                                          
75 In a nutshell, all semiotic phenomena would be ruled by this form of necessary deter-
minism, a claim that can hardly be substantiated from within semiotics. Still, a different 
perspective on time can be found in Matsuno (2011) 
76 Not to be confused with causality of signs. 
77 This is not a definitive form of the argument or a definitive explanation, and it can be 
contested using an inverted formula with regards to phenomenal properties vs. semiosic 
properties. I will not explore this further here, but it seems to me that using the opposite 
form of the argument stumbles with the problems I have already mentioned with regards 
to base-level laws and semiosis. 
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5. JUST HOW EMERGENT  
IS THE EMERGENCE OF SEMIOSIS?78 
The origin of semiosis is an elusive and complex topic that demands some 
attention. In defining its origins, we may talk about its diachronic dimension, 
that is, the original conditions for its first emergence, and its theoretical dimen-
sion, the ahistorical conditions needed for its existence. In the philosophical 
exploration of the topic we have to consider what emergence really refers to, 
what does it have to do with a definition of semiosis and whether there are 
alternative accounts to the idea of an emergent semiosis. As an option, we can 
have a non-emergent account of semiosis within a different framework, either 
assuming it as basal and setting the conditions for other elements to emerge; in 
reductionist semiotics; or in an account of biosemiotics that only requires the 
heuristics of a sign relation. In this chapter we will only review the former, but 
we will mention the latter in passing as a contrast to the possibility of emer-
gence. For now though, reduction theses will be abandoned given their proble-
matic requirements for complete identity claims with regards to the semiotic: If 
one is to reduce meaningful phenomena to identity claims on the physical 
world, we are left without a biosemiotics to begin with. Emergence is, for the 
purposes of biosemiotics, of definite relevance in that it makes some philo-
sophical issues apparent: That if we talk about some point of origin of sign 
action, we need to address it conceptually, and that when we do, we make 
metaphysical assumptions regarding either the constitution of signs or their role 
in biological systems. This in turn translates into further assumptions about 
ontology that may derive in incompatible accounts of sign action depending on 
what our initial standing is. As such, it is useful to take into consideration the 
concept of emergence – whether we assume it to be correct for our theories of 
biosemiotics or not – as an avenue for exploring the presuppositions made by 
biosemiotic research, and that the problems faced by the concept, if treated 
within biosemiotics, will also have to be overcome by the discipline. The best 
way to deal with this is, then, by exploring the basic tenets of emergence and 
see where they take us with regards to semiosis. In this regard, what we will 
treat will again be only limited to the so-called lower semiotic threshold, our 
focal point for understanding claims about minimal semiosic capabilities. 
 
 
5.1. Emergence and Biosemiotics 
The concept of emergent properties, while common in the philosophical discus-
sion on the origin of life and mind, has been historically less problematized in the 
study of biosemiotics. This may have to do with the programmatic approach 
stating that biosemiotics deals, among other things, with “the emergence of 
                                                          
78 A version of this paper has been published on Biosemiotics 9 (2): 155–167. 
51 
semiosis in nature, which may coincide with or anticipate the emergence of living 
cells” (Emmeche 1992: 78).79 In other words, it would seem that emergent 
accounts of semiosis are some of the de facto preferred explanations for sign 
action.  
The philosophical nature of this concept certainly requires a wider characte-
rization, but in a nutshell, it refers ‘to the idea of ‘new properties’ showing up in 
systems of sufficient complexity’ (Stjernfelt 2007: 218). The relevance of the 
concept to biosemiotics becomes apparent when considering Sebeok’s axiom 
that life and semiosis are coextensive, as the origin of one will yield information 
about the other. This is not the end of the story, for in any case the axiom itself 
can be problematized as well as its relation with emergence. Semiosis could 
prove to be epiphenomenal to life in the same way that mental properties may 
be epiphenomenal to certain physical causes, but for the sake of brevity we will 
not engage in this argument.80 
 
 
5.1.1. Characterizing Emergence 
The history of emergence in philosophy is varied and interesting in its own 
right,81 but the current literature focuses on a conceptual form that can be 
applied to both epistemological and ontological or metaphysical aspects, the 
first being related to the unpredictability of an emergent property, and the 
second, to the bringing about of new causal powers that did not exist previous to 
it (Kim 2010: 13). This distinction has also been called weak for epistemo-
logical emergence, and strong for the ontological or metaphysical one (Kim 
2010: 86). Chalmers defines these two concepts more specifically by stating 
that “a high-level phenomenon is strongly emergent with respect to a low-level 
domain when the high-level phenomenon arises from the low-level domain, but 
truths concerning that phenomenon are not deducible even in principle from 
truths in the low-level domain” (Chalmers 2006: 244),82 whereas “a high-level 
phenomenon is weakly emergent with respect to a low-level domain when the 
high-level phenomenon arises from the low-level domain, but truths concerning 
                                                          
79 It is important to note that this same description has been referred to in Brier (2010: 369) 
and Martinelli (2010: 194). Kull (2007: 4) also includes it among different approaches to 
biosemiotics. I will not try to document all possible perspectives, as it is beyond the 
scope of this research. The idea is, in any case, that the emergentist foundation of bio-
semiotics seems to be unproblematic except in its actual implementation, as we will later 
see. 
80 The arguments against the epiphenomenalism of mental properties could be reworked 
into arguments against the epiphenomenalism of semiosis stating, for instance, the 
relevance of sign processes for living systems, as opposed to the qualitative irrelevance 
needed to make the epiphenomenal argument work. This, however, is a different 
discussion altogether. 
81 See Stephan 2002 (25–26) for a historical survey of its stages in philosophy. 
82 While the language used by Chalmers in this initial definition talks about ’phenomena’, 
the concept of emergence deals more often with properties. 
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that phenomenon are unexpected given the principles governing the low-level 
domain” (Chalmers 2006: 244, emphasis in the original).  
This points to the fact that the two different varieties of emergence will play 
a certain role in defining what exactly it is we are dealing with when referring to 
the emergence of semiosis. Emergence should inform our views on what 
semiosis is and how it comes to be, and at the same time, the standing of our 
previous definitions of semiosis will also have a role in how we begin to frame 
emergence within biosemiotics. This is so because in postulating a conceptual 
apparatus for biosemiotics, we can revisit our initial assumptions in order to 
explore their validity, leading thus to the possibility of reformulating both 
concepts and assumptions in the theories we espouse.  
In making a finer distinction between both weak and strong emergence, we 
can see how they diverge in a number of important areas, and what their 
implications may be for biosemiotics. In the case of strong emergence, we can 
further add that, at least in standard accounts, properties are said to be strongly 
emergent if they supervene on basal properties, that is, "if the same basal 
conditions recur, the emergent property will recur as well" (Kim 2010: 88).83 
While supervenience on its own may sound like a platitude, its effect in the 
argument is of strong importance. Say, the property of being round may 
supervene on the property of being a ball, this being a trivial form of the argu-
ment. When we refer to supervenience in the context of strong emergence, we 
mean that in an ontological sense. Mental properties, seen under strong emer-
gence, would not be explainable to any degree even with a complete physical 
description of the brain. Strong emergence then would present an interesting 
philosophical option for biosemiotics when dealing, for instance, with meaning 
and its obtaining in the biological world if we can work an argument for that.  
Weak emergence, in expanding the distinction between both the strong and 
weak versions, presents a more moderate case for speaking of emergent 
properties. This is so because we are only limited by the amount of knowledge 
we have about the potential properties that may emerge from a system, and with 
enough knowledge we could deduce the emergence of these properties based on 
their basal conditions. The main difference is that there are no deep ontological 
commitments as the ones that come with strong emergence. Weakly emergent 
properties may play a number of roles in biosemiotics linked with the study of 
complex systems, as we will see later on.  
As this is not intended as a full exposition of the philosophy of emergence,84 
we will only focus on the main possible tenets of emergence for biosemiotics, 
their development and the possibilities they offer.  
 
                                                          
83 Supervenience itself, also called upwards determination, appears commonly divided in 
three different types, weak, strong and global, related to possible worlds (Kim 1984: 
157). We will limit our talk on different types of supervenience to the common usage in 
standard discussions of emergence. 
84 A better place to look for such an exposition can be found in Kim (2010), Deacon 
(2011), or from a more general semiotic perspective, Szívós (2008). 
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5.1.2. What is a semiotic emergent? 
Given that the current discussion lies on the context of biosemiotics, the 
question of what should be an emergent must be limited to the scope of semio-
sis. But can semiosis be an emergent, or should we focus on the particulars of a 
semiosic relation as individually emergent? Both possibilities must be explored 
in this case. What’s more, both cases can be presented under the scope of strong 
and weak emergence. 
In a systematic exploration of what semiotics deals with, starting from the 
Peircean perspective, one may be reminded how the semiotic endeavor is based 
on the study of the nature of semiosis and its varieties (C.P. 5.488), and that 
semiosis is the equivalent of the triadic action of the sign (C.P. 5.472). This 
much is made clear from a historical perspective by Nöth (1994). Peirce is 
essential for biosemiotics in that his conceptions of representation and meaning 
provide a robust background for the study of significative phenomena in the 
biological world that could otherwise not be attained by, say, considering 
chemotaxis as the ultimate indicator of mechanical action that resembles 
meaning. The idea that sign action comes into play even at the low levels of life 
is of the utmost relevance for the project of a naturalized semiotics – of which 
biosemiotics by definition takes part –, piecing together the main tenets for a 
more extended and robust philosophical background for general semiotics. To 
fit emergence in this picture, we have to analyze what elements would exactly 
be emergents and to what extent, ontologically speaking. Of note is Peirce’s 
belief that “the problem of how genuine triadic relationships arose in the world 
is a better [...] formulation of the problem of how life first came about” (C.P. 
1909, quoted in Romanini and Fernández 2014: 2), setting a strong precedent 
for the enquiry into the emergence of semiosis.85 The concern regarding the 
possible point of origin of semiosic phenomena is embedded in the idea that we 
can apply our theories on signs to different levels of biological action86 to the 
degree that we can inquire into the reasons behind the study of signs itself. 
Peirce himself considers at one point that universal laws have an evolutionary 
origin (C.P. 6.13) which leads to their lack of an absolute character. Kiblinger 
(2007) argues that this view on laws has an immediate convergence in a view of 
biological emergence87 in that mechanical laws can only explain homogeneity, 
with the biological world abundant in heterogeneity (195). In this sense, 
emergence can aid us with finding specificity in some relevant topics for bio-
semiotics such as the differentiation between species and the value of meaning 
beyond basic mechanisms.  
                                                          
85 While it appears that Peirce considers chance as the best possible explanation, there is no 
reason in principle to stop there, as his remarks on evolution may suggest other possibi-
lities. 
86 A notable contribution in this respect has been carried by El-Hani et al. (2009). 
87 The author refers to Kauffman’s view on emergence, but these claims can be generalized 
without much trouble. It is important to note, however, that Kauffman is associated with 
weak emergence. 
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We may assume then, in general, that the idea of a semiotic emergent may 
have to do with either the elements of the sign relation being emergent to some 
degree, or to some conception of meaning as emerging from sign action. In both 
cases, there are interesting ramifications and implications to consider. In this 
chapter we will mainly treat the sign relation (object-representamen-inter-
pretant) in order to analyze the usefulness of emergence for biosemiotics. Let us 
then first consider the triadic relation of the sign as a general account of 
meaning.88 Strong emergence may reformulate it in such terms as to state that the 
terms of a sign relation may supervene on a lower domain, that is, objects (in the 
sign relation) would supervene on some (possibly physical) properties without 
itself being derivable from them. We will examine this possibility later on.  
When framing the sign relation in terms of weak emergence, the treatment 
we have to give it will depend on whether we think that meaning emerges from 
sign relations (requiring us to give a separate account of meaning) or that sign 
relations qua meaning weakly emerge from a lower level domain and that we 
are missing some possibly physical details about how the terms of the sign 
relation come to form a relation in the first place.  
A theory of emergence may help us explain how either a relation or the 
objects of the relation come to be, whether they can be explained independently 
and if they form a domain of their own. In the rest of the chapter we will refer to 
semiosis as both a strong and a weakly emergent phenomenon and see how 
these claims can be cashed out for potentially competing views in biosemiotics. 
In what follows we will take semiosis as the prime candidate for an emergentist 
account and respectively examine the plausibility of strong and weak emer-
gence for it.  
 
 
5.1.3. Semiosis as a strongly emergent phenomenon 
If we are to consider semiosis as a strongly emergent phenomenon, then we 
must find how it is not deducible from the initial conditions. Now, the issue 
here is assuming what the initial conditions could be. The Sebeok axiom works 
as a guideline in at least making the case that semiosis must have started at the 
same time life did, but this is certainly not enough. Why should we accept that 
principle? It could have been the case that semiosis existed well before the first 
living things ever came to be, as theories of physiosemiosis argue. However, if 
we want a prebiotic semiosis, we need to argue for the sustainability of a 
relation, which hits the key issue: being that semiosis is a relational phenome-
non, we need to find how the elements fit the picture. For the sake of clarity, we 
may simply try to analyze the possibility of an abiotic sign, understood as a full 
triadic relation. With Champagne, we see though that “for a sign to be truly 
abiotic, confirmation that a sign-vehicle and object are abiotic does not suffice, 
                                                          
88 We will avoid the issue of representation and reference altogether to skip extra comple-
xities in the argument. These aspects can, however, play a role in more developed 
accounts of cognition within an emergentist framework. 
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as the interpretant which such a pair produces must likewise not depend on a 
living entity” (Champagne 2013: 286).  
The Sebeok axiom seems then safe enough an assumption for the sake of the 
argument. The point of making it a question of emergence still remains: How do 
we begin to deduce that with life comes semiosis? If we tweak the question to 
ask if it is possible to have a living agent without semiosis, the negative answer 
seems intuitively clear.89 If there is a perceptive agent, it seems unlikely that it 
would perceive without the instantiation of any sort of relation. But we can 
exemplify this with, say, the chemotaxis of Escherichia coli swimming towards 
glucose. Stjernfelt argues that “the cell’s behavior forms a primitive, if full-
fledged example of von Uexküll’s functional circle [...] connecting specific 
perception signs and action signs. Functional circle behavior is thus no privilege 
for animals equipped with central nervous systems” (Stjernfelt 2007: 207).90 
This points to the fact that semiosic relations can be determined by the com-
position of elements in the semiotic system, i.e., the perceiver and its environ-
ment. 
If we move to the elements that conform a sign, there seems to be nothing 
about, say, a rock, that would imply its future becoming of an object. We may 
then ask whether there is such a thing as semiosic properties and if they are 
emergent. If we decide to shift the argument to properties, then we have to be 
clear about the possible properties we may want to postulate, and the clearest 
indicator would simply be the property of being an object, a representamen or 
an interpretant. Since we are dealing with the strong sense of emergence, we are 
most likely dealing with a set of phenomena that require new fundamental laws 
for their explanation (Chalmers 2002: 245) given the impossibility to use only 
the base level for their deduction. While some supervenient relations supervene 
with logical necessity, such as for instance being round metaphysically super-
vening on being a ball, others may be contingent, as supervening on a nomo-
logical law does not make the supervenience relation metaphysically necessary, 
for one may conceive of a law that is metaphysically contingent (McLaughlin; 
Bennett 2014). We may make a modal distinction in how we analyze the sign 
relation and say that semiosis holds with logical necessity, that is, it is 
necessarily true by definition. This would leave emergence out of the picture if 
we assume that the terms of the relation do not map into specific properties of 
the elements that may come into it. However, we can assume that the elements 
in the relation cannot be basally necessary but contingent in that they are not 
determined. Instead, they are heterogeneous and open to difference, which 
would mean that even if we can have a relation hold without emergence, we 
                                                          
89 At this point it is important to remark that, while inextricably related, the question of the 
emergence of life is not the same question about the emergence of semiosis. 
90 Stjernfelt carries out the rest of the analysis of chemotaxis through biosemiotic 
terminology, reaching the striking, yet not unexpected conclusion that “in the perception-
action circle of a bacterium, we find some of the minimum requirements for semiotic 
processes: the self-regulatory stability of a metabolism involving categorized signal and 
action involvement with the surroundings.” (Stjernfelt 2007: 209) 
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could still have an open possibility to examine its elements as strongly 
emergent. Can we say that an object in a sign relation is strongly emergent? 
Taking into account that an object in a sign relation does not need to be a 
physical thing as long as it is part of an instantiation of said relation, and 
considering that in Peircean terminology the object is “that for which [the sign] 
stands” (C.P. 1.339), we may have to give some thought to the possibility that 
objects may be accounted for as abstract entities independent of any 
psychological power enabling the relation. The problem we face with 
postulating a strongly emergent object independently of the sign relation lies in 
that the object depends on the relation to be an object itself. It goes beyond the 
issue of accounting for an abstract object. If we wish to preserve objects as 
strongly emergent, our research must lead towards establishing certain 
properties that may be unique to objects. However, it would seem that the being 
of the object is always accidental in the sign relation,91 that is, it is possible for 
things to be objects, but this is not due to their objectness so to speak, but to 
factors that come into play from a multitude of other sources. It would seem that 
arguing for a strongly emergent object92 presents hardships that go beyond the 
scope of this chapter, however there’s a possibility of salvaging it via certain 
specific properties such as topology that could map into object-like properties, 
at least in an initial stage.  
The case of the representamen may show a different picture, and so it also 
deserves some examination. The representamen, that “horrid long word” (SS 
193), defined as something having the “character of a thing by virtue of which, 
for the production of a certain mental effect, it may stand in place of another 
thing” (C.P. 1.564), presents a special problem on its own. Being defined partly 
by the properties of the object and of the perceiver, we have a representamen 
that comes to be because of the instantiated relation. If we use a simple physical 
instantiation of the object, it will be both the topological properties of the object 
and the constraints in the observer that will give rise to the representamen. The 
property of being a representamen then falls into the possibility of other things 
in place. If taken like that, is it strongly emergent with respect to the sign 
relation? If we want to argue for that we would need to make a case for a 
specific way to account for the representamen not as determined by the other 
terms of the relation. As such, it seems a strongly emergent representamen 
should supervene on the sign relation, but this seems rather unconvincing in that 
the sign relation would be then basally a dyad. Perhaps a supervenience claim 
should be avoided in this case as it may easily be dismissed as a type of trivial 
logical necessity. However, a strongly emergent representamen could also carry 
a special emerging ontology if we can assign it to a certain class of representa-
                                                          
91 Yet, once the object is part of the relation, we see that the relation, while not determined 
simply by it, needs it to exist. 
92 The difference between dynamical and immediate object does not have an impact on this 
conclusion as both are taken in the same relation. 
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mina,93 most likely by also providing a ground for different ontologies in the 
rest of the sign relation. 
As for the interpretant, that is, the “significate outcome of a sign” (C.P. 
5.473),94 its being remains determined by the conditions of the representamen 
and constraints in the perceiver, but also, one could argue, to other factors that 
may play a role in the conditioning of the perceiver as a secondary type of 
determination. That is, the interpretant is not independent, but presupposes a 
twofold organization with the sign relation and the history of the perceiver. The 
abstraction of the interpretant in the logic of relations does not do away with the 
need of a certain history of the system. This point is reinforced by Kull when he 
states that an “important property of semiosis, which makes it different from 
physical processes, is its historicity together with the ability for learning” (Kull 
1998: 303).95 The interpretant is defined by the relation, but the relation is not 
defined by the interpretant, at least from a point of view of its basic constitution. 
The task of a taxonomical approach towards semiosis and its possible types will 
not concern us for the time being, but suffice it to say the program of potential 
taxonomies is very much open to both its development and criticism.  
The interpretant can be expressed in a number of forms without requiring a 
mental concept, making the term an abstraction for referring to the grounding of 
a semiosic relation. This is an elementary point to biosemiotics (Stjernfelt 2014: 
13) and it is met with a need for complementarity referring to the description of 
the system instantiating the interpretant. Again, arguing for specific properties 
in the sign relation can be done, but it seems that these elements taken separa-
                                                          
93 The option for physical representamina is explored by Deely (2001) a different philo-
sophical perspective, but it is worth noting that the language used is perfectly valid in 
this particular formulation. 
94 This quotation is far from straightforward. Peirce goes on to state that “the example of 
the imperative command shows that it need not be of a mental mode of being.” (C.P. 
5.473) This passage, in any case, discusses causation in different levels, starting with 
microscopic animals and continuing with verbal military commands, from where the 
reference to imperative commands comes. While naive in his psychological interpreta-
tion, it seems Peirce points to the fact that the interpretant is wider than the concept of a 
mental image or idea. A discussion on this passage can be found in Hulswith (2002: 
140–143). 
95 An important passage from the same text states that 
 
Semiosis, more shortly, could be defined as the appearance of a connection 
between things, which do not have a priori anything in common, in the sense that 
they do not interact or convert each other through direct physical or chemical 
processes. However, as far as the relation between them, once established (by a 
subject), is nevertheless intermediated by physical or chemical processes, this 
infers that the relation is semiotic as long as it is established through learning 
(Kull 1998: 303–304). 
 
 This is something to keep in mind when dealing with the possible properties of semiosis 
as an emergent phenomenon. The hierarchy between the elements of semiosis is not 
equal, despite the necessity of every element once the relation has been established. 
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tely bring more issues to the ontology of semiosis by apparently requiring 
multiple differential ontologies. If there can be a cohesive ontology for different 
types of strongly emergent properties, there is a chance such a view can take off 
as a more robust ontology for semiosis.  
Perhaps, however, a more viable strategy is to argue that the sign relation 
altogether is strongly emergent from a set of conditions, not just in its co-
extension with life but as part of the non-biotic world too. This is rather vague, 
so if we wish to preserve semiosis as strongly emergent, we need to make our 
case more specific. El-Hani et al. (2009) argue in one of the few instances of a 
defense of strong emergence of semiosis that, given an evolutionary set of 
natural laws – following Peirce – everything can be explained away in evolu-
tionary terms containing a certain degree of indeterminacy. This is construed 
within a hierarchical structure for describing modal states of affairs, where 
emergents are “explained as the product of an interaction taking places at lower 
and higher levels” (140). Some of the further problems to be tackled in such 
propositions can be summed up in a robust ontological categorization of 
hierarchies, a demonstrability of non-trivial non-deducibility with regards to 
semiosic phenomena and a reevaluation of axiomatic premises derived from 
Peircean cosmology.  
A final option, and perhaps the most controversial one within this specific 
section, could be the idea that natural laws may strongly emerge on sign 
relations, as hinted by Romanini and Fernández (2014).96 While interesting, 
such an inversion of terms would go beyond the scope of this chapter, but it is 
still worth mentioning as an alternative to explore in further research. After 
having reviewed strong emergence,97 we will now examine the possibility of 
weak emergence for biosemiotics. 
 
 
5.1.4. Semiotics and complexity 
As Bedau notes, weak emergence “is now a commonplace in a thriving inter-
disciplinary nexus of scientific activity (sometimes called the “the sciences of 
complexity”)” (Bedau 1997: 375), and this claim has some bearing on some of 
the research programs involving biosemiotics. The connection between bio-
semiotics and complexity science has grown into the integration of specific 
paradigms and their application to theoretical biosemiotics as it can be seen 
from Deacon’s influential work (2011) and the more recent approach of 
Kauffman to semiotics (2012), to name only some of the more relevant sources.  
                                                          
96 The original quote states that “the laws of nature, which are all expressible by differential 
equations, might be semeiotic at the bottom, although of a degenerated kind” (Romanini; 
Fernández 2014: 3). 
97 J. H. van Hateren (2015) also proposes what he calls “a strong form of emergence” (403) 
of meaningful phenomena, but the argument proposed only seems to require weak 
emergence to hold. 
59 
This connection is far from being fortuitous, as the different research pro-
grams in biosemiotics include topics that are cross-disciplinary by nature. In 
Faria’s overview, “our understanding of biological meaning, complexity and 
contingency is intimately linked to the theory of organic codes in Biosemiotics 
by one hand, and to some account of multiscale emergence formulated by 
sciences of complexity and philosophy of sciences by the other hand” (Faria 
2007: 352). This link between biosemiotics and the sciences of complexity in 
their many flavors corresponds to the exploration over emergent phenomena 
without the common problems associated to strong emergence in the philo-
sophical literature.98 
Among the biosemiotic literature explicitly related to or taking from the 
sciences of complexity, cybernetics and systems sciences, notable examples 
include Wheeler (2006) and Brier (2008), and it has been thoroughly docu-
mented in Cannizzaro (2012). Since this is not a historical overview, this 
account should by no means be taken as comprehensive, as many efforts 
regarding complexity and cybernetics are being undertaken from different 
biosemiotic perspectives. The point I am trying to make here is that there is a 
very palpable interest in weak emergence from biosemiotics, even if it is not 
explicitly stated as such. For instance, Markoš has recently stated that “Emer-
gence is a process creating complex systems spontaneously, “out of nothing”, 
from a singularity in some unstructured homogeneous system, and repeatedly 
under specific conditions” (Markoš 2014: 495) in the context of describing 
living systems as semiotic systems. This specific case sets some important con-
ditions for the analysis of the possibility of emergence in living systems, and I 
believe it is firmly footed in the ‘weak emergence’ camp. We may recall that 
weak emergence “refers to the aggregate global behavior of certain systems 
[which] derives just from the operation of micro-level processes, but the micro-
level interactions are interwoven in such a complicated network that the global 
behavior has no simple explanation” (Bedau 2002: 11–12). When we deal with 
repeatable, ‘specific’ conditions, we are already committed to at least the 
possibility of a principle of deduction99 and thus our emergents will come in a 
weaker form.  
It is important to note that weak emergence “does not yield the same sort of 
radical metaphysical expansion in our concept of the world as strong emer-
gence” (Chalmers 2006: 250). A landmark example of weak emergence comes 
from the Game of Life, a cellular automaton model originally devised by John 
                                                          
98 In brief, Bedau maintains that “although strong emergence is logically possible, it is 
uncomfortably like magic [...]. But the most disappointing aspect of strong emergence is 
its apparent scientific irrelevance.” (Bedau 1997: 377) On the contrary, “science 
apparently does need weak emergence.” (Bedau 1997: 377) 
99  This may not turn out to be true if we hold that repeatable specific conditions do not 
need to have any explanatory value for emergents in that the property would not be 
deducible even if we are aware of what it takes for it to emerge. However, the fact that 
the specific initial conditions can be understood and even derived indicates that there 
may be a chance to reduce the possible emergents to monadic properties of some sort. 
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Conway (Gardner 1970) which makes an interesting case for unexpected and 
hard-to-deduce outcomes in a simple system.100 How much of this applies to 
semiosis is nevertheless a matter of discussion, as the apparent differences 
between a rule-based simulation of cellular automata and the elements of semio-
sis may have very different outcomes and require slightly different approaches 
in their analysis. The point, in any case, is that evolutionary patterns in cellular 
automata may display a high degree of complexity in contrast to their simple 
underlying laws (Berto; Tagliaube 2012: 5), but this does not imply an over-
and-above distinction of properties. The ‘rules’ of semiosis being established in 
the need for its elements provide a case for an immense variety of outcomes, 
something that can be attested to by the different attempts at sign typologies,101 
showing that at least in principle, the abstraction of sign elements does not need 
an extraordinary ontology to produce an ample repertoire of possibilities.  
The important question here is then, how do we frame semiosis as a weakly 
emergent phenomenon? If the assumption that some background conditions are 
necessary for semiosis to exist – namely, a type of interpreter, an environment 
and habits inter alia – there is not much to add: Semiosis would be an emergent 
process by virtue of the predetermined conditions. I think, however, that this 
misses the point of the abstraction itself, not because it cannot be a weakly 
emergent process (or because it may be a strongly emergent process), but rather 
because it is conceptually true to the terms in the whole system where semiosis 
can exist. This, however, constitutes a different paradigm from the emergentist 
account of semiosis, and one that should be taken into account when dealing 
with the ontology of semiosis.  
Another matter to consider is whether there is any form of causal power 
from sign action towards the lower levels. The concept of downward causation 
has been of ample relevance for the discussion of weak emergence, being 
defined as the idea that emergent properties may “be able to exercise their 
causal powers “downwards” – that is, with respect to processes at lower-levels, 
levels from which they emerge” (Kim 2010: 25). This conceptualization should 
drive home the need to postulate emergent properties to begin with as the point 
is that their interest lies in them not being trivial or non-causal.102 Taken as 
such, downward causation has been postulated in biosemiotics through concepts 
like Hoffmeyer’s semiotic causation, the kind of causation “of bringing about 
effects through interpretation” (Hoffmeyer 2007: 152). Here the resultant effect 
of a sign relation would read as there being something that can presumably act 
                                                          
100  Conway’s Game of Life has some important traction in the discussion of determinism 
(Dennett 1991), but this must be set aside for the time being, though it can have some 
interesting and serious implications for biosemiotics. 
101  A good introduction to this type of research can be seen in Nöth (1990: 107–114), 
however, there are many specific variations and elucidations on the Peircean theme and 
its extension, such as the ones in Farias and Queiroz (2007) and Borges (2010). 
102  Similarly, there’s a conceptual difference between resultant and emergent properties, 
with the former being predictable unlike the latter. Regarding the extent to which 
downward causation is actual causation, a review can be found in Hulswit (2006). 
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upon the physical world after a sign relation has taken place. Giving a 
constitution to such causal powers is not trivial as it depends on overcoming the 
challenge of the causal closure of the physical, where every cause can be 
derived exclusively from physical causes. Either one must reject this causal 
closure or explain how certain causal powers that are not physical can be 
compatible with it (Macdonald; Macdonald 2010: 148). Downward causation 
can, however, bring enough explanatory power to biosemiotics that its strengths 
can outweigh these problems if they can be worked out. Emerging sign cau-
sality centered on a premise of complementarity of the physical with sign 
relations without reducing one to the other nor postulating a different base 
ontology has been defended in certain programmatic approaches to biosemiotics 
(Pattee 2005; Hoffmeyer 2007), but it remains to be seen if these so-called 
causal powers can be explained further in postulating a weakly emergent 
account of some sort of semiosic properties.  
In any case, the view that semiosis is causally relevant for biological pro-
cesses is one that has been held as productive in the exploration of the emergen-
ce of meaningful phenomena. Downward causation plays a formal role in 
defining then how emergent properties may have a causal role, however it does 
not explain exactly how they get there. The issue with non-reductive mate-
rialism, while still standing, has to be addressed head-on for a weak emergence 
framework to move forward within biosemiotics. 
 
 
5.2. Reaching Semiosis 
Both types of emergence present their own cases for exploration while also 
being faced with important philosophical obstacles. We have reviewed the main 
tenets of a potential emergent framework in its strong and weak flavors applied 
to semiosis. Strong emergence, being ontologically anomalous, confronts a hard 
problem in providing concrete cases,103 but its semiotic application may allow 
us to provide a wide account of multiple semiosic phenomena by exacting a 
mechanism of ontological difference. The propositions in this area must still 
face scrutiny in the biosemiotic literature, ideally through a wider understanding 
of the implications of strong emergence for the ontology of semiosis.  
The case of weak emergence, seemingly the more common avenue for pro-
posing an emergent account of semiosis, doesn’t present the ontological 
problems of strong emergence by its being construed epistemologically. 
However, the problems delineated above must be overcome to reach a more 
concrete, non-trivial view of emergent meaningful phenomena.  
While it is important to note that there are ways to make arguments from 
both sides of the divide, it seems that biosemiotics lends itself more naturally to 
weak emergence, itself appearing compatible with notions of weak emergence 
                                                          
103  Chalmers sees consciousness as the only case of strong emergence (Chalmers 2006: 
246). 
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of meaning without any special ontologies, that is, without further complicating 
the main metaphysical assumptions of a biosemiotic theory. Though this doesn’t 
mean it is not possible to give a strongly emergent account of semiosis, the 
problems faced when taking that route have to be weighted in regarding its 
plausibility and principles for validation.  
Despite the interest in and explanatory power of emergent accounts of se-
miosis, as it was mentioned before, there are non-emergentist options as well. 
Semiosis, taken outside of an emergentist framework, could be held as a logical 
truth characterized in the following way: The elements of the sign relation are 
real abstracts pertaining to a secondary level of analysis that can only be 
brought about with some underlying preconditions. This secondary level of 
analysis is logical in that its constructions and consequences are immediately 
deduced from the conditions established in the premises, at least at the abstract 
level. The point is that it should be logically impossible for a perceiver to exist 
without semiosis if we define signs through the abstraction of their elements. 
But for this logical relation to hold, there is a necessary semantic precondition, 
the actuality of the perceiver. The perceiver here is still to be taken lato sensu, 
but the logical picture still holds. One way to think about it is by drawing a 
comparison to tautologies. There is no logical possibility of a married bachelor, 
and in the same way, though less straightforward, the elements of the sign are 
true by virtue of the fact that they are the natural composition of perception at 
its most abstract.104 Could we argue for contingency in the sign relation itself as 
opposed to talking about the contingency of the elements in the relation? The 
idea that we could have a representamen without an interpretant should 
intuitively be answered in the negative, but that doesn’t preclude the possibility 
of an argument in its favor.  
The options of strong, weak and non-emergence can all provide competing 
accounts of semiosic phenomena, yet all of them are grounded in metaphysical 
assumptions. In examining and characterizing those assumptions, we can rein-
force our theories of biosemiotics to have a critical philosophical understanding 
of their implications and points of contingency, while also making a dialogue 
between poles clearer with conceptual distinctions taking a central role in how 
we frame the basic elements of sign action. This opens several avenues of 
research that can have a lasting impact in both the philosophical arena of bio-
semiotics and its potential modeling of sign relations in the biological world. 
The different examples in emergentist accounts of significance in the biological 
world, such as Deacon’s work on autocells or autogens (Deacon; Sherman 
2008; Deacon 2011) or El-Hani et al.’s conception of a hierarchical strongly 
emergent semiosis (2009), provide us with a great deal of research with a strong 
                                                          
104  There is a different issue altogether with whether we should characterize all semiosis as 
perception. This will not be treated here, but in principle I do not wish to characterize all 
forms of sign usage, especially at the higher levels of cognition, to be based on the same 
principle. See Marcus (2001). 
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philosophical dimension that can play a role in further articulating theories and 
models of biosemiosis. 
In the next chapter we will treat the concept of modeling, making use of a 
concept of minimality to analyze what it takes to give a parsimonious account 
of semiosis, how to deal with the object of modeling and how this is treated 
within biosemiotics. The issue of models is an essential topic across the diffe-
rent branches of semiotics, and one that has a deep impact in the way we 




 6. MINIMAL MODELS AND MINIMAL OBJECTS105 
Models deal with the abstraction of objects – of a specific science, for the most 
part – in order to bring analyzable elements to the forefront and constrain the 
possibilities data gives in order to present a congruent picture of the object and 
the theory behind it. Note that objects are not defined in specificity or mate-
riality, but rather as the phenomena that can be investigated through certain 
means. What this means is that the objects of our models will not necessarily be 
grounded in specific material objects such as vacuum cleaners or footballs. This 
chapter will attempt to give an overview of what a minimal model can say about 
its object while retaining the character of a model. But as there is no talk of 
models without their respective objects to a certain degree, I will occupy myself 
with the conceptual divide between a minimal model and a minimal object, both 
of which occupy a very different philosophical space but that must come into 
play in a relation that we must account for in our theories. Doing so will make 
philosophical commitments clearer and open new avenues for considering both 
consequences and applications of said theories.  
The relevance of questioning, discussing and applying minimality is part of a 
larger debate on the principle of parsimony applied to different sciences. As we 
are concerned with semiotics, the issue will address the concepts of model and 
object from this particular standpoint, that is, without entering the realm of 
scientific models in physics and so on. With this in mind, there is a number of 
things to be discussed on the general relation of scientific models and semiotic 
models that can do much good to our understanding of models and objects, and 
that perhaps will helps us in considering whether minimal aspects are of any 
relevance to semiotic theory.  
 
 
6.1. The Meaning of Minimality 
The first question that may arise from these concepts is the proper definition of 
minimality. What do we mean when we say that something is a minimal some-
thing with respect to something else? The concept of minimality is intuitive 
enough that we can imagine a minimal model to be the least complex bundle of 
elements possible capable of accounting for the object or objects of our 
theories, and while this basic definition will be what works in practice for the 
remainder of the text, we first must clarify some of the nuances implied in its 
formulation.  
For starters, minimality will be informed by the mode in which we are 
operating. That is, when dealing with models, we invariably refer to the 
                                                          
105  A version of this chapter has been published as Rodríguez Higuera, Claudio J. 2016. 
Minimal models and minimal objects. In: Rodríguez Higuera, Claudio J.; Bennett, Tyler 
J. (eds.), Concepts for Semiotics. (Tartu Semiotics Library 16.) Tartu: University of 
Tartu Press, 234–248. 
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epistemological ground on which we are making certain mereological assump-
tions about the object (in the sense of how we frame and divide this object in 
itself). This in turn is not independent of some previous conception of the object, 
but what we think of as the objects of our theories – something that can be 
modeled by them – will require a different mode of characterization, the 
ontological one, no matter what our specific commitments to their ontology is. 
This point should be basic: That objects and models are not one and the same. 
While the questions pertaining the characters of models and objects will be taken 
up in the following sections, it is important to understand what the limits to each 
can be in order to know how both can be undertaken adequately by our theories.  
Certainly, minimality is not a necessary condition for either, but it is a 
desirable element in a constitutive approach to any discipline for more than just 
elegance (without discounting the role this plays). The desirability of mini-
mality is directly related to the mereology allowed by our theories. That is, to 
what degree we are allowed to create sets of different elements without running 
into internal contradictions, for minimal aspects bring about some core issues 
and questions regarding that which we talk about. Take, for example, an 
imaginary science about, say, pointy objects. We could be persuaded to include 
in our analysis a set containing the Eiffel Tower, a drawn triangle and a bee 
sting. The question then is what we do with such objects in our theory. Let’s 
imagine that this science about pointy objects, or SAPO for short, only cares 
about the ontological property of something being a pointy object. Then we 
would need a definition of a pointy object, and this is where we see minimality 
in operation. Defining the core issue of the science at hand will lead to a 
number of constraints that make the operation of theories effective. So if we 
define ‘pointy object’ as ‘anything that could cause a stinging pain if you touch 
it’, we would have a base model for SAPO. This base model would then allow 
us to investigate the elements in the set we defined previously, and we would 
find that the set could possibly be invalid due to the Eiffel tower not necessarily 
causing a stinging pain if you touch it around its legs. But is the set we chose 
invalid for SAPO or is the base definition we gave in SAPO invalid? This 
apparent contradiction leads to an opening of the base ground that requires more 
definitions based on a number of questions. But then again, we could partially 
resolve this issue by providing a number of answers to questions regarding who 
is the perceiver of said stinging pain and what shape would be needed for 
considering something to be pointy. An answer to both requires some degree of 
consensus, but it is evident at this point that only having one positive result in 
one will not yield enough information for the model to be valid. 
 
 
6.1.1. Validity of minimal aspects 
How do we reach a value of minimal validity then? What does it take for some 
theory or model to be minimally valid? For one, definitions set the main 
constraints, so validity has a semantic component to it. That is not to say 
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validity is set purely by the semantic values of the definitions in our specific 
science. Instead, there is an added component that goes without articulation in 
the definitions of our sciences. So in the case of SAPO, the questions we 
previously raised will yield specific answers that at the same time will have 
some previous constraint to them in the way we define the questions as well. 
When we talk about the ‘pointy objects’ of SAPO, we evidently refer to a 
previous definition that aims to open its own investigation. However, these 
terms are rather fuzzy and give way to conceptual puzzles. Fuzzy initial 
definitions must be coupled with questions of applicability and coverage then, 
and even at that point, if we are dealing with partial concepts, we will incur 
more potential contradictions. If this is so, then it seems minimality is nowhere 
to be found, as most of the questions will give way to a different question. 
However, minimal aspects, contrary to the previous idea, are available as part of 
the ontological commitments of the theories, including the definitions and the 
questions we ask about them. To expand on this, the sciences present their 
domains as limited to a certain range of questions. It would be unusual to ask 
about, say, the study of vacuum cleaners and ask questions about its minimality 
in recursion to the point of reaching a discussion on fundamental physics. The 
question of regression, however, is one of the fuzziest areas of the endeavor and 
we will return to it later.  
How valid would it be to establish a minimal character for SAPO, and what 
would that do to the rest of the theory and its models? If we state that for 
something to be a pointy object, its tip must cause stinging pain on beings with 
reportability capacities, then we have a category ample enough to cover some of 
the most important aspects of the things SAPO wants to deal with. This in turn 
will have some long-term consequences, for it will be hard for our previous set 
to include the Eiffel tower and remain valid. Yet, minimality is not necessarily 
determined without the possibility of change. Instead, minimality provides the 
means to investigate further and provide later amendments through new models 
that can be consolidated with the previous ones. 
 
  
6.2. The Character of a Model 
Admittedly, the concept of minimality as we have used it right now only really 
applies to what we refer to as models. In the case of SAPO, it seems fair to 
consider that the questions we asked should yield enough information in order 
to come up with some minimal aspect to the theory. But we still have not 
characterized the way SAPO investigates its objects as defined previously. 
Instead of continuing blindly with the application of definitions, there is a need 
to come up with some form to tackle the objects in our science. For both SAPO 




6.2.1. Model versus theory 
Importantly, model and theory are not exactly equal, but they overlap on a 
number of things. If we imagine a ‘domain of facts’ of which no theory is 
known, we can replace the domain of facts with a similar domain of facts for 
which theory is known to use a model and develop our knowledge of the 
domain of facts for which no theory is known (Apostel 1960: 125). What we 
can take from this view is that models may perform as theory for certain facts or 
phenomena. A second possibility is that our theories may be so complex in their 
totality that we may require a model simplifying some of its aspects to make the 
problems in the science soluble (Apostel 1960: 126). These two possibilities 
(among nine others given by Apostel) point to the fact that models may act as 
theories and act on behalf of theories, depending on the needs of our specific 
perusal, particularly in the case of the empirical sciences as Apostel charac-
terizes them106. It seems to be the case, however, that theories can be set in two 
different extremes, either as syntactic or semantic (Frigg 2006; Frigg; Hartmann 
2012), the first defined as “a set of sentences in an axiomatized system of first 
order logic” (Frigg; Hartmann 2012: 23) and the second as “a family of models” 
(24) without any formal calculus. While both can be analyzed in their own right, 
what I want to point out with this is that models are integral to the formulation 
of the science, no matter if we consider them univocal or as part of a family. As 
I do not intend to make this a discussion on the conceptual issues that arise from 
our conception of theories but limit myself to the application of minimal models 
and what they require, the point to take home here will simply be that models 
and theories are necessarily interconnected, with one and the other informing 
their own developments. Models, taking from Cartwright, may well mediate 
between theories and reality (that is, representative models) instead of being a 
system of axioms, or they may be concrete principles that bridge the abstract 
terms of the theory with another model (interpretative models) (Bailer-Jones 
2008). With the possibility of making such differentiations, we may depend on 
what our standpoint regarding modeling is in order to reach a rather personal 
conclusion about the status of models versus theories, but for now we do not 
need to go that far. 
 
 
6.2.2. Modeling models 
The creation of scientific models is not a straightforward task and it is adjusted 
to certain parameters that will vary according to the needs of the theory or lack 
thereof. This does not exactly mean that all models are ad-hoc, however, since a 
model may take the form of a precondition before being established.  
                                                          
106  Apostel makes the point that the empirical sciences do not deal with the same type of 
axiomatizable formalizations that may be adjudicated to semantics or syntax, but this 
does not mean that it cannot be met with certain generalizing demands (1960: 159). 
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With that said, we should be aware of the fact that models can take many 
different forms when referring to scientific inquiry. Briefly, we may divide 
models into the grounds they cover or the purpose of their existence, but we 
may also talk about what it means for something to be a model and wonder 
about its ontology. As the latter question does not hold an important role for this 
particular chapter, I will avoid it almost entirely. Still, we may mark a diffe-
rentiation between material models, that is, concrete objects that represent 
something in our scientific theories, such as a scale DNA model (Contessa 
2010:217), largely uninteresting and irrelevant for the topic at hand, and other 
types of models, either mathematical models, which do not cover the whole 
spectrum of possible scientific models (Contessa 2010: 217), and fictional 
models, which “are typically ascribed to concrete objects and yet, unlike 
concrete objects, they do not exist” (Contessa 2010: 218). Beyond the question 
of potential paradoxes that arise from this particular typology, we find that 
scientific models are not limited to one specific form of representation.107 
Briefly then, when it comes to functionality, models in science can either 
represent a way to deal with missing theory for certain facts; a simplification of 
the already complex theory; an interpretative bridge between theories; the 
means to fulfill some missing part of our theories; a method of confirmation of 
the previous theory according to new findings; a method for explaining certain 
facts that appear in our theories; a way to experiment on objects that are out of 
reach and obtain information about them; a structural description of our 
theories; or as a bridge between theory and observation (Apostel 1960: 125–
127). This will be contrasted with the semiotic understanding of models, as we 
will see now. 
 
 
6.2.3. Semiotic modeling and semiotic models 
The concept of modeling in semiotics takes, however, a completely different 
form, which, while related to the conception of models in science, does not 
share the same definitions and moves away from the more formal model theory. 
That is not to say they are conceptually incompatible, but rather that they take 
from different theoretical backgrounds to work in their own metatheories. In 
fact, semiotics has a particular history when it comes to the concept of model 
and that of modeling, for “in semiotics models are based on a relation of 
similarity or isomorphism and are therefore associated to the iconic sign as 
understood by Peirce.” (Ponzio 2010: 267) This difference in scope makes the 
specificity of the concept clear when used in the context of semiotics. To make 
matters more interesting, the Tartu-Moscow school proposes a more committed 
definition for so-called modeling systems. In this case, J. Lotman defines model 
as “an analogue of an object of perception that substitutes it in the process of 
perception” (J. Lotman 2011: 250). This is expanded to the conception of 
                                                          
107  Frigg and Hartmann (2012) expand this typology to set-theoretic structures, descriptions 
and mixed ontologies. 
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modeling systems, both in their primary and secondary levels. A modeling 
system is defined by J. Lotman as “a structure of elements and rules of their 
combination, existing in a state of fixed analogy to the whole sphere of the 
object of perception, cognition, or organization” (J. Lotman 2011: 250), with 
the primary variety being first thought of as natural language but later extended 
by Sebeok (1989) to encompass communicational phenomena in non-humans 
(Kull 2010: 55). Secondary modeling systems would then first “describe the 
functioning mechanisms of systems using natural language as material” (Torop 
1999: 10), but with the extended definition of a primary modeling system then 
we can settle for the assumption that “a secondary sign system is secondary 
only in respect of a given primary system” (M. Lotman 2012: 21).108  
One important question that I will not take up here is whether language is a 
primary modeling system. This question has been treated repeatedly (Sebeok 
1989; Chang 2003), but neither its positive nor negative answer will have an 
impact on the topic at hand. What I want to focus on at this point is the im-
portant differences and relations between both conceptions of model we have 
reviewed so far. So far, a salient aspect of the semiotic concept of model and its 
derivatives is that they are purely epistemological. A first thing that comes to 
mind is that the concept of modeling from the semiotic perspective is wider than 
what we have seen before as scientific models, and this much should be 
obvious. But to make it clear, a model in the semiotic sense (or at least from the 
perspective of the Tartu school) is grounded in empirical notions. It is 
interesting however to note that we cannot have all scientific models be based 
on empirical notions, as that would lead to a number of contradictions regarding 
some of the possible definitions for a scientific model, particularly those that 
use models themselves as theory. You could model some facts into something 
that has never been perceived and come up with a reasonable thesis about said 
facts. There is a number of possible ways to mend this claim. One would have 
to do with the fact that we can model the elements that derive from perception 
in a long chain of referents. In this case we could speak of scientific models that 
cover the facts that we have deduced over a different set of facts and so on. A 
second way to mend it would be to accept that the semiotic concept of model 
does not suffice for making scientific claims, though it can still suffice in 
making claims about the models we use to make scientific claims. Both options 
seem rather heavy-handed, making the difference between the concepts from 
each side steeper than what we could have imagined at first.109 Perhaps a way to 
evade this possible debate is to consider that semiotic modeling in an ample 
sense must be prior to scientific models in at least the abstract conception of 
                                                          
108  That is, if we can assume sign systems are indeed synonymous with modeling systems. 
109  Fischer-Lichte hints at this when she says that art as a secondary modeling system ‘is 
substantially different from a scientific model. For the making of a scientific model is 
always preceded by an analytical act: first, the object is analyzed and recognized, then a 
model of it is formed. The artist, on the other hand, has a closed idea of the whole 
perceived and/or imagined object to be reproduced, and it is this whole that will be 
modeled.’ (Fichter-Lichte 1997: 309) The problem, however, runs much deeper. 
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both, for we may assume that, if the concept of semiotic modeling holds, it has 
to be achieved prior to the possibility of modeling other phenomena, empirical 
or otherwise.  
Expanding on this, a terminological precision derived from Sebeok’s take on 
modeling systems comes from the inclusion of the biosemiotic perspective – 
more exactly, the integration of Jakob von Uexküll’s work on the Umwelt – to 
the premises already established by J. Lotman and the extension of the sense of 
primary and secondary modeling systems. Instead of going to repetitive defi-
nitions, we may point out that the reason for including the concept of Umwelt 
here is because we can assume it to be semantically related to the concept of 
model. And if that is so, then the Umwelt of an organism is a model or 
‘mapping’ of the world with its meaningful elements (Kull 2010: 43). A later 
consequence of this thought is that all sign processes are acts of modeling by 
including “an organism’s experience” (Kull 2010: 48) and the relation of the 
objects with that experience. Semiotic modeling provides modeling for models 
in the sense of assigning meaning to the elements as constrained by the models. 
 
 
6.2.4. Middle ground 
We may still find a conceptual middle ground between the seeming disparity of 
the concepts used for models and their area of applicability. J. Lotman’s con-
cept of model is wide enough that it does not require an important or specific 
commitment – and this much is made clear by him (J. Lotman 2011: 250) –, but 
rather a general understanding that models are, to some degree, epistemological 
representations. We may remember as well that the object of a scientific model 
does not necessarily entail a material object – we may create scientific models 
positing existences that will turn out to be wrong – and in a (partially) Peircean 
fashion, we may then define models as abstract relation-types, a wide enough 
claim to provide a bridge between the multiple definitions of scientific models 
and those of semiotic models and semiotic modeling. In no case do we have to 
assume anything about the problem of the ontology of models, and so we can 
remain in the epistemological field. This is very good news for the conceptual 
work on models and how these can be thought of in different contexts. Contrary 
to the posited isomorphism or iconicity posited by Ponzio,110 we do not even 
need to be committed to a type of similarity for the relation to hold. Again, the 
problem of positing an object that may turn out not to exist gives us enough to 
understand how the premise holds.  
Completion and coherence of ontological assumptions aside, the fact that 
semiotics provides us with some tools for analyzing the elements of models 
does give us a big impulse in providing a conceptual schematization of what 
commitments theories make when positing models. That is, even if we cannot 
consolidate both sides of the concept, we can provide specific roles for them. If 
                                                          
110  This iconic reading has also been defended by Hauser (1991). 
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anything, given the varied nature of scientific models, semiotics can provide us 
with a way to regard the elements of theories from a general perspective. But 
more than just labeling parts of scientific models, when introducing an 
epistemologically robust set of concepts in the form of signs, and coupled with 
the existent possibility and variety of scientific models, we can come up with 
semiotically sound models to talk about semiotically interesting phenomena.111  
This metatheoretical claim has, I think, an important value to be found when 
considering how we extend our models or constrain them in order to find out 
things about semiotic phenomena. Scientific models of semiotic phenomena can 
perform reductions and expansions depending on whether we have taken a 
bottom-up or a top-down approach to the object of research. Models, in any 
case, can be constrained to their minimality in order to study the essential 
assumptions of the elements in our ontology over which we can expand. It goes 
without saying that a minimal model will not be able to do the same tricks an 
expanded model can. We will return to SAPO to explore these claims. 
 
 
6.2.5. Minimal models 
At this point we can go back to the original definition given to minimal models 
as the least complex bundle of elements possible capable of accounting for the 
object or objects of our theories. Though it captures the essentials, we may not 
be exactly sure about how to tweak a model to reduce it to its minimal aspects. 
In the case of SAPO, how do we exactly declare the minimal model for 
exploring our Pointy Objects? The answer to that is that the minimal model 
would have, in its most basic iteration, to operate on the basis of the definition 
of the Pointy Object. What is it about a Pointy Object that makes it at least a 
pointy object? This question already sets enough of a constraint to generalize 
the activity of the model. If we are to examine the main claim, that there are 
pointy objects in the world, then we have to accept that pointy objects have, as a 
definition, a sharp tip and come in shapes that can cause aichmophobia. In other 
words, we depend on a verification claim that something can cause us pain 
because of their sharp end. Let’s say that SAPO, as a science, wants to find out 
what is the exact property of being a pointy object. This would then constrain 
our model of analysis to solving the question of ‘what is a pointy thing and how 
can we tell if it is.’112 It is easy to notice then that the constraints lie first on the 
object of our model. The object itself – abstract or not – provides, via its defi-
nition, a set of rules for considering when creating a model. If we obviate this 
fact, we may end up with mereological sets that offer no apparent contradiction 
                                                          
111  While I am not making the claim that semiotics makes scientific claims, it is important to 
consider that it may do so. 
112 Note here that this is not the ultimate question, but rather a basal question that can be 
expanded upon without restriction. We could ask of SAPO to provide us with the most 
adequate way to maximize sharpness for creating new and sophisticated pointy objects, 
for instance. 
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but that are not tightly bound together or consistent within the set of definitions 
for the model itself. As previously, our example of including the Eiffel Tower in 
our set becomes problematic, so the answer to that is either recanting our posi-
tion on definitions or simply removing the element from our set. This process is 
part of the concept of minimality when applied to a model.  
A minimal model must then be robust enough to prevent it from being 
inapplicable. Instead of a feeble basic description, a minimal model must not be 
so wide as to be applicable to absolutely any mereological set we can come up 
with that has some syntactic similarity to the formalization of our theories. In 
addition, a minimal model must still represent the question of what with the 
idea of not that, that is, under the knowledge that the object of the theory is 
partly substantiated by the questions asked by it.113 
We can expand models and create new models that have little apparent 
connection with it, as we have seen before. What is necessary to include in 
building our theories, however, is a core of assumptions that can be spelled out 
and that create the elements of the model, which can be described much like in 
a sign relation, based on definitions and implied variables for the object, its 
consequences and analytical possibilities. 
 
 
6.3. The Character of an Object 
As mentioned before, objects play an essential role in our theories, no matter 
what sort of existence we grant them. Objects in both described arenas of 
models and modeling are easy to apprehend and intuitive enough, but we may 
expand on them first and later think about the issue of reduction of the object in 
the light of a minimal model. 
 
 
6.3.1 Ontology, or not 
The claim attributed to Peirce that objects do not need to be concrete in order to 
stand in the sign relation is perhaps the most powerful way to avoid the 
discussion on the ontology of objects here, for we may be committed to 
existences that may be proven false via the same models we construct, and the 
whole point is that the process of creating and updating models has as a 
condition that we can talk about our premises and see if they hold.114  
                                                          
113  This is a complicated matter and there is not enough room to take it here, but models and 
theories are not idealized in a vacuum with an object that is specified and singular from 
the onset. Instead, as I point out, it gets revisited and reconstructed along with the 
theories and models themselves. 
114  The distinction between observables and names, put together in the biosemiotic context 
by Barbieri (2015: 23–24), can present a similar argument when dealing with scientific 
models. The conclusions of adopting such metatheoretical model could, however, imply 
different results. 
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It is thus better to set aside ontological claims in the model, but interestingly 
enough, the model will do the work of carving out an ontological panorama of 
our theory. 
 
6.3.2. Object in the sign relation 
The object of a model is not exactly the same as the object that we have come to 
know from the Peircean paradigm, but it is nevertheless related to our con-
ceptual concerns. Quickly defined, an object in the sign relation is the thing for 
which a sign stands (CP 1.339). Evidently this definition is not sufficient in the 
development of semiotic theory, but it is necessary as one of the its building 
blocks. Given that we can frame scientific models as relation-types with objects 
in representation, we can make a wide ascription of analyzability to models as 
signs. The fact that the object of the sign relation is abstract opens up this 
particular metatheoretical avenue, because again, we do not need to commit 
ourselves to the existence of the object for the theory to be right or wrong, but 
we will need to use the theory to understand whether the posited entity holds up 
to scrutiny.115 Importantly, models are not separate from our learning about 
them (Schlimm 2009), that is, our models are subject to update. Does this 
however apply to the model of the sign relation? This tricky question depends 
on whether we claim that all models can be updated or not. The answer is not 
straightforward, but if I were to venture an admittedly simplistic answer, I 
would say that even if we claim the sign relation to hold logically, logic 
notation and variables can and have been expanded upon, revealing differences 
in how the elements in logic operate with said new variables. Therefore, even 
the metatheoretical model of the sign can be updated as we learn from it, 
expanding on the object as well – elements in sets that would not fit previous 
models could find new clauses for them to be part of new sets. It may be the 
case that changes and updates are not crucial, and perhaps when it comes to 
certain issues on morality there is a rockier road of possible changes ahead. This 
question, while valuable and interesting in its own right, must be skipped for the 
time being. 
 
6.3.3. Minimal objects 
Finally, we may wonder how to establish the concept of the object with respect 
to the concept of a minimal model. A minimal model does not need to imply a 
minimal object, and a minimal object does not call for a minimal model. But a 
minimal model makes claims about its object, and given the previous definition 
of a minimal model, an object becomes reduced to a certain degree because by 
necessity some of the claims of an expanded model are not possible with a 
minimal model. A minimal model is always minimal with respect to something, 
so the object of the parent discipline will, even if fuzzy by definition, be 
                                                          
115  This, however, is not a simple decision, and in order to accept it we need to give way for 
integrative paradigms. In other words, no theory works alone. 
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reduced by the minimal model to a certain account. This new object, if we are 
willing to call it new, is not independent of the expanded models. What this 
means is that a minimal model calls for a minimized object, and provided we are 
dealing with a minimal model regarding the core assumptions of our research, 




Surely we may feel uneasy at the thought of reductionism, as we could open the 
door to wide assumptions regarding the instability of models and the possibility 
to reduce the objects of our theories. But this concern is unfounded. As we have 
already established, models take on the epistemological side of things and 
minimal models are not an exception to this principle. Our accounts of reduc-
tion in this sense can only be explanatory, as opposed to ontological and metho-
dological (Sarkar 1992), and this claim itself is already weak. We may not be 
committed to one particular form of explanatory reduction, but our assumptions 
about the abstract object prevents us from making specific ontological claims in 
the construction of the model. The ontological claims come in conjunction with 
the model, when both syntactic and semantic poles have been put together. That 
is, the constitution of our models may allow for reduction, but if we are con-
cerned with parsimony as actually reducing the objects in their ontology, we 
may as well remember that expanding complexity is not parsed in the model, 
but rather given as a possibility to be further developed. 
 
 
6.4. Semiosis and Minimality 
SAPO offers us a way to understand these concepts without investing much in 
definitions, but when it comes to the elements of semiotics, there may be some 
much more complex issues to address. Semiosis and the sign are the central 
claims of semiotics, no matter what our commitment to their ontology is, and it 
is this precise core of assumptions that can be investigated. If we claim that 
semiotics investigates semiosis or signs, or types of signs, we can make 
assumptions about these. Our models of the sign will comprehend a vast array 
of ramifications, such as all the specific prefixed varieties of semiotics. Yet, the 
core assumptions can be investigated in the removal of expanded assumptions 
and elements. Why would we be interested, however, in the construal of a 
minimal theory of semiotics? It seems the answer is quite simple: The way we 
treat our core assumptions on the sign will have an impact in the way we deal 
with the more developed branches of semiotics. As models are not detached 
from wider research, they will find some internal cohesion with other, expanded 
accounts of the tenets of semiotics. If our core assumptions on the sign are that 
it is a relation of a sign-type, and that said relation is irreducible, and that it has 
a beginning, we can explore questions about the nature of the relation, the 
exploration of whether it truly is irreducible and what its opposite would yield, 
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and what the conditions for a beginning are, if any. This in turn expands the 
situation to considering the clear metaphysical premises of the arguments – that 
semiosis is logically irreducible, that it may be an emergent, that it is a special 
relation. 
 
6.4.1. Specific accounts of semiotics 
An important issue that will not be considered here is that certain accounts of 
semiotics do not deal exactly with the same theories others do. Can there be 
unity in semiotics – either through assumptions in minimality or in termino-
logical coalescence – with these differences in mind? The issue of prefixed 
semiotics is quite complex because to basal assumptions there is an addition of 
questions regarding certain applicability. Biosemiotics, for instance, is born out 
of potential applicability and coalescence of terminology, but the process of 
naturalization in semiotics reaffirms or reconstructs possibilities in its other 
prefixed varieties. To be clear, we are positing a theory by talking about semio-
tics in this same manner, and that can be spelled out in the notion that signs are 
only analyzable given the recognition that signs necessitate a background of 
implementation. That is, the position requires us to distinguish between a 
reference fleshed out as correspondence and a sign as a relation understood 
under (some) Peircean terminology. There is no metaphysical neutrality to be 
had when opening up the notions behind a theory, even if these are not strong 
enough to do much work as final realizations of the theory itself.  
If, in any case, semiosis turns out to be what our assumptions make of it, 
then we will have a layer of confirmation for some branches of semiotics that 
can use it. If it turns out that these assumptions were wrong when poking the 
object of the minimal model, then it means there are either assumptions that are 
missing or conclusions that are wrong. 
 
 
6.5. Conclusions of the chapter 
The discussion on minimality is twofold: We can acknowledge that semiotic 
inquiry makes metaphysical assumptions about signs and their role in the world, 
and with that we can also observe that sign relations as expressed by (mostly 
Peircean) semiotics can be analyzed to a certain degree of parsimony.  
I have tried to give a brief account of the difference between a scientific 
notion of model and the semiotic notion of modeling while illustrating the role 
of minimality through the proposed thought experiment of SAPO within the 
discussion of semiotics. The role SAPO plays in this illustration is that of 
construing an intuitive appeal to questions of ontology that derive in metho-
dological divisions of what is available for a theory. Semiotics may, in 
principle, not need to ask questions of ontology in the pretension of being a 
metaphysically neutral science, but this position seems hardly tenable when 
referring to the kernel of specific definitions requested by certain analytical 
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perusals. Minimality as expressed here fleshes out core assumptions and charac-
terizes them while also opening the possibility of reworking certain beliefs 
within the system to which a parsimonious account is applied.  
There is a number of issues that stem from this though, many of which 
cannot be dealt with in this space. Such issues, like the regression of questions 
in a definitional system, the validation of a theory by begging the question, or 
the differentiation between formal and informal scientific inquiries resulting in 
completely different theoretical views on the issue of setting methodology and 
definitions, all bring important issues, but these appear to be in line with the 
specificities of theory building rather than negating parsimony as a theoretical 
driver for definitions and change. In this sense, the challenges posed by such 
problems can only cause precision in this particular view, with the more 
complex issues being related to questions of metaphysical values within specific 
types of research. Semiotics, and biosemiotics in particular, can only benefit 
from such a discussion in approaching living systems and sign usage through a 
modeling of relations that responds to naturalization and basal organization of 
its questions. Minimality can create either a competing or complementing view 
of semiotic elements available to a basal account of semiosis in living orga-
nisms.  
In the next chapter we will lay the more specific groundwork for coining a 
minimal semiosis. Having a stronger notion on modeling as it pertains to 
semiotics, but informed by the scientific concerns of biosemiotics, we can see 
that when it comes to sign action in organisms, there are certain elements that 
we must account for, not in the least the role of the organism within its 
environment. Modeling will thus retain its place as a semiotic tool in the way 
we have described it earlier, with the caveat that it will still be subject to the 




 7. SEMANTIC IMPLEMENTATION  
IN A MODEL ORGANISM 
The role of a model organism is deeply rooted in the semiotic approach itself: 
beyond the general and correct notion that models are the essence of semio-
tics116, a biosemiotic view on organismic use of signs depends on grounding 
relations in organisms and environment. This much is clear in the Umwelt 
‘methodology’. By establishing a systematicity to the semiotic classification of 
organism-environment relation (even if it seems rather one-sided from the point 
of view of the organism) we are directly dealing with a number of constraints of 
salient features assigned to the organism. And it is through that same act that we 
map the salient features of the environment for the organism. In this chapter we 
will examine the constitution of a model organism for biosemiotics and see 
what role the special notion of semantics can take in this context. For this, we 
will also consider the ontological underpinnings of the coming about of signs 
and the divide between the physical world and meaning, taking from H. H. 
Pattee’s work on the matter-symbol complementarity problem, complemented 
by K. Kull’s concept of choice. Finally, we will also refer to semiosic imple-




7.1. Model organisms in a biosemiotic context 
Model organisms are, for all intents and purposes, part of the parlance of bio-
logy: organisms that have been studied for considering certain biological pheno-
mena. As it stands, the concept is not exactly given to the theoretical aspects of 
biosemiotics, not because it is inapplicable,117 but because the concept of model 
resonates with different technical meanings, as we have seen before. We need to 
arrive to a proper distinction when referring to a model organism in the 
biological sense and, perhaps, a semiotic model of an organism. When I refer to 
a model organism here, I do it with the intention of referring to an “implemen-
tational model of semiosis”, that is, a model whereby semiosis can be ascribed 
in action according to a specific number of features that have to be assumed for 
sign usage to be effective. I will develop this particular concept throughout this 
chapter, explaining its necessity for a theory of minimal semiosis, its termino-
logical background and the implementation of a semantic aspect following 
Pattee’s ‘semiotic closure’ (2010). This concept will be dealt with later in the 




                                                          
116  This is especially true for Tartu semiotics. 
117  It is to the degree that naturalized empirical semiotics can use it. 
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7.1.1. Biosemiotics and model organisms 
The study of sign action in organisms is dependent on what we consider as the 
validity of the organism to implement said action. This much is clear throughout 
the history of biosemiotics, with Uexküll foreseeing “the study of “model orga-
nisms” and their qualitative changes, which are equivalent in both the animals 
and human beings” (Chien 2004: 1).118 But Uexküllian modeling of cycles and 
functions – and their exemplification through model organisms in the biological 
sense – begets only a partial realization of the conditions for semiosis. 
Depending on how we position ourselves within the ontology of semiosis, our 
semiotic model of an organism will require a certain specificity for imple-
menting a meaningful sign function. Then again, we could object to this semio-
tic model on the grounds of mechanicism, because having a specific set of 
axioms can only provide a mechanistic picture of what seems to be an anti-
mechanistic phenomenon. Salthe (2007) voices the concern against mechani-
cism stating that it “generates deep metaphysical and even conceptual problems 
that are made liminal when, for example, we try to model organisms” (210). 
Nature is not clean like our models want it to be, so why bother? But the 
heuristics of such semiotic models119 do not just rely on their capacity to teach 
us something, nor on their success at predicting future outcomes – if they ever 
do –, but in opening up new considerations for units of analysis and furthering a 
specific research program, despite the potential problems we may find on the 
way. Biosemiotics has been at odds with mechanicism throughout its history 
(cf. Barbieri 2007a: 106), and the relation between the both has been thoroughly 
documented across historical accounts of biosemiotics. For that reason, there is 
no need to delve deeper in this divide.  
There is a number of more accurate divisions to make at this point with 
regards to models, in any case. Biosemiotics has made use of model organisms 
in the biological sense since its very beginnings (or since it was protosemiotics, 
perhaps). On parallel developments in biology, there have been a growing 
number of models of organisms, computational or otherwise, that attempt to 
implement functions and physiological specificities of certain organisms.120 
Such models, however, have a hard time implementing any potential semiotic 
function, whatever those may be, because by definition it is not possible to 
implement them without an extra something that actualizes sign usage. In a 
more semiotic parlance, we can understand this issue by assuming that “[t]he 
difficult problem to solve in any theory of the origin of agency and life is how 
to unify two normally quite separate of dynamics: a dynamics of chemical 
                                                          
118  This reference to model organisms in Uexküll has also been taken up by Tønnessen 
(2015). 
119  I do not want this to be taken in its moral sense, that is, as a crusade against mechani-
cism, but rather in its traditional relational sense. 
120  As, for instance, (Karr et al. 2012) and (Roberts et al. 2011) to name a few works on E. 
coli. However, there are multiple other attempts to create models of neurons and organs 
as well. 
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interaction patterns and a dynamics of signification and semiosis” (Hoffmeyer 
2010: 193). A semiotic model organism must attempt to first circumvent this 
issue. For something to be a semiotic model organism then, much like a compu-
tational model of the C. Elegans, it must implement semiosis to a certain degree. 
This is the crux of the issue, and the major problem to solve.  
 
 
7.1.2. Defining a semiotic model organism 
A semiotic model organism will then refer, in my usage, to the illustration of 
functions implemented by an organism in relation to its environment that bring 
forth the action of signs. As such, and in agreement with Salthe, this definition 
depends heavily on our metaphysical position with regards to the constitution of 
semiosis qua relation. This particular definition utilizes the concepts of function 
and implementation, which need further development. In the first case, a 
function in this sense takes from the idea of functional cycles: repetitive active 
behavior that obtains given certain conditions. Functional cycles are not 
comprised of singular entities causing the behavior, but rather lie in individual 
processes that take part in the action (Kull 1998). As such, a semiotic function 
can only be implemented by an organism given a certain array of possibilities in 
interacting with the environment.121 The physiological aspects of such condi-
tions are not simple in their involvement: The physiological aspect of a semiotic 
system is not detached from the conditions of the existence of the semiotic 
function. In other words, there are no semiotic functions to speak of without a 
physiological aspect to them.  
Semiotic functions, by definition, cannot be static. They have loose endings 
and are constructed according to specific needs. That in turn implies that some-
thing must precede functions, either because of needs or a learning that creates 
them. This is how implementation comes to the scene. Implementing a function 
necessitates physiological constraints. Evidently, this sense of implementation 
is less transitive than the term would make us think – the implementation occurs 
by virtue of the existence of the whole system. In other words, it is physiology 
plus environment that are needed for its actuality. This will, however, be treated 
later on.  
 
7.1.3. Semantic and semiotic closure 
After dealing with these terminological nuances, we must focus on the more 
relevant aspect of how a relation can ever be established given the described 
system. This problem has been expressed as the issue of “matter-symbol 
                                                          
121  Sonesson derives a concept of semiotic function from Piaget articulated as “an 
intercalated variable between stimulus and response” (2006: 158). This is a useful, non-
Peircean description of a meaningful possibility, despite the acknowledgement of its 
speculative nature. This will be treated further in 7.2.2. 
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complementarity” (Pattee 2012),122 seen as essential in the construal of living 
systems. The concept of semantic closure, later replaced in his own work by 
semiotic closure, is of the essence for understanding the issue at stake. The 
original definition given by Pattee involves a self-reference “that has an open-
ended evolutionary potential” being “an autonomous closure between the 
dynamics (physical laws) of the material aspects and the constraints (syntactic 
rules) of the symbolic aspects of a physical organization” (Pattee 2012: 211–
212). Self-reference is, however, tautological in its definition, in that it “applies 
to a closure relation between both the material and the symbolic aspects of 
organisms” (Pattee 2012: 211) to the effect that one concept is correspondingly 
necessary with the other. Now, the metaphorical style of such definitions may 
add to our understanding of systems as such, with constraints and rules and the 
whole make up of an organized disunity. As a matter of fact, it must be clear 
from the onset that the concept of symbol used by Pattee does not map correctly 
to the more technical definition of symbol within semiotics. While the usage of 
symbol by Pattee is defensible (Pattee 2008: 158), it is the case that his usage is 
highly idiosyncratic and less fruitful than the Peircean definition (Kull et al. 
2009: 172). This incompatibility can be explained in that Pattee considers 
symbols to be “a material constraint not determined by physical laws that 
controls specific physical dynamics of a self-replicating system” (2008: 158), 
but this definition stays short of the more complex Peircean symbol, and it can 
be equated to a more abstract concept of sign relation at the level of the 
indexical and the iconic.123 What we must take from Pattee’s notions though is 
that the base problem to treat is that of how some form of reference can exist in 
living organisms at all. The Sebeok axiom, while a good guideline, needs its 
basis in the solution to this problem.  
What Pattee tries to address is extremely useful in what we assume to be the 
core functions of a semiosic organism, in any case, and it is a good turning point 
to consider that the problem we are faced with requires indeed a complementary 
approach. 
 
7.2. The meaning of closure 
Semantics, in a wide sense, is essential to the biosemiotic endeavor. For Pattee, 
the biosemiotic option is still grounded on “material embodiment” (Pattee 2012: 
214) in what can be defined as a form of non-reductive materialism, which will 
be treated later on in this chapter. Is this a plausible philosophical option for 
biosemiotics? And is it even fair to deem Pattee’s position as such?  
                                                          
122  This sense of symbol should not be taken to mean symbol in the Peircean terminology. 
Instead, it should be treated as ‘semantic’ (cf. Pattee 2010: 524). 
123  The concept of symbol as used by Pattee will not, then, play a role in his own termi-
nology, understood here better as a general meaningful sign or, more widely, as 
meaning. Symbolism can be better referred to as semanticity, a general sense of 
meaningful phenomena for an organism. 
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Pattee sees both material embodiment and meaning as material phenomena, 
but thinks of meaning as more than just matter, stating that complete physical 
descriptions are unable to “tell us all we know about their symbolic function” 
(Pattee 2012: 214). Semanticity (or symbolism in his own parlance) is a 
function that doesn’t correspond to law-based properties, much like other 
biological functions. The world cannot be reduced to its physical properties; it 
very much depends on a less describable form of functions that does not fully 
correspond to physical laws. We have already treated this form of descriptions 
in chapter 5, so the point to develop here is, how do we represent the meta-
physical aspect of this thesis to make sense of it?  
So far, physicality and complementarity are two aspects we can agree with to 
a large degree, but the different dimensions of this non-reductive materialism 
have to be examined properly. 
 
 
7.2.1. Descriptions and measurements 
One of the problems we have to face is that of descriptions as the fundamental 
term for the discussion. If the issue is purely epistemological, then descriptions 
are indeed what will trouble us. Pattee states that his view requires “that 
theories of life be epistemologically consistent not only with logic but with 
fundamental physical principles” (Pattee 2012: 224). Complementarity is 
exemplified by measurement, for “it is possible to describe a measuring device 
in its material detail” (Pattee 2012: 214), but at the same time, in order to 
achieve its function, the device must be limited in its “semantically relevant 
symbolic degrees of freedom” (Pattee 2012: 215).  
More precisely, the measurement problem is described in the following way: 
“Measurement is a physical process, but the function of measurement, recording 
specific initial conditions, is beyond physical laws to describe” (Pattee 2010: 
526). The polarization of the world of biological beings, with its speculated 
origins at the point of departure between the physical act of measurement and the 
semanticity of measuring, leads to a recursive problem by itself, in that the 
distinction cannot be made epistemological if it lies in the nature of things. Pattee 
defends himself against this by postulating that the issue at hand is not meta-
physical, but rather a “pragmatic fact” (Pattee 2012: 215), because, we can 
surmise, measuring is not the same as presenting the thing that is being measured. 
Yet, the problem does comprise an issue for ontology in the question of what it is 
that’s beyond physicality and physical description that is actually relevant for our 
theory of biosemiotics. Perhaps the problem is purely epistemological in that it is 
only a matter of solving further problems of measurement in order to get a 
complete picture of the possibilities of description. That wouldn’t solve the issue 
of the functions of descriptions, and in fact, it intensifies the point of the division. 
But then again we can claim some sort of epiphenomenalism as the main cause 
and leave it at that. The epistemological claim is not useful in the end because it 
opposes the principle of the division: By assuming the problems of measurement 
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can be solved by further measurements, we accept that the aspect that cannot be 
reduced to physicality can, in fact, be reduced.  
Removing this option leaves us with a less clear standing. The semantically 
relevant aspect that lies at the heart of the problem must be treated in such a 




One thing that is clear is that semanticity as used here is not quite the same as 
what its common usage refers to.124 Its usage in biosemiotics, while not comple-
tely determinate, refers to ascribed meaning – that is, relevance and informational 
derivation – for organisms.125 In Pattee’s treatment of semantics, this notion is 
connected to ‘value’, ‘information’ and ‘symbolic results’, being, however, more 
limited in the genetic sense than it is in natural language (Pattee 2001). The idea 
is intuitive enough: We are working with some sense of meaning that is far more 
abstract than a dual conception of content, but that seems to work just in the same 
way. This is how signs come into the spotlight, and that much should be clear 
already. But the problem we are facing is how to make sense of semanticity in a 
way that is philosophically consistent with what we have discussed. Perhaps the 
main way to avoid the pitfall of regression is by reworking semanticity into 
relational possibility and the concurrent Peircean sign types. To the degree that 
we can talk about meaning, we need to have it grounded in a sign relation, but in 
order for relations to be functional, we need some agentive notion together with it. 
The abstraction of the sign is necessary insofar as we need to talk about 
meaningful relations, but we cannot depend solely on it because it doesn’t solve 
the issues of meaning in the biological world.  
So then, what can we say about sign types and biological meaning in order to 
find a more concrete standing? The matter-symbol complementarity issue 
cannot be decisively solved in that we need to add propositions to it in order to 
make it work in our theories, but we may be parsimonious in our inclusion of 
propositions. That is, our ontology needs to be as clear as possible. Beyond 
description or acquiescence that for signs to work, they must be relational, we 
would do much better in taking ‘cuts’ and ‘closures’ to test, figuring out if they 
are either possible or consistent within this framework. The fact that we have a 
distinction between semanticity and materiality is already grounded in mate-
riality. Either we have meaning supervene on the material or both of them occupy 
parallel ontological spaces. There does not seem to be a middle ground between 
                                                          
124  Of note is the fact that semantics and semanticity can be used interchangeably in this 
context. In most cases, when we refer to semantics we will refer to the ascription of 
meaning in the biological world. 
125  In the research program of code biology, the notion of semanticity is inextricably linked to 
that of organic meaning, which refers to a correspondence between objects such as 
nucleotides and amino acids (Barbieri 2015: 26). This formulation, however, is not exactly 
useful except in the terms of its own theory, and as such it will only be treated laterally. 
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these two possibilities, and disregarding the issue with pragmatism as our maxim 
is not exactly an answer. We will now examine both possibilities. 
 
 
7.2.3. Ontological parallelism of meaning and matter 
The idea that both meaning and matter occupy two ontologically distinct spaces, 
and that as a consequence we cannot reduce one to the other, resonates pro-
foundly with all sorts of dualisms sanctioned by most in biosemiotics. The 
number of problems we face in this situation is insurmountable by its sheer 
quantity. This is the issue of physiosemiosis with a difference in vocabulary. In 
renouncing this possible universe of meaning-objects, we renounce the onto-
logical dualism of meaning. There are ways around this though: That meaning 
is material in a way that does not operate in the scale of physicalism. Rather like 
vibration, meaning could be considered relative and fully operational, consistent 
with physicality and yet not exactly physical: A result of the physical without 
having a properly physical aspect. This is an attractive prospect if we can work 
it out. However, the results are not quite stellar. Using the example of sounds 
we can get a clearer picture of what this view on meaning would entail. That 
sounds exist should not surprise us. A non-physicalist account of sound requires 
us to think of sound without reference to their physical causes (Scruton 2009: 
58), but up to this point, we are stranded in the same issue: Are we actually 
giving meaning a distinct ontological constitution or are we simply assuming 
that the distinction between object and reference yields different ontological 
objects? In trapping our notion of meaning into an object of its own we are 
splitting the sign relation into a multimodal operation. Not only would we need 
a relation to exist, but we would need it to exist across substances, so to speak. 




Returning to the issues of emergence and supervenience is never quite 
gratifying. As I have already written, I do not believe the option of emergence is 
readily available for signs. Pattee’s proposition of non-reductive materialism is 
not easily tractable and it falls prey to some heavy criticism, but it is worth 
considering it as a potential option, if we can work out its kinks. Chapter 5 on 
Emergence explores this concept more thoroughly, and as such it is not 
necessary to explain it further at this point.  
 
 
7.2.5. Non-reductive materialism and supervenience 
How can we come to terms with the idea that there are some material, yet 
irreducible aspects to meaning if we submit to a form of base materialism? 
When we mentioned the causal closure of the physical (chapter 2), what was at 
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stake was the exemplification of the odd ontological status of semiosis. Now we 
must deal with the issue head-on. Kim (1989) attacks non-reductive materialism 
with regards to mental causation on different grounds. By considering the 
mental “as a legitimate domain of entities” (1989: 43), and understanding 
entities as events that exhibit the property of mentality, where non-reductive 
materialism is not an eliminativist view, one must assume that “mental pro-
perties must be causal properties – properties in virtue of which an event enters 
into causal relations it would otherwise not have entered into” (Kim 1989: 43). 
This, however, seems to be in conflict with the causal closure of the physical.126 
As we have seen, the issue with the complementarity of symbols and matter 
brings in a similar issue, one that has been discussed by biosemioticians to a 
different degree,127 but that keeps finding a way of sliding through our well-
intentioned proposals. Meaning and sign action do find themselves overlapping 
terminologically, but they must be treated separately. In meaning lato sensu we 
do not need more than so-called signals – as long as meaning is considered in its 
dimension of action/reaction, there’s no need for it to be more than a pre-
established function –, but that leads us nowhere, for such meaning does not 
entail the meaning of meaning. Meaning, appended to sign action, would be 
subservient to interaction, that is, in consequent relations.128 To defend this 
view, we need to incorporate the criticisms levied against non-reductive mate-
rialism, applied to the metaphysics of biosemiotics.  
We may assume, in principle, that all sign properties are accidental. But 
relations themselves can have a specific constitution as entities that do not 
necessitate a different realm of objects. Still, there is a big problem in front of 
us, for postulating the existence of relations is a minefield of its own. Processual 
relations, that is, relations established in the process of cognition, can be taken 
to form the core ontological proposition: As long as there is a type of cognitive 
activity, there is a relation that does not exist in independence. By establishing 
the precondition of cognitive activity we are doing a double play. First we 
assume a couple of things before the entailment of a relation, a subject (that is 
capable of cognitive activity) and a world to which it relates. Then we assume 
the sign relation to always be positive in that if there’s cognition, there is 
semiosis. In a way, this is the closest we can get to pragmatist hand-waving, but 
the difference is that we do not outright deny the existence of preconditions, 
these take an essential role as building blocks.  
The argument is thus that semiosis is only entailed by mental properties of 
any sort. We may have property dualism at the core of our mental theory, or we 
could be epiphenomenalists, but the fact of relations can only be established by 
securing a way of subjective interaction. The distinction between relation and 
interaction that has been mentioned earlier (chapters 1 and 3) can be understood 
                                                          
126 This has been partially treated already in chapter 2. 
127  Take, for instance, the notion of semiotic causation espoused by Hoffmeyer (2008:64). 
128  This as long as we remember the notion of relation that we have used throughout the 
text. 
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here in this way: an interaction is unrelated to mental properties of any sort, 
whereas a relation depends on it. All forms of relations from cognition entail 
meaning in a subdued sense.129 
Is the semantic aspect truly irreducible while also remaining in the same 
universe as that of physical aspects? That is certainly the line Pattee suggests, 
and the line I have tried to follow here. But in order to have it that way in our 
understanding of semiosis, the concession we have to make is that the 
descriptions that come from it depend on a physical basis, and that while the 
description of semanticity is not reducible to physical notions, it is more than 
just complementary: it is situated in the world of physical aspect because it is 
entailed by relations, which can only be accomplished by the existence of 
regulated processes of interaction in an environment. I have already argued 
about the counterpoint from semiotics, that the relations can predate or be 
separated from the physical at the ontological level, so what needs to be 
developed further is the idea of an affirmative ontology for signs without 
recurring to more than entailed relations.  
 
 
7.3. Semiosis, autopoiesis and implementation 
Cowley (2008) brings to light an issue between different traditions and their 
basal concepts, namely biosemiotics and biomechanics, the first operating with 
semiosis while the second needs self-organization (89). Interestingly, both 
concepts can be used as interpretative devices for chemotaxis. Cowley, how-
ever, states that “signal recognition is unlikely to be the basis of either com-
munication or cognition” (2008: 91) in that the evolution of biological systems 
towards complex cognition cannot be accounted for by merely invoking the 
notion of semiosis – action and reaction can be present, but they do not lead to 
complex thinking or linguistic universals or anything of the sort. To this he adds 
that “if meaning is natural, there is more to life than natural selection, self-
organization and adaptive systems” (Cowley 2008: 96), in that feeling as a form 
of cognition lato sensu “may use simpler forms of agency (and world-
modelling)” (Cowley 2008: 96). However, in his view, biosemiosis does not do 
the work of showing how meaning comes from the natural world. The point is 
that, while the claim that physics and semiotics “are just two different ways of 
seeing the same world” (Kull 2007a: 171) seems to be correct if we desire not to 
posit extraneous ontologies, it is still a potentially basal assumption more than it 
is a product of the semiotic enquiry. That meaning is natural seems to be 
evident except when you consider what concept of meaning is used, and signs, 
in this case, bring a wide-scale problem in how we characterize them, as we 
have seen. Now, however, the fact that we cannot reduce signs to their physi-
cality does not mean we cannot have them, but rather that we need to allow 
relations to have a more robust constitution. But do we need to argue for 
                                                          
129  Again, not in a one-on-one form that an arbitrary sign would seem to take. 
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unlikely identity claims when assuming that triadic relations are irreducible? 
This, treated in Chapters 3 and 4, keeps coming up because it is a threat to the 
naturalistic ambition of biosemiotics. The divide shown by Cowley between 
biosemiosis and self-organization can be compensated, at least metaphysically, 
with a multiple realizability argument from the bottom-up perspective, and a 
special sciences view of semiotics from the top-down. While these are tradi-
tional arguments used to defend non-reductive materialism (Baker 2009), their 
application can find a home in the discussion of semiosis, as hopefully it will 
transpire from this discussion. 
 
 
7.3.1. The multiple-realizability of semiosic implementation 
The idea of multiple-realizability entails that a property X is realized by a certain 
property W only if the realized property X supervenes on that certain property W. 
Baker uses the example of hunger to illustrate the point, for hunger happens in 
mammals and octopi, but they are ‘achieved’ by different physical states that may 
not be correlated (Baker 2009: 112). This, translated to biosemiotics, implies that 
in order for a semiosic relation to commence, we do not need a specific grounded 
mechanism of interaction between agent and environment, but we need the 
interaction to be at least based on these premises. Perhaps a simpler way to put it 
can be devised under the idea that for meaning to happen, we do not need one 
specific organismic constitution, it can come in different packages. The point that 
Rosen tries to make when stating that the problem of a metabolism-repair relation 
is of realization with the relation following from organization alone (2000: 263), 
can be interpreted here as following the same line we are trying to follow. There 
is no need to have sign relations be entailed only by the existence of a specific 
biological constitution, but rather, there is a way to have semiosic implementation 
across different forms.130 
 
 
7.3.2. Relations and implementation 
The idea is that relations hold logically, that is, the sign relation is conceptually 
true in that any act of cognition depends on an abstract object that is attained 
somehow and produces an abstract representation. The meaning of abstract here 
is set as a placeholder for a variety of options, whereas representation is simply 
a means of stating a form of reaction, that is, not referring to images of any sort. 
The terms of the relation are still contingent. Semiosis is a cross-domain 
relation that obtains despite qualitative differences in its parts, that is, the pro-
perties of the parts in the relation do not need to be the same in all respects in 
order for semiosis to hold.  
                                                          
130  It would be disingenuous not to allow, however, a negative interpretation to this point, 
stating that the formality of organization implies that realization is singular in its consti-
tution. However, this seems contrary to the idea that we can have, at least theoretically, 
multiple semiotic systems developed from different resources, as Rosen would have it. 
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Distinguishing the features that allow something to relate to its environment, 
as opposed to properties that interact in some way with it, is still quite tricky. 
And that is because the boundaries of chemistry show themselves to be at the 
vastly problematic area of distinguishing the living from the non-living. The 
point is then not of distinguishing what is equated to a living being and what is 
left alone, without even the need to refer to synechism, but what is necessary for 
the sign relation to be considered such. In any case, semiosic implementation is 
not set to a single mechanism of necessity. On the contrary, achieving a relation 
with the environment doesn’t depend on one particular physiology to obtain. As 
long as a mechanism of choice is possible, semiosis is effective. Kull (2015) 
theorizes that “choice requires the simultaneity (synchronicity) of options” 
(226) encased in the possibility of logical conflict (from the side of the inter-
preter). This point works in our theory in that the implementation of a relation, 
while consistent in form, doesn’t require actual consistency in behavioral 
results. We can agree with Queiroz and El-Hani in that semiotic systems are 
physically embodied and semiosis must be physically instantiated (Queiroz; El-
Hani 2006: 189), and that at the core of semiosis there must be an element of 
choice, understanding choice, following Kull, as a mode of selection that 
depends on a multiplicity of synchronic options which cannot be accounted for 
as a general if-then rule that doesn’t allow for contradictions. In order for a 
physical system to implement a relation then we need it to have a mechanism of 
such selection, but before that we also need it to possess a mechanism of 
relating to its environment. The actual physiological characteristics will 
necessarily vary across organisms, but the abstraction can be modeled as such.  
Is semiosis implemented and multiply realized? This seems to be the only 
available option, first because the alternatives do not lead us anywhere as I have 
tried to show, and second because it is the simpler way to account for semiosis 
within a naturalized framework, even if the accounting for is only done through 
abstractions. 
 
7.4. Layering semanticity 
So what is the place of semanticity in all this? In the use we gave it before, it 
cannot be considered as the initial foundation for semiosis, but rather, it needs 
to be appended to a layered order in the implementation of semiosis. For seman-
ticity to happen, there needs to be the possibility of a relation in a material 
setting, as we saw in section 3.2. In the next chapter, and taking the theory we 
have built so far, we will put forward a model for this layering when con-
sidering its minimal possible expression as a way to abstract the sign relation 




 8. MINIMAL SEMIOSIS 
This chapter will explore a tentative model for the minimal expression of 
semiosis, its minimal conditions expressed in the unity of the model subsumed 
under the theory we have examined so far. The starting point for this, as it was 
established in the previous chapter, is that of semanticity under its special notion. 
The first point to explore thus is the layering of semanticity, as we will see next. 
 
 
8.1. Building in layers 
The precondition for semanticity should lie on the possibility of relations. That 
is, a material setting is necessary for the existence of any form of semanticity, 
but this is certainly not enough for it to happen. Taking from Pattee then, 
matter-symbol complementarity is a presupposition we cannot do away with, 
with the caveat that we understand the nuance of symbol as used by him. 
However, in order to explain it further, we can postulate that the material aspect 
must in some way precede the symbolic aspect (understood as semanticity), and 
that the symbolic aspect is attached to behavioral output. As mentioned before, 
semanticity cannot be the initial foundation for semiosis. Under this conception, 
we need a layered scheme of interactions in order to bring about the actuality of 
semiosis. There’s no semanticity without the possibility of a material aspect, but 
the possibility itself cannot be cashed out adequately individually. In other 
words, possibility does not entail any actuality of necessity. This issue of 
contingency is quite simple if we consider that one could be named differently, 
but is not. That there existed a possibility of my name being Norbert does not 
necessitate its actuality. This takes care of some basic objections about the 
implementation of virtual relations that give rise to physiosemiosis (as we saw 
in chapter 3). As the possible semantic value of something is directly related to 
the physiological constraints set in the organism will thus give us a starting 
point, as this sort of percepts do not imply a set of all possible meanings, but 
only those that are possible within certain limitations.  
As much as life and semiosis are coextensive, we must try and observe to 
what degree they are immediately concurrent. Instead of thinking of this as an 
egg or chicken kind of problem, we may assume that the distinction is rather 
useless, for it doesn’t add to our knowledge as much as it gives us an analytical 
hint as to where we can look for sign usage. And although the threshold issues 
stand, we have an analytical distinction between sign implementation and non-
implementation in broad strokes. This, I feel, is enough to first subscribe to the 
idea of sign action as weakly emergent, and second, to leave the specifics of its 
emergence to a different sort of terminological issue.  
The abstraction thus is this: If semiosis is implemented in any form, and if it 
depends on a perceptual apparatus, unless we are able to either find a perceptual 
apparatus on a rock or assign it a protophenomenal value, we will not be able to 
either determine the implementation of semiosis in that particular system nor 
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will we be able to refer to the same thing when using the term ‘sign’ in dealing 
with it.  
And so, let us first give some specific ground to the idea of building in 
layers. There’s two questions we need to take into account if we want to follow 
the sense of parsimony behind this endeavor. The first is ‘Can we live without 
this element?’ and the second, ‘What is the payoff?’. In other words, sufficiency 
and causality. Importantly, the layers do have some metaphysical implications, 
but these will be made clearer as we proceed. We have also preferred the usage 
of the concept of ‘layer’ to that of ‘level’ to distinguish ourselves from the 
hierarchical vision of Salthe. However, it must be noted that the concept of 
layer is as loaded as that of level (Kim 2010: 54–65), with the hierarchical 
assumption of the levels made patent in the usage of the word. With layers, 
however, we mean to have a sense of complementary buildup instead of an 
absolute piling up level over level. The layers are thus differentiated and, to a 
certain degree, vertical, but the idea is avoiding the strong assumption that one 
lies on top of the other towards a directed end. Each of the layers circle specific 
surrounded areas, as we will see now. 
 
 
8.1.1. Physical layer 
I have suggested using Pattee’s notion of semanticity as relational possibility 
within sign types, and with that it is necessary to build off matter-symbol 
complementarity. This means that there is at least a need to set a physical layer, 
even if we are not dead set on a hard hierarchy. The physical layer as basal can 
be cashed out in two different forms, one through Peirce’s continuity thesis as a 
metaphysical clause in our theory; or by allowing the ‘complementarity’ of 
symbols to be an emergent. Let’s examine both possibilities.  
 
 
Synechism and tychism 
We have mentioned synechism as a metaphysical proposition for biosemiotics, 
and it is against this backdrop that continuity can assume a simple account of our 
layering. However, continuity as such doesn’t add much to our specificity. It may 
well be that matter and symbol are continuous, but the problem lies really in the 
gradient. Synechism does enough work for a categorial subsumption of pheno-
menal realization for Peirce, but we hit a wall against it. Either we assume 
synechism to be correct and state that between point x and y there’s a point that is 
half x and half y. The directedness of this view subtly incorporates a guiding 
arrow from x to y that can be characterized as an incremental addition of 
properties and a tendency towards y. While this must not be understood as any 
form of determinism, for it is coupled with tychism – chance –, it augments the 
need for principles that determine the metaphysical outcomes while still following 
a single line. That the line hits some bumps in our imaginary arrow is not exactly 
an issue. A simpler take on this implies the reduction of principles: Continuity is 
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only necessary insofar as it determines that a property we currently have could 
have been an aim at a previous point in time. Chance is necessary insofar as we 
need to assume that a present property is contingent. If we reframe synechism and 
tychism as the contingency of some properties in time, we have already a simpler 
epistemological account of Peirce’s view.131 We do not have any determination 
of, say, mental properties, but the fact we have them should at least account for 
their possibility. This is a rather controversial point to make, but the idea is that 
possibility does not need to have a special ontological characterization. More 
importantly though, a strong ontology for possibility is unnecessary for a 
biosemiotic characterization of signs. One may try to use tychism as the ‘engine’ 
to get both an argument against mechanicism and a metaphysical claim about the 
reality of possibilities, but it is hardly necessary to go through such hoops. First 
take tychism in the form of a law that states that for any other law x, that law may 
change into law x+1. But that form of the argument necessitates a secondary form 
of tychism, that law x entails that there is always a law x+n. And that at a certain 
point in time the regularities of x+n can be given by the fact that x+n is a law at 
that point in time. That tychism governs Peircean metaphysics doesn’t necessarily 
lead us to believe that chance must necessarily take the form of an indeterminate 
property at all given times; rather, simply, we can minimize it to say that pro-
perties are contingent without having to be entailed by both an x law and its 
necessary ‘sublaw’ x+n. Laws are taken as primitive, whether they change or not, 
and contingency of properties is enough to avoid expanding the ontology we are 
dealing with. 
 
Complementarity of symbols 
A weaker proposition is that of weak emergence for Pattee’s proposed comple-
mentarity. One issue we find here is that of irreducibility, for a weakly emergent 
complementarity can mean the reduction of symbolic reference to its physical 
constituents. Can semiosic implementation be reduced to the fact that there is a 
physical aspect to it? The answer to this is negative. Now, complementarity is 
taken by Pattee to be a ‘symbolic description of reality’ (Pattee 2001: 343), 
which doesn’t amount to much. However, complementarity must be irreducible 
when applied to descriptions in a hierarchical view of semiosic emergence. To 
paraphrase, Pattee assumes epistemological complementarity when we refer to 
organismic models. This poses more of a problem than a solution, for the 
recursion to descriptions amounts finally to a metaphysical proposition that 
Pattee doesn’t want to refer to. But I believe we can salvage the spirit of the 
proposition by retooling it into an argument regarding the indeterminate status 
of referential instantiation.132 The point is not leading to the specific principle 
                                                          
131  It is arguable whether Peirce would have accepted any form of non-contingent property 
following the synechism/tychism coupling, but most likely he already accepted that both 
synechism and tychism were non-contingents of their own. 
132 An argument for solving the symbol grounding problem has been proposed by Steels 
(2008) that will play a heuristic role in my argument later on. 
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that caused signs from the physical, but to the principle that states that signs are 
not reducible to the physical. A weakly emergent account of signs gives us the 
chance to do so by not affirming either that signs are merely reducible to their 
physical constituents (which are only partial), but that they nevertheless depend 
on the physical aspect to exist. This is in line with Peircean realism while doing 
away with some of its metaphysical claims.  
The situation, however, is not so simple. We cannot just append complemen-
tarity without having a form of doing so. At this point, we have to be rooted in a 
physical layer in order to have anything of the sort of claims biosemiotics can 
make about signs, but we need more than just that. The second proposed layer 
should then aim at the implementation of possible sign relations. The line we 
will follow, however, depends on complementarity to work, and as such it is 
taken as a primitive of the argument.  
For now, if we review our original questions, we can stipulate that a physical 
layer is necessary for any semiosis to be actual, with the payoff being that of 
having an actual ground where to establish semiosis. It is not an expensive 
element for us to have as long as we are aware that it depends on a simplified 
form of realism. 
 
8.1.2. Implementational layer 
The problem left in the previous layer is that of allowing complementarity. As it 
stands, a physical layer is insufficient for semiosis. We need a bridge between it 
and actual relations. Implementing relations requires an apparatus capable of 
doing so, and this apparatus must be grounded in the physical layer. The 
implementational layer would thus correspond to a complementarity function, a 
set of constraints for informational input and output, without assigning specific 
value to that concept of information. That is, information here is only heuristic 
and not characterized as a type of information. With that in mind, the necessity 
for an implementational layer is characterized in this way: For a sign relation to 
hold, it needs to be mapped to an object initially. In reducing the types of 
objects we need as a basic necessity, we may do away with abstract objects in 
characterizing our argument as essentially evolutionary. Assuming simple bio-
logical forms do not require complex abstract objects to entail a relation, or 
rather that complex abstract objects are only possible in complex systems, we 
do not need to account for them, at least for now. However, given that physi-
cality is not a sufficient condition for a relation to hold, we need to have an 
organized form within the physical world we have established. The quirks of 
this part are hard to work out, but not impossible.  
An implementational layer already makes a couple of extra propositions that 
are not in the physical layer: (i) that some elements in the physical layer are not 
fully contiguous, and (ii) that some of those non-contiguous elements can be 





The idea is that there must be relevant topological differences out there, that 
semiotic systems can be differentiated from non-semiotic systems at least to the 
point where a difference is noticeable between them, even in a trivial sense. 
This shouldn’t come as a surprise, for the contiguity thesis of synechism doesn’t 
imply that everything that has been individuated entails the same identity as 
everything else. The gradualism of synechism goes to the point that there’s 
some contiguity between the layers, and that is as much as one can say about it. 
It is important to know though that this assumption is, however, not trivial. The 
fact that there is non-contiguity is also partly relevant in the physical layer in 
that the physical layer can be composed of multiple properties. For now though, 
what matters is that non-contiguity brings out the necessity for differential 
structures for relations to obtain. 
 
 
Differential structures in non-contiguity 
This in turn means a specific arrangement within the physical layer, for if 
anything, semiotic systems are grounded on it. In order for implementation to 
occur, we need to have a conception of systematic input-output relations, where 
input is dictated by the physical layer and constrained by the implementational 
layer. But what is exactly the structural arrangement that we are talking about? 
Much like the physical layer, it is an abstraction of the potential mechanisms 
that take place in simple behavioral control. As actual chemotaxis presents 
divergence across species (Szurmant; Ordal 2004), it is relevant for our position 
to assume that relation-entailing mechanisms can be given across different 
structural possibilities. That, however, doesn’t mean that all possible structures 
also entail relations. We can limit the layer to signal transduction from an 
element rooted in the physical layer, but not in the non-contiguous imple-
mentational layer, deriving in excitation of the same layer. Here we do need yet 
another bridge, because excitation is not enough to call a relation semiotic.  
In chemotaxis, we can distinguish both metabolism-dependence and in-
dependence for behavioral output. In metabolism-independent chemotaxis “be-
havior is not sensitive to changes in the metabolism” in the short term (Egbert et 
al. 2010: 1) and that seems to be the case for E. coli; however, there is evidence 
for metabolism-dependent chemotaxis involving “an ongoing influence of the 
metabolism upon the chemotaxis mechanism” (Egbert et al. 2010: 2). This 
presents a problem for us in that we must take both possibilities and see how 
dependent our models can be on such distinction, or rather, to what degree the 
existence of such a difference can be of relevance for a minimal model of 
biosemiosis. Take for instance the assertion that “The semiotic quality of life is 
grounded [in] the organization of the cell’s metabolism” (Emmeche et al. 2002: 
16). However, in a chemotaxis that bypasses metabolism, we would have no 
behavioral output unless this behavioral output were to be absolutely 
insignificant. The question would then be, is all chemotaxis involved in sign 
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processes? To tackle this issue head-on, let’s assume that metabolism-inde-
pendent chemotaxis does not pose a problem for relation entailment: Relations 
can obtain even with an implementation that does not fulfill a metabolic role. 
We will need to cauterize this theoretical wound later on by assuming some 
consequences to this assumption, but this will suffice for having implementation 
in a simplified fashion.  
Interestingly, Hoffmeyer addresses Kauffman’s less recent attempts at 
understanding minimal complexity regarding the emergence of life. Kauffman 
believes that the key lies in ‘collective catalytic closure’, that is, 
 
that every molecule in the system either is supplied from the outside as “food” or 
is itself synthesized by reactions catalyzed by molecular species within the 
autocatalytic system. Catalytic closure is not mysterious. But it is not a property 
of any single molecule; it is a property of a system of molecules. It is an 
emergent property. (Kauffman 1995: 275) 
  
Hoffmeyer, however, believes this not to be enough: 
  
From the biosemiotic point of view, Kauffman’s idea about the generation of 
autocatalytic self-sufficiency is only a necessary first step on the way from a 
chemical system to a living system [...]. Beyond this, we must add a second step, 
which is the establishment of the very conditions that could make semiosis possible 
in the first place – i.e., the generation of a closed membrane around such an 
autocatalytically closed system of chemical components and thereby the creation of a 
basic asymmetry between an inside and an outside, making the membrane a potential 
interface structure through which the autocatalytic mix on the inside might learn to 
adjust cleverly to conditions outside. (Hoffmeyer 2008: 34) 
  
The relevance of this for us lies in that both Kauffman and Hoffmeyer point to a 
structural need for relation entailment, but this is certainly not enough. We see 
in Kauffman’s original view that complexity is a requirement for certain actions 
that sustain the existence of certain semiosic organisms. Hoffmeyer comple-
ments that with the need for this complexity to pertain to a significant difference 
between the structure that enables semiosis and that which lies beyond this 
structure. We can identify this division with the layers we have so far, with the 
caveat that what Hoffmeyer thinks is the second and final step for semiosis is 
not, in fact, the full story. Now, we will not take care of the problem of origins 
(of life), for that is certainly beyond the scope of this work, so some of these 
assumptions may play out differently in also adding that idea to our exami-
nation of layers. With that said, the issues of semiogenesis may certainly seem 
related, but this is not an issue that can be solved purely through modeling. 
However, hopefully modeling can assist in theoretical assumptions with regards 
to the Sebeok axiom.  
That aside, the point here is that implementation does not fulfill the role of 
entailing the relation, only to ground the possibility into a structure that will 
make it actual. The specificities of the differential structures, however, will be 
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reviewed later. For now, its differentiation is simply not enough. What’s 
necessary to entail sign relations is a dynamic enactive system joining the 
output with behavior. 
 
8.1.3. Enactive layer 
Bridging output with behavior is crucial to entail a proper sign relation. This 
asks us, however, to assume that an interpretant requires some form of 
reportability (lato sensu, evidently), and that it is not an abstract at its simplest 
in an entailed relation. The reason to assume that is grounded in the conception 
that an entailed sign relation at its bottom can only be assumed to exist if it 
takes place in behavior. The more complex a system, the ampler the possibili-
ties to entail complex relations. From a top-down approach, take symbolic 
representation. A symbolic representation is aspective (that is, not univocal) and 
its interpretant is branched into abstractions and complex reactions. A basic 
system may have multiple, non-univocal interpretants, but if ever-growing 
complexity is the basis of symbolic growth, then we may also accept as a 
corollary that less complexity yields simpler forms of reference.  
The implication is simply that more basic semiotic systems possess simpler 
behavioral cues than those of more complex ones.133 There does not seem to be 
anything particularly hard in accepting this position, and for now that much 
suffices for our purposes, as we are not interested in making sweeping claims 
about semiogenesis.  
This particular layer makes already a different assumption, as the concept of 
an enactive layer says something about the expected implications. Enactivism is 
already a loaded topic, but it is relevant to the degree that it allows us to have a 




The idea is to take enactivism as an ostensible theoretical background that is 
necessary not only as a side note for a biosemiotic model based on complexity, 
but as a methodological principle to account for the unit of analysis that the 
model requires. As such, we will need to briefly define it within the scope of 
this work. While the concept of enactivism is usually set as a theory on human 
cognition (Kirchhoff; Hutto 2016), and as such is a view on mental phenomena, 
the principle is that of combining theories of embodied and embedded cognition 
(Silberstein 2008). Let’s characterize this further.  
Cursory definitions for embodied and embedded cognition begin with the 
relation between the organism and its environment. Embodied cognition usually 
sees cognition as situated, that is, taking place “in the context of a real-world 
                                                          
133  A similar point is made by Maran and Kleisner when they state that organisms are 
characterized biosemiotically as “actively participating in semiosis” and thus being “the 
shapers of their own life and future” (2010: 190). 
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environment, and it inherently involves perception and action” (Wilson 2002: 
626). More specifically, 
  
situated cognition is cognition that takes place in the context of task-relevant 
inputs and outputs. That is, while a cognitive process is being carried out, per-
ceptual information continues to come in that affects processing, and motor 
activity is executed that affects the environment in task-relevant ways (Wilson 
2002: 626) 
  
This is not applicable, however, to semiosis in a basal condition in that we are 
talking about a difference of several orders of magnitude. First, for the concept we 
are trying to develop, semiosis does not equate with cognition. Second, applying 
concepts of human cognition to simple organisms smacks of anthropomorphism 
without offering much else. If anything, such a view can only be a metaphorical 
reference. In order to get out of this problem, we need to develop a theoretical view 




At this point we can make use of some terminological technology coming from 
the concept of minimal cognition. If we consider cognition as “a biological 
phenomenon [...] that exhibits itself as a capability to manipulate the environ-
ment in ways that systematically benefit a living organism” (Calvo Garzón; 
Keijzer 2011: 161–162) in the context of non-human cognition, we can start 
seeing how we can link the principles of embodied cognition to those of 
semiosis. In fact, Calvo Garzón and Keijzer provide us with just an example: 
  
Consider chemotaxis in E. coli. These free-moving bacteria use flagella to move 
around and can travel up or down gradients of several substances that they can 
ingest or that they need to avoid. All of the basic ingredients for a minimal form 
of cognition are already present here: manipulating the external environment at 
larger scales to enable or enhance metabolic functioning. (Calvo Garzón; Keijzer 
2011: 162) 
  
Minimal cognition thus considered provides us with the most grounded rule for 
using an embodied approach to semiosis, for the entailment of relations ne-
cessitates at its most basic level a way to instantiate relations between the 
organism and the world that surrounds it. Again, following the principles of 
minimal cognition, “Setting up an adequate sensorimotor organization requires 
a particular physical embodiment of an organism, be it bacterium or monkey ” 
(Calvo Garzón; Keijzer 2011: 162). Here we bridge the implementational layer 
with the enactive one, because sensorimotor organization cannot entail anything 
in a vacuum. The point here is that relations, as our theoretical desiderata for 
biosemiotics, cannot be entailed simply by the existence of the physical world 
and a sensorimotor structure. We need the combination of both in order to have 
actual, initial relations.  
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The problem we face here is that one may argue that if structures and the 
world are not sufficient on their own to entail relations, all we are left with is a 
vitalist account of action. We can immediately argue against such a claim by 
stating that claims about sensorimotor structure simply do not argue for its 
action, and that it is in action that we find the completed entailment of a sign 
relation. But if minimal cognition is dependent on metabolism, then we need to 
deal with this contradiction (pointed out in 2.2.2). But as we saw, minimal 
cognition is not instantiated by metabolism, rather, it affects it. Now, we seem 
to be clinging on to a technicality in order to salvage this point, but the 
structural aspect of the implementational layer is not independent, so what 
matters to us is that what is called minimal cognition reflects specifics related to 
an organism’s needs and possibilities. Introducing semiosis to this scheme gives 
us a way to specify the metaphysical aspects of the sign relation within the 
scope of biosemiotics. We can then be in agreement that “Metabolism is based 
in chemistry while cognition is based in sensorimotor coordination, which 
modulates the conditions of metabolic processes” (van Dujin; Keijzer; Franken 
2006: 165), but at the same time, we are referring to a different sort of 
theoretical object. Where there is cognition in the sense lined up by the pro-
ponents of minimal cognition, there is semiosis, or sign-relation entailment.134 
As we mentioned before, enactivism requires cognition to be embodied and 
embedded. We have taken care of the embodied aspect at least partially, but it is 
important to also take into account that embeddedness gives us action in the 
system.135 Normally, embedded cognition “highlights the role of external 
structures in supporting and scaffolding cognitive activity” (Fenici 2012: 279), 
which can be differentiated from the principle of embodied cognition in that 
embodiment implies the relevance of physical structures of the organism for 
their cognitive activity.136 It is in their combination that we can have a basic 
form of the enactive layer, and yet their combination would seemingly need to 
be radical in this model. The guiding principle is that it is in the combination of 
both aspects that we can have a relevant account of semiosis, one that can be 
corroborated by behavior, but that is not to be frames as mechanism. In fact, it 
would seem that “an embedded system is never purely reactive” in that 
 
Agents modify their position with respect to other objects in the environment 
and, thus, partially determine the sensory patterns they will receive in the next 
time-step, thereby providing a concrete example of an agent creating the form of 
the stimulus by its manner of offering itself to actions from the outside 
(Izquierdo-Torres; Di Paolo 2005: 260) 
  
                                                          
134  This argument reminds of Sebeok’s thesis (Kull et al. 2008), but under the stipulation 
that semiosis can only be attested to given certain conditions of what we call living. 
135  While vague for now, we will take care of the concept in the following pages. 
136  I will not address the relevance of situatedness for enactivism as it doesn’t pertain 
properly to the problem of entailing sign-relations beyond what is already addressed by 
embodied and embedded views. 
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leading us to posit the necessity of the combination of embodied with 
embeddedness to have a functional account of semiosis.  
 
 
A note on behaviorism 
The enactive layer is, at it may seem, action-oriented. This opens up some 
potential criticisms regarding the validity of a behavioristic approach. The idea 
of such criticism would be to point out that so far the layers only indicate that if 
there’s a physical input, there is an output, and that if we allow that to be the 
whole story, we are simply stuck with mechanism. Our view, however, allows 
us to answer that it is not the case. By having the enactive layer be combi-
natorial in the way we have already described, but also conjoined to the 
previous layers, we can make our case about sign action not only limited to a 
reactive model. In fact, we are arguing here for the enclosing of perception and 
effectors in the way that was postulated by Uexküll. While the terminology and 
means are different, it is this aspect of biosemiotics that grounds our possibility 
of referring to an enactive later altogether. In the same line, the fact that 
autopoiesis remains a relevant piece for the enactive approach (Froese; Di Paolo 
2011: 6) is indicative of the convergence between a semiotic approach and an 
enactive one.137 In this, we oppose mechanism as the sole enabler of behavior, 
but we will develop this idea later in this chapter.  
 
 
8.2. The role of the layers 
We have proposed three layers in our view. These are what we can assume to be 
the minimal constituents for talking about the possibility of semiosis in the first 
two layers, and its actuality in the third one. While it is possible to conceive a 
world in which these three layers do not exist, we can agree on the layers 
hinging on each other vertically, to some extent. This means, we need to 
subscribe to a form of emergence in order to talk about both the enabling 
structures and the action that comes about within semiosis. In other words, we 
have only done half the work. What we need next is to give a more detailed 
explanation on what sort of emergence is necessary and what are the minimal 
requirements and specificities for sign-action to take place given the constraints 
set by the layers. At this point, it is important to refer to a competing view of a 




                                                          
137  Take, for instance, the assertion that “Viewing causality, purpose, function, and 
“meaning” of living systems in both their internal organization and their relationship to 
their environments implies a semiotic view” (Weber 2009: 354). While I do not think 
that this statement is uncontroversial, it serves to illustrate the point. 
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8.2.1. Salthe hierarchies 
Stanley Salthe develops his own system of categorization in the frame of 
Hierarchy Theory (1985).138 His view, however, is highly specific, divided in 
two categories for hierarchies, scalar hierarchies and specification hierarchies. 
Presented as a metatheoretical account, it also starts with ontological assump-
tions, such as the unlimited complexity of the world (Salthe 1985: vii). But as it 
goes, hierarchization becomes more complex in that it attempts to bring about 
causality, complexity, stability and boundary conditions (9). And in order to 
bring about such a hierarchy (or hierarchies), we derive it from “our array of 
basic qualities, primary activities, and theoretical concepts” (11), but to that is 
also added the aesthetic judgment of applicability of such hierarchies – an 
intuition based on fascination –, which Salthe explains as “resonance between 
one part of the world (our minds) and other parts, all embodying the same basic 
structure” (11). While this explanation is not quite precise, the point to Salthe is 
that judgments about possible universal structures can be attained in a similar 
fashion as what we see in Peircean categorical thought. Whether this is right is a 
matter of debate, however, the metaphysical assumption that goes there becomes 
clearer. In explaining his position further, Salthe explains that his view depends 
on processes, entities and boundaries, all of them radical in his view (17).  
The difference between levels is given, in Salthe’s view, in an evolutionary 
scale. Where there’s causal processes of relevance to the focus level (in our 
case, that of humans), these processes will be stored as perceptually relevant 
throughout genetic history to the extent that perceivers can detect these pro-
cesses and differentiate them (59–60).139 These are the basic conditions set in 
thinking about hierarchies proposed by Salthe, and it expands in a number of 
specific consequences, the most important of which is the expanding, linear 
interpretation of continuity between basal biological processes towards cultural 
ones in organic evolution (189–248). These claims are avoided by the layers 
proposed earlier because they only apply to minimal mechanisms. The 
argument for parsimony does not entail its expansion as a univocal thrust in 
evolution. Instead, it only serves to illustrate the specific point about minimal 
requirements for a conceptualization of semiosis.  
A Salthe hierarchy allows its constituents to come about via intuitions 
without having a final ontological say about their status. The two types of 
hierarchies mentioned in the beginning are metatheoretically construed (Salthe 
2004: 331). These Salthe exemplifies as those hierarchies that nest subsystems 
within supersystems, in the case of scalar hierarchies, and as a specific 
interpretation for specificity of elements within the set described by the full 
hierarchy, in the case of specification hierarchies (Salthe 1991). Now this 
descriptive attempt at observing hierarchies is, ultimately, also set against a 
metaphysical backdrop as we have seen. And in fact, it is productive enough in 
                                                          
138  A summary can be accessed at http://www.nbi.dk/natphil/salthe/Summary_of_the_ 
Principles_o.pdf. 
139  We return here to the ‘resonance’ explanation Salthe uses initially. 
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this way in that it opens the possibility of referring to newly crafted hierarchies 
while also criticizing them. We will limit our understanding of Salthe 
hierarchies as those that take a descriptive role on reality140 and that allow the 
research of the levels that they posit (mostly related to scalar hierarchies, but the 
boundaries are never as clear). As such, however, our layered description does 
not comply with Salthe hierarchies in that the layers we have used depend on 
the conceptualization of semiosis and not on the intuitions of the world that may 




A Salthe-hierarchical emergentist account of semiosis 
In order to see how a Salthe hierarchy operates in the same realm of analysis, 
the main example in the biosemiotic literature is the strong emergentist account 
of semiosis from El-Hani et al. (2009). As explained by the authors 
 
to describe the fundamental interactions of a given entity or process in a 
hierarchy, we need (i) to consider it at the level where we observe it (‘focal 
level’); (ii) to investigate it in terms of its relations with the parts described at a 
lower level (usually [...] the next lower level); and (iii) to take into account 
entities or processes at a higher level (also usually [...] the next higher level), in 
which the entities or processes observed at the focal level are embedded. (El 
Hani et al. 2009: 139). 
  
Such a hierarchy allows them to give a strongly emergentist account of 
semiosis. However, as we have seen before, in order to have a strongly 
emergent account we need to accept that these hierarchies are firmly rooted 
ontological characterizations of the world. The emergent properties can be seen 
as strongly emergent if they cannot be deduced (section 5.1.3), and overall, the 
metaphysical account of the hierarchies lies in their own description. If 
anything, a Salthe hierarchy in a strongly emergent biosemiotic account of 
semiosis cannot be only heuristic, it is cashed out in at least a partial ontology. 
The argument proposed by El-Hani et al. is derived in the following way: By 
assuming the focal level to be the level “in which a selected semiotic process is 
observed” (El Hani et al. 2009: 141), with semiotic processes being defined as 
sign triads of the Representamen-Object-Interpretant order, we can derive both 
a lower and a higher level. The lower level is defined as micro-semiotic, and the 
higher level is taken to be macro-semiotic. The micro-semiotic level involves 
“the relations of determination within each [semiotic] triad” (142),141 whereas 
the macro-semiotic level involves “networks of chains of triads, in which each 
individual chain is embedded” (142). Considering the stipulations of Salthe 
hierarchies, the micro-semiotic level is defined by the observed semiotic triad. 
                                                          
140 Or in nature as the defining concept for World in Salthe’s view (1985: 12). 
141  This considering that sign relations are only possible in a chain with more than one sign 
relation. 
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El-Hani et al. jump to the assumption that this micro-semiotic level sets the 
initial conditions for the focal level (143), and that an object142 in the sign 
relation is thus defined by the conditions on this level. Here the authors attempt 
at distinguishing potential and actual elements in the sign relation. Finally, the 
micro-semiotic level is considered to be where potentialities lie for all elements 
of the sign relation. The macro-semiotic level regulates what potentialities can 
become actualities (again, for all elements of the sign relation), and the focal 
level witnesses the emergence of semiotic processes. They explain that the 
emergence of semiotic processes happens here due to the interaction between 
micro- and macro-semiotic processes, between “the potentialities established by 
the micro-semiotic level and the selective, regulatory influence of the macro-
semiotic level” (144).  
The obscure ontological status of potentialities in this account is indicative 
of the mark of a strongly emergentist account that the authors try to defend. The 
argument is nuanced by the assumption that the irreducibility of a Peircean sign 
relation must be taken as indicative of non-deducibility (176), and by the idea 
that semiotic processes are unpredictable with tychism as the backbone of the 
assumption (178). These, I think, are very expensive ways to have semiosis as a 
strong emergent, because the argument depends on having correct intuitions 
from the structure of the Salthe hierarchy – if our intuitions are correct because 
they are natural, then intuitions about aether could be cashed out empirically, 
for instance – with said structures causally connected to each other, the micro-
semiotic level being somehow recognizable despite its consisting in possibilities 
of, we may assume, the ontological flavor, but even if it is not the case, the 
point that stands is that possibilities can only be taken as feasible given prior 
epistemological constraints, without having to consist of a separate level. It may 
well be the case that what is ‘micro-semiotic’ here is simply the same as the 
focal level, making the emergence argument harder to place.  
If anything, the point I am trying to make is not that Salthe hierarchies are 
flawed, but rather that their applicability must be scaled down and reworked. 
An argument for a strongly emergent semiosis from a Salthe hierarchy adds a 
number of clauses to our ontology and these clauses are only posited as 
theoretical desiderata to correspond to Peircean metaphysics (take the case of 
tychism, for instance).  
 
 
8.2.2. The layers and weak emergence 
The difference to make here is that the conception of the layers tries to avoid the 
complications of strong emergence. As mentioned before, we can only fit a 
weakly emergent conception of semiosis if we take the layered model. Taking 
the physical layer as radical, and this is only insofar as the other layers are 
                                                          
142  More specifically a dynamic object, that is, an initial object that generates further sign 
relations. 
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dependent on it, the following layers can be recognized in the sense that they 
are discernible in their difference, not in that they are reducible. In fact – and 
this in general lines –, “a model of the world as layered can be independent of 
reductionism” and the denial of reduction can be explained “because the 
properties of higher layer (constituted) objects seem to be different from the 
properties of their lower layer (constituting) sums of objects” (Paul 2007: 266), 
but while this implies important ontological differences across the layers, and 
thus creates some relevant problems for the picture we are painting (such as 
causal overdetermination), a weakly emergent account of semiosis within a 
constrained context can bring a better explanatory position here.  
As we have set the physical layer as radical, we are committed to some form 
of materialism. This is not necessarily a problem as implementation and 
enaction are differentiated for a reason: that they are specific constraints for 
semiosis and that they are not the same as a disperse physical layer. That we 
translate into a nonreductive account of semiosis. However, instead of using the 
argument from El-Hani et al. based on their (and in general, of most bio-
semioticians’) confidence on Peircean irreducibles, we may slightly retract from 
strong ontological formulations and assume that we are not forced to accept 
causally emergent processes of the strong kind (Pereboom 2002: 511). In fact, 
reducibility does not seem to be all that relevant for a weakly emergent account 
of semiosis,143 but the point still stands.  
As the implementational layer suggests, mechanisms for environment 
interaction are not singular in that they can come in a variety of forms. We 
depend on having a notional characterization of these, but what matters is that 
its complement in the enactive layer allows for an ample variety of settings for 
sign action to take place. This reinforces the point of multiple realizability from 
the previous chapter. There is, however, one element missing here besides all 
the fuss about the layers, and that is the actual semantic implementation. It is 
this what I claim is weakly emergent from the conception of the layers. In what 
follows we will explore the other hand of the argument.  
 
 
8.3. Layered P-Semanticity 
We can finally integrate semantics to our view. However, this semantics, as 
we’ve already discussed, is a special type of concept in that it is more through 
resemblance that we reach it (for we want to avoid imposing a sense of 
semantics in language to our special semantics here). The layers are both 
necessary, yet insufficient for us to talk about fully-fledged semiosis. The 
principle we laid out earlier states that Pattee’s notion of semantics depends on 
matter-symbol complementarity. Now, what we can usually call sign action 
                                                          
143  This from Chalmers’s view differentiating phenomena characterized as weakly emergent 
that can be reducible to physical laws and phenomena that is not prima facie emergent at 
all, such as the functioning of a telephone (Chalmers 2006). 
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depends on al three functioning layers, but we are left with the threshold of 
complementarity. That we have the layers does not functionally entail semiosis 
if we assume there will be some form of semantic value in it. What they do, 
however, is give us the conceptual apparatus through which we can have this 
special sense of semantics. Pattee’s semantic closure principle (from now on P-
Semantics) is an interdependence between symbol, matter and function (Pattee 
2012 [1982]: 172). More explicitly, what Pattee proposes is “a generalization of 
this primeval fact to higher levels of evolution, including cognitive systems”, 
and through which complementarity occurs due to “physical embodiments for 
recognizing the symbol tokens and dynamically executing the rules. The 
synthesis of these physical embodiments must be constrained through the 
processing of these symbols” (172).  
In order to unpack these statements further, we need to understand that this 
view is dependent on similar constraints as the ones we have set the in layers, 
but P-Semantics on its own cannot be responsible for the division of perception 
and meaning assignment, so to speak. P-Semantics are called semantics (or 
semiotics, later in the works of Pattee), because their realization includes 
physical, syntactical and pragmatic aspects. However, in deflating this claim – 
or at least removing the hard terminological imposition –, P-Semantics still 
contributes in making a clear distinction between what is fundamentally mecha-
nistic and what can be seen as meaningful within the realm of basic sign usage 
in simple organisms. The point to make is that for something to be meaningful 
at this level, it needs to be mapped to specific instances of behavior. What it 
does not fully solve, however, is the directedness of the action in specific 
instances of behavior. Now, this can be explained away by stating that for 
something to be meaningful in the biological world, it needs to entail some form 
of causation. I agree with this, but we must qualify this assertion.  
Within biosemiotics, accounts of semiosis in simple organisms are usually 
cashed out in terms of finality (as in Aristotelian final causes) or teleodynamics 
(Hoffmeyer 2008; Deacon 2011). So far we have avoided going into Aristo-
telian language because it brings forward more complications than it solves 
problems,144 but teleodynamics offers a different view, championing the pro-
perty of selfhood and its phenomenology (Deacon 2011: 468). Aditionally, in a 
clearer way, teleodynamics is dependent on morphodynamics – the processes of 
change in morphology –, and more precisely, in autocatalysis and “self-
assembly” (Logan 2012: 295). Both of these, claims Deacon, provide the right 
mix for teleodynamics. But teleodynamics is, ultimately, outcome-oriented 
action with a certain amount of choice. The difference between teleodynamics 
and teleonomy is a matter of putting choice in the forefront or as a seemingly 
indifferent possibility. Now I would not argue that teleodynamics is con-
ceptually wrong, but rather, that a viable philosophical alternative exists in 
teleonomy itself, and this teleonomy is the effect of P-Semantics. An important 
                                                          
144  Ontological status of causes, independent law-like regularities and denaturalization are 
just some of them. 
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philosophical point that Deacon tries to make is that when dealing with 
meaningful processes in nature, unless we consider the constituents of the world 
as processes, we will end up with a dualist picture (Deacon 2012: 44–45). 
Finality or oriented processes, entention in the very specific Deaconian termino-
logy, adds another element to teleodynamics under the condition that we build 
from a processual ontology. The consequences to this, however, are not 
completely clear, but the intention is coherent in the same manner that 
synechism attempts to break off dualism for Peirce. In Logan’s view, Deacon’s 
position falls in the camp of property dualism and triadism (Logan 2012: 297). 
However, following Logan’s interpretation, this property n-aryism is of the 
weak kind. Briefly, property dualism claims, in this weaker variety, that it 
“applies to any domain in which the properties are not themselves properties 
invoked by physics” (Chalmers 1996: 123).145 So we may well be speaking of 
such weak property n-aryism, but it is fundamentally not a strong claim. Rather, 
it is an observation of weakly emergent properties at systemic levels. The 
problem is then that the odd ontological implications cannot exactly obtain 
unless we clear up whether we are making strong or weak assumptions about 
how semiosis may emerge. Again, while the Sebeok thesis works, it does not 
exactly say that life is semiosis, but that they are co-dependent.  
P-Semantics is the domain of teleonomy in the same sense that teleo-
dynamics needs morphology, but our account tackles the issue from a different 
perspective. As we establish ‘boundary conditions’, value assignment reali-
zation becomes harder to grasp in our theoretical models because of the added 
concept of agency. Agency, however, when defined as a phenomenal quality of 
self-control and environmental action,146 becomes a metaphorical model for the 
apparent sense of agency in less complex organisms. I argue that P-Semantics 
does not require a sense of agency to realize value assignment.147 
 
 
8.3.1. Value realization 
What is exactly then P-Semantics? What do we talk about when we talk about 
semantic or semiotic closure? Let’s return to the concept of agency. A top-down 
view of agency will not do if we wish to avoid anthropomorphic accounts of 
semiosis at a basal level. Autopoietic Enactivism considers agency as the 
“phenomenological subjective dimension of organisms” (De Jesus 2016: 133), 
which conceptually may or may not be causally relevant for our explanations. 
                                                          
145  As a contrast, the strong formulation of property dualism “involves fundamentally new 
features of the world” (Chalmers 1996: 123), with said properties not being logically 
supervenient and nonphysical in a strong sense. 
146  Take the simple definition that agency refers “to the experience of controlling one’s own 
actions, and, through them, events in the outside world” (Haggard; Chambon 2012: R390). 
147  This does not mean that agency is unimportant for biosemiotics, and that is not the point 
I wish to make. Rather, I’d say that concepts of agency can be only used in a more 
metaphorical sense at this level. 
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The key, however, is in deciding whether perception and sign action entail a 
phenomenological world. This may well be the case, but here ‘phenomeno-
logical’ refers to ‘sense-making’ (De Jesus 2016: 133), which deflates pheno-
menal claims to semantic claims. Whether these two are inextricably connected 
or not can eventually be pursued, but for now we will consider this a problem of 
concepts. But how can we have P-Semantics in our model?  
In creating this model we are switching to a different unit of analysis, one I 
think is requested by a semiotic approach. This unit of analysis, as hinted at by 
the previous layering, depends on the composition of an organism-environment 
unit for semiosis to be a relevant point in our discussions of semiosis. In 
removing individuality for sign relations, we can come up with explanations 
that both require less commitments and that can account for the same elements 
we want in our theories of biosemiotics. P-Semantics is closure insofar as it 




The idea is, however, that P-Semantics is not dependent on one-on-one con-
nections between elements outside the organism and reception of said elements 
by the organism. The fact that Pattee’s semantic closure states that “by virtue of 
the freely selected symbolic aspects of matter do the law-determined physical 
aspects of matter become functional” (2012 [1995]: 212) allows the layered 
perspective to operate, but it is this sense of freedom that we must take charge 
of. The problem we faced earlier has to do with the fact that meaning cannot be 
characterized as completely outside of the physical,148 but the formulations we 
make of it will invariably end in commitments that we may not wish to explore. 
With this freedom then, we need to establish some limits as to what it could 
possibly mean for simple organisms. In this regard, we can define freedom as a 
non-deterministic coupling of reception mediated by implementation from the 
physical to the enactive. The non-determinism of this coupling should be 
construed as the lack of a single input-output mechanism that entails a repeated, 
singular action. That is, in case of physical instance that can be perceived by an 
organism, its consequent reaction will not be predetermined in all cases. The 
idea is that choice is part and parcel of perception, even at this level, as long as 
we understand it as the fact that for semiosis to happen there must be more than 
a singular element in the organisms ‘world’, there must be some sense of back-
ground against which elements can come up.  
This idea of freedom is, I believe, fully compatible with the notion of 
‘logical conflict’ recently espoused by Kull (2015). Here, we see that an 
organism “can only have the freedom to make a decision if several possibilities 
are presented and available at the same time” (226), leading to decision making, 
which is construed by Kull as choice “in the situation where operations are 
                                                          
148  One is reminded of the problem of the ‘causal closure of the physical’ we have already 
explored in chapter 2. 
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incompatible” (216), such as going forward and backward at the same time. 
However, instead of incorporating phenomenological simples to this picture, we 
have a background that brings enough traction to semantic closure as the 
driving mechanism for the concept of choice.  
P-Semantics, thus, is conceptually the non-deterministic implemented map-
ping of relevance for an organism within a given environment. P-Semantics 
closes the loop of value realization, but this closure is not of a fixed value. That 
is, as meaning is not proposed as a unambiguous one to one correspondence 
between objects and concepts, we are left with what could be characterized as 
stochastic processes of selection between elements that integrate actions 
towards or against them.149 
The way this value is realized is, however, fuzzy in the sense that value 
realization does not depend on crisp values. If logical incompatibility as 
described before is part and parcel of choice at the most basic level of semiosis, 
we are not exactly talking about truth or falsity of propositions as handled by 
the organism. Instead, the choices that are not clear and without seemingly 
relevant specific practical value can be construed as fuzzy – and it is at this 
point that we have a conceptualization of what it takes for some organism to use 
signs at the most general level. The enactive layer, already embedded in the 
other layers, allows the talk of P-Semantics in that the concept of reaction that 
comes with it is the actual form of an interpretant taking place. We are not 
talking about representations, but rather about identification (of some sort) and 
action upon it. Now, mechanical identification based on organismic necessities 
is basic in understanding any sort of behavior, and fuzzy choices seems to 
represent a higher order of internalized functions. These, however, can be put 
together within the same mechanism.  
 
 
Necessities and choice 
When we divide the elements of necessity and choice (in the sense we have 
underlined before), we are usually making two distinct claims: that the mecha-
nisms for fulfilling necessities are independent from mechanisms of choice, and 
that choice does not need to be related to necessities. Both of these claims are 
related in that they present a higher characterization of possible behavior in an 
organism. The point I am trying to make, however, makes a single mechanism 
enough for both. A condition of choice is already related to behavior, and 
organismic necessities, understood as elements necessary for sustenance, are the 
basic drivers of behavior. Choice is not inherently different from necessity, it is 
simply a different side of the coin. The necessity is internalized (or normalized), 
and the choice is the actual output. In a way, necessities are expressed in imple-
mentation, whereas choices are expressed in enaction. Fuzzy choices are the 
form of choice where there’s no implicit necessity over two different options. 
                                                          
149  I will not make an argument for stochastic functions here as I believe the road to take is 
much longer to get there. 
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Logical conflict or not, a fuzzy choice doesn’t map to a full value that mandates 
its realization. Instead, in the choice – stochastic or not – there is a point in 
which there can be no absolute value, with its realization depending on comple-
mentary factors.  
 
8.3.2. Unit of analysis 
With all that said, we can see how a different unit of analysis can be formulated 
within this framework. Drawing from Järvilehto’s view on organism-environ-
ment systems (2009),150 we can understand sign processes as realized subjective 
experience, but more importantly, 
  
Key to this theory is the concept of result as what emerges from the history of 
experience and organization of the organism-environment system, not as a 
simple effect or consequence of behavior but a new possibility of action forming 
in the process of transition from one act to another on the basis of organization of 
the organism-environment system. (116)  
 
In our case, however, limiting the scope of the notion of result leaves us with a 
less far-reaching claim, that the organism-environment system so conceived is 
ultimately the basic unit of analysis for biosemiotics. Even if we are able to 
partition the elements that lead to semiosis, a minimal conceptualization of 
semiosis requires us to address the fact that sign processes are not internally 
processed, they depend on the situatedness of the organism, its actions in the 
environment conceived as the sign processes themselves. Put in this way, “An 
organism as a skin bag is no functioning system; it may be such only together 
with the relevant environmental parts” (Järvilehto 2009: 119), at least when 
what is at stake is a conceptualization of the organism’s usage of signs.  
This then implies that the minimal model of semiosis we are trying to 
develop cannot do without a comprehensive constitution of analysis modeled as 
organism plus environment, but also metaphysically extended to include the 
necessities laid out by our conception of the layers. The system described by 
Järvilehto is a pretty good companion to our model in that it articulates similar 
points from a different perspective. It serves to illustrate the difference between 
organism individuation and environmental inclusion in the conceptualization of 
the sign.  
 
Individuation 
Individuating organisms when conceptualizing semiosis provides an incomplete 
account of semiosic radicals. It is not that we are denying the existence of 
individual organisms or the possibility of partitioning things even further in 
their analysis, but when signs come into play, the way to make sense of a 
minimal claim for them is actually by including the elements outside of the 
                                                          
150  Which at the same time draws from Uexküll’s work, an implicit influence across the 
present work. 
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‘building’ of the organism into the picture.151 Now, when dealing with 
abstractions, we are capable of stating that a semiosic relation may hold in the 
form of object-representamen-interpretant and leave it at that. But this claim 
doesn’t paint the picture of a minimal claim for semiosis, a minimal model that 
gives us a functioning edifice for something we can call semiosis. That the 
logical definition of the sign implies the elements of the relation is, however, 
foundational. It is the recognition of its elements what allows us to understand 
the need to frame sign action within a more specific context.  
At this point I would like to return to Steels proposed solution to the symbol 
grounding problem (2008). The idea is that first you need to have a “physically 
embodied autonomous agent” (236), with its own energy source and computing 
power, present in the world through its own body and capable of interacting 
with it, perceiving it and acting through it. Next, you need “a mechanism by 
which an (artificial) agent can autonomously generate its own meanings” (237). 
The agent in this context must come with a relevance parsing mechanism, 
putting some things in the forefront of its attention and others, behind it. Then 
you need a categorical mechanism “by which agents can internally represent 
and ground their relevant meanings” (237). And after that, it is required that 
“agents autonomously can establish and negotiate symbols to express the 
meaning that they need to express” (238). Meanings must be negotiated if there 
is to be any communication between agents. Coordination is of the utmost 
relevance here in that a specific coordination process “creates the right kind of 
semiotic dynamics so that the semiotic networks of the individual agents 
become sufficiently coordinated to form a relatively organized semiotic land-
scape” (238). With these steps, states Steels, we would have a functional 
solution to the symbol grounding problem. Grounding symbols in this sense is a 
processual affair, but interestingly, it is both an internal and external depen-
dence. In a way, the basics are very similar to what we have proposed, but 
grounding symbols goes a step further because of affixed, negotiated semantic 
content to percepts of some sort. It may well be the case that symbol grounding 
can be solved in this way, and we would do well in paying attention to the 
process presented here, but there’s already a much higher level of usage than we 
are trying to reach. That is, the involvement of communication implies much 
more complex structures of sign usage. And the argument depends on a certain 
individuation of the agent, something that can come later on when semantic 
content is being negotiated, but the basis of P-Semantics allows us to talk of 
semiosis when the negotiation is a process of commonality. Still, we need to 
solve a relevant problem with regards to the continuity of specific percepts.  
 
  
                                                          
151  A more in-depth and current look on semiotic individuation can be found in Hoffmeyer 
(2015a) and Hoffmeyer and Stjernfelt (2016). 
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Sign stability 
The problem of continuity – or rather, of the stability of signs – is an interesting 
one to pose, but its solving is, I believe, not something that comes at a great 
expense for us. The problem, more clearly formulated, can be stated as ‘how is 
it possible for signs to remain consistent within a minimally construed system?’ 
This is a relevant question as signs are, it has been surmised, in constant growth 
(Merrell 1996; Kull 1999; Collier 2014; Nöth 2014), and this growth must be 
grounded on a basis of some sort. The connection between growth and stability 
is inextricable in the same way we saw for symbol grounding: the process 
through which signs (in usage) grow is related to the possibility of having said 
signs be stable across time. Without sign stability, on the other hand, growth is 
not possible in that there’s nothing you could call growth if all your signs are 
simply variations of the same. But this stability needs to be obtained from 
somewhere. P-Semantics as we have defined it is non-deterministic, meaning 
that the obtention of meaning does not entail a fixed value realization. While 
this may be in apparent contradiction with stability (if we consider it as the 
notion that a sign becomes determinate with usage), this is not exactly the case. 
As P-Semantics is constrained by the constitution of the layers, that is, both by 
morphology and situatedness, the non-determinism we have referred to can be 
made more explicit by understanding that meaningful action is not a singular 
external reaction, but rather it functionally responds to specific needs. Instead of 
treating it as a key for one door, P-Semantics allows fuzzy options within a 
range of possibility. The stability of signs in this case is not to be taken as the 
maintenance of certain sign types, and in fact this proves to be a rather hard 
argument to make, for the point of dividing between potential indexicals or 
icons is already axiomatic: whether we believe the most basic type of sign is the 
index because basal perception, so to speak, can only lead to grasping causes or 
proximities (such as nutritional objects), or that it is the icon, because of some 
supposed similarity between the properties of the objects beyond the boundaries 
of the organism and the means of perceiving them, we’ll have to rely on certain 
arguments that ultimately do not change the standing of sign usage in its 
minimal expression. Not that this discussion is useless. However, the point is 
that sign stability will not be defined by sign types, but rather, it is part of the 
whole unit. It may well be that P-Semantics is non-deterministic, but that does 
not mean it is indeterminable. Stability is determined by the same constitution 
of the layers, it is an effect of them as much as it is a feature of semiosis.  
 
 
8.4. A non-exclusionary model for analysis 
In the discussion of parsimonious applicability of models, one thing that may be 
lost is that within its constraints, the model we have developed here is not 
exclusive of other possibilities, especially of those that could be thought of as 
incremental changes. That is, our view on how to model minimal semiosis is not 
a way to refuse the possibility of sign growth, as we have stated before. Instead, 
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the model does call our attention to this fact and allows a more robust 
constitution of its elements, including those that are not directly predictable 
from the idea of minimal semiosis. These include complex communication 
networks, agentive organization and hopefully the basic semiotic ideas in the 
prefixed varieties of semiotic research. At the same time, however, it has not 
been the intention of this research to provide a solitary groundwork on which 
other, specific expressions of sign action can be derived. This is an ongoing 
project for general semiotics and its institutionalization. Still, this model does 
not require exclusivity of methods, it asks for complements that can be 
appended to it.  
This being the case, one relevant notion that we have to deal with is the 
applicability of the model. The heuristics of the modeling task are surely 
evident as far as its conceptual aspect goes, but the reframing of our objects will 
give us a specific picture to use in our understanding of semiosic phenomena. 
The fact is, however, that as far as semiotic simples go, our model must be 
hinged on organisms that are already more than sufficiently complex as it is. 
However, semiotic analyses of some order over model organisms (in a bio-
logical sense) do some explanatory work that we can observe from our model. 
In the case of the previously mentioned E. coli analysis by Stjernfelt,152 we see 
that there’s a semiosic implementation centered around the Uexküllian notion of 
functional cycle. Stjernfelt distinguishes here self-regulatory stability of meta-
bolism “involving categorized signal and action involvement with the 
surroundings” (Stjernfelt 2007: 209), and we can agree with this view. When 
later unpacking his view, we see that for Peircean semiotics, meaning and 
inference are what produces interpretants (Stjernfelt 2014: 117), understanding 
inferences to be “action habits” (119). This view is fully compatible with what 
we have developed so far, but there are some terminological quirks that stand in 
the way. Dicisigns, defined as “signs which may be assigned a truth value – 
without providing, themselves, reasons for that value” (Stjernfelt 2014: 55), can 
be partially equated with a P-Semantic interpretation in that they both give rise 
to behavior of some sort. The difference, however, is that a P-Semantic claim 
does not hinge on a propositional form insomuch as it is a condensed action 
within the system defined by the organism and its environment. The difference 
may seem subtle, but it is a relevant one: P-Semantics are inclusive of the 
environment without limiting the sign function (of, say, the dicisign) solely to 
the organism making inferences about the world. While true that the Peircean 
sign ultimately involves the relation between the environment and the organism 
(including its actions), the expression of such a sign is differential in that a 
proposition is entailed subjectively, expressed individually and based on the 
internal organization of the organism. Layered P-Semantics conforms to a 
different unit of analysis without proscribing semiosis. Meaning obtains in 
semantic closure not as an ultimate result of inferences, but in the coupling of a 
possible choice and the total action directed in the environment. While both 
                                                          
152  In section 5.1.3. 
110 
forms of expression are possible, because they are not mental and environ-
mentally relative, the nuances are dependent on different metaphysical 
standings, and compatibilizing them would take some work that goes beyond 
the scope of this work. Nevertheless, this points to the difference in analysis that 
one can make with different models that follow a similar conceptual path. More 
importantly though, the difference between the approach from the dicisign and 
our minimal model lies in that the claims on minimality are only as strong as the 
boundaries we can set for them, and while our claims are evolutionary to a 
certain degree, they compete only the basal functions in semiosis. A minimal 
model of semiosis will not include its own evolution, only its minimal 
conditions on which its evolution can be deduced.  
In the example set by van Dujin et al. (2006), E. coli is used to show the 
tenets of minimal cognition in a way that makes sense regarding their con-
ceptualization of cognition. The appeal that cognition does not necessitate a 
nervous system is well allowed in the biosemiotic dimension, as well as the 
suggestion that sensorimotor coordination provides “a more basic, more general 
and conceptually clearer starting point for minimal cognition” (van Dujin et al. 
2006: 164). That the E. coli’s Two-Component Signal Transduction System 
(TCST) of E. coli acts as a “molecular form of memory” (162) provides one of 
the most important keys here as it gives us an implementational setting for 
action. That mapping signs to physical objects may turn out to be hard to 
assume under some conditions is no problem for us at this level. Semiosis is in 
fact constrained by the sum of elements within our analysis, and we cannot use 
assumed interpretations beyond what can be derived from action itself. In this 
way, we can assume that a simple organism needs, first, an environment on 
which its actions are hinged and that cause said actions. The implementation of 
behavior in the environment is dependent on structures that range from 
receptors to motility, but these are certainly not enough to produce an account 
of semiosis. We want to rule out tropism in E. coli as a type of semiosis because 
it doesn’t present the directedness of taxis. Tropism may well lack the 
expression of sign action because it cannot be defined as enactive. Ruling it out, 
however, may only follow the concern of ruling out all chemical interactions 
that cannot be attested to be of an organismic nature.153 For now we can assume 
taxis to be fully in the domain of semiosis, but tropism cannot be fully excluded 
as the impact of stimuli can be consequential, though much more restricted.154 
With that said, the point is that E. coli is grounded and its behavior can only 
happen within its physical space and through its TCST, which consists of 
receptors, a transmitter and a response regulator (van Dujin et al. 2006: 162), 
the machinery for E. coli to interact with its environment. As van Dujin et al. 
put it, 
                                                          
153  The problem of viruses is a hard one to crack from semiotics not least because meta-
bolism does not provide us with a full, exclusive indicator of sign action. 
154  Nöth presents an analysis of tropism contextualized as spatial opposition within bio-
semiosis (1994: 37–60). 
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 the transient feedback that is sustained by the slow-paced methylation pathway 
provides E. coli with a dynamic, molecular form of memory which allows it to 
perform what has been dubbed “robust integral feedback control”. That is, by 
filtering out external noise and internal variations, and enhancing tiny variations 
in populated receptor density, the output of the system becomes independent of 
the input level in steady-state, enabling perfect adaptation to a stimulus 
 
As we mentioned, this ‘form of memory’ seems to be of the utmost importance 
when referring to the way the organism interacts with its environment because it 
allows the organism to ground its action on certain non-random factors. That this 
memory is not a retrievable language-like repository should not come as a 
surprise, and as a more metaphorical view on what this memory is supposed to 
mean, we find ourselves with a determinative factor for Kull’s concept of choice, 
which we have co-opted as fuzzy. But as we have seen, choice is determined by its 
enaction, and enaction depends on the correlation of its semantic closure. 
However, we do not use the specific concept of memory in our model because of 
its transitive nature. That is, the corrective nature of such a metaphorical memory 
is subsumed in implementation, but in order for behavior to be cashed out within 
semiosis, we cannot assume that everything in the realm of the organism is 
semiosic. Taxis’s orientation is metabolically constrained and so it presents an 
easier case for claims of meaningful sign action. In the more Uexküllian, sense, 
the form of semantic closure comes about by constrained relevance that is acted 
upon, or as van Dujin et al. put it regarding the constitution of minimal cognition, 
it “is not so much a centralized property of the biological hardware of an 
organism, or a set of internally computed algorithms, but instead denotes an 
abstraction of organism-environment reciprocity” (2006: 165). So the similarities 
of the concept of minimal cognition and minimal semiosis are quite relevant. As 
the point that has been made lies in the difference in units of analysis and 
philosophical elements we refer to, we cannot exactly say that the elements of 
minimal cognition will map to those of minimal semiosis, but the interconnection 
between them is conceptually relevant nevertheless.  
 
 
8.4.1. The model, summarized 
The form that the model takes can be briefly summarized as follows: 
 
1. A physical layer: The most general of the three, setting basal condi-
tions for the materiality of relations, that is, a ground for semiosis. This, 
simply put, is equivalent to accepting that the physical precedes the 
meaningful (section 8.1.1). 
2. An implementational layer: Assuming that not all of the elements 
within the physical layer are contiguous, we can see some differen-
tiation and specificity, a functional structure that allows relations to be 
established, not merely the ground for them. In this case, we are talking 
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of a set of perceptual structures of any sort in an organism, the 
constraints to informational input and output lato sensu (section 8.1.2). 
3. An enactive layer: At this point we need to join output with behavior. 
A sensorimotor structure is not sufficient in that their existence does not 
imply actual output. That is, we have instantiated action at this level, 
closer to the sense of a Peircean interpretant (section 8.1.3). 
 
With these defining our field of coverage, we need to add a notion of special (P) 
semanticity to make the layers work, for there is more to the story of semiosis 
than a description of posited structures that necessitate it. Semantic closure is an 
attempt at closing the loop by establishing that the principle we need comes 
from organizing our unit of analysis beyond the organism and towards its action 
within the environment, not solely at the inner molecular level. This, taken as a 
starting point for a constrained and local level of minimal semiosic capabilities, 
presents us with the opportunity to engage at the theoretical level with the 
meaning making processes of organisms in describing a fully-fledged semiosis. 
More precisely, the task of a biosemiotician concerned with the theoretical 
description of initial semiosic capacities may see in the model a way to tackle 
the problems from descriptions that hinge on the previously mentioned meta-
physical commitments made by some theories in semiotics. In this case, with 
the task of naturalization in mind, the aim of making some of the metaphysical 
commitments explicit while also trying to simplify them can help the bio-
semiotician overcome some terminological issues regarding the status of 
semiosis. This in turns gives us a viable alternative to explore some of the 
pressing issues in biosemiotics, such as the modeling of the relation between the 
physical and the phenomenal, or the description of necessary mechanisms for 
semiogenesis. While it is true that the model will not solve these problems by 
itself, the analytical perspective offered can open new options for considering 
what some of our current theories depend on to work, and whether committing 
to, say, a strong sense of finality in simple organisms, can be acceptable as a 
concern of biosemiotics. 
Besides the example of E. coli in the previous section, we can try and apply 
our model more directly – knowing that the model itself does not exclude the 
possibility of a complementary approach – to some other biosemiotically 
interesting phenomena. As the most common case of a biosemiotic analysis of 
an organism is that of the cell as the minimally competent living unit (Hoff-
meyer 2008; Kull 2015a), we can quickly examine scaffolding as one of the 
essential openings for an analysis of biosemiotic phenomena. Scaffolding in 
biosemiotics is treated as “structural couplings” that work within a living 
system (Hoffmeyer 2007: 152). Theoretically, semiotic scaffolding happens at 
the cellular level because of the possible inside-outside distinction brought 
about by the membrane surrounding the cytoplasm, which in turn allows for a 
sort of informational exchange depending on its internal codes (Emmeche et al. 
2002: 16). This enabling of sign relations, informing our semiotic understanding 
of the cell, and perhaps we can enhance our understanding of scaffolding by 
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seeing how the evolutionary process described by Hoffmeyer (2007: 156–158) 
fits with our model and what the change in commitments can be. That 
scaffolding happens is not in question, but rather, what comes from it and what 
it allows us to say about evolutionary semiosis, for the description of scaf-
folding works constrained by time and the physical constitution of the orga-
nism, that is, semiotic competence calls for the development and definition of 
changes in the organism, building up towards a difference that produces newer 
functionality. The process of semiotic scaffolding is open-ended to the point 
that Hoffmeyer sees it available to the point of cultural change in complex 
organisms (Hoffmeyer 2015: 251–252), but we will limit ourselves to the more 
basic mechanism in simple organisms. In the case of, say, assuming that an 
interpretant forms given certain electrochemical change in the membrane of a 
cell – an example used by Hoffmeyer to describe the possibility of change and 
thus, scaffolding (2015: 148) –, what matters to us is that, given that these 
changes are, first of all, physically instantiated (that is, they happen in the 
physical layer), but are constrained to signify by the differential structures of the 
organism (the sensorimotor apparatus that we represent in the implementational 
layer) and create a behavioral condition that eventually derives in some change 
(that is, they are effective in the enactive layer). But this is not enough to have a 
form of interpretation. A P-Semantic approach required by the model allows us 
to indicate that gluing the layers together requires us to assume the inter-
dependence of these elements in order to speak of semiosis, that is, the relation-
ship is not to be characterized simply as the electrochemical change inciting the 
membrane to react, but rather, it describes the reaction within the environment 
and tracks for the material dependence and the fact that behavior is instantiated. 
The main difference here between the more mainstream biosemiotic approaches 
lies in that the semiotic activity as described within a certain time frame 
necessitates the invoking of special causes in order to lead change towards the 
scaffolding. While Hoffmeyer opposes the “taboo” of final causation in natural 
sciences,155 the fact is that we can do away with it and use a more descriptive 
teleonomical account, as we have established before, because philosophically 
speaking we do not exactly see a reason to entail directed change. That is, the 
sense of agency here is not necessary for value assignment (in section 8.3.1). In 
a more extensive way, reducing this commitment means that we do not have to 
assume that the processes of change and evolution in simple organisms end up 
in the same semiotic processes at higher levels of complexity. This is because 
we have constrained the devices we use to simple formulations of organisms 
without the assumption that a strong directedness remains essentially unchanged 
towards the more complex semiotic systems we can account for in the world.156 
                                                          
155  This “taboo” can also be found, regarding Aristotelian teleology, in philosophy (Came-
ron 2003).  
156  I do not wish to imply that we cannot find similar mechanisms in such an evolutionary 
constitution as the one that follows from Hoffmeyer, because the consequences of bio-
semiotics to general semiotics are of great relevance and can be carried out successfully 
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The model can lend itself to analyzing other semiotically interesting formu-
lations, such as the autogen model (Deacon 2011) or the conceptualizations of 
artificial intelligence in the vein of Emmeche (1992), and can give us an 
interesting perspective on such thought experiments to strengthen our under-
standing of some of the philosophical implications entailed by these projects 
while also allowing us to continue in the development of a theory that can 
integrate the model to evolutionary claims. However, we will not treat those 
here beyond what has been already said. 
 
 
8.4.2. Internal objects and minimality 
One of the relevant problems we may find has to do with internal objects in a 
sign relation, these being the internal regulatory processes in organisms that do 
not deal exactly with the environment, or that can at least be seen as interior 
radicals. Say, if we model internal control mechanisms, we may have to abide 
by some semiotic terminology as it has been done in some analyses of genetic 
information (Barbieri 2007; Queiroz et al. 2011: 106), and we can understand 
informational processes through semiotic concepts. As the analysis of Queiroz 
et al. goes, genes are taken as signs because they signify something else to the 
whole organism. Genetic information is taken here as “the whole process 
through which a gene acts as a sign in a given cell, mediating the reconstruction 
of a specific sequence of amino acids” (2011: 109), with internal mechanisms 
being of relevance for the interpretation. This scheme is apparently harder to 
make work with our model because of the presupposition that it is the external 
differences for the organism that make sign action possible. The concept of 
codes as rules or habits connecting different elements (Brier 2009: 39–40) has 
to be noted to some degree, but it is in the basal idea of a code that we have a 
hint: If the code is even partially defined internally, it means that imple-
mentation can be meaningful. Brier makes the point that 
 
A sequence of differences such as the base pairs in DNA can be information for 
coding, but is not a code in itself. Peircean biosemiotics argues that codes are 
part of triadic sign processes where an interpretant makes the motivated 
connection between objects and representamens. Living systems function on the 
basis of self-constructed codes. (Brier 2009: 40)  
 
The inclusion of autopoiesis as a relevant point for Peircean biosemiotics makes 
sense because of that, and while the project of Cybersemiotics deals with the 
specific problems of a more autopoiesis-centric approach,157 our view tries to 
separate metabolism from cognition to a similar degree that van Dujin et al. do. 
If cognition is “based in sensorimotor coordination, which modulates the 
                                                                                                                                              
even with the checks I have proposed in place. For a review of such consequences from a 
perspective that follows Hoffmeyer, see Cobley (2016). 
157  Such as the problem of constructivistic idealism (Brier 2008). 
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conditions of metabolic processes” (van Dujin et al. 2006: 165), then semiosis 
needs not be attached to the internal informational mechanisms. If we go back 
to implementation, what we have is a partial key to the environment. What we 
cannot claim is that semiosis gives rise to morphology. That would make us go 
from the opposite side. What we can claim, however, is that codes as previously 
defined are proportional to implementation and enaction, and defined in both at 
least partially. Internal information processes may be interpreted by the whole 
organism, which would lead us to believe in internal abstract objects, a form of 
self-dialogue if we may,158 but we can only follow this scheme insofar as it is 
not determinative as a whole and that it has results beyond internal organization.  
Having said that, the difference we find in our approach can be focused on 
how we retain a specific unit of analysis that seems to be of value to bio-
semiotics. Our unit of analysis is not solely internal, it comprises the internal 
but value is finally assigned in combination with the external. ‘Representation’, 
even if heuristic, is only of value if our semiosic processes are supposed to take 
relevance within the interactions of our encircled organism. Information 
processes – incomplete as they may be and thus requiring of some indeter-
minism – are taken as implementational because they give us only a partial 
setup for the investigation of sign action. Triads of some form present us always 
with arguments on how we limit the scope of potential mereological sums we 
may consider as triads, and we have tried to avoid this problem to the degree 
that we can say we are not utilizing representational mechanisms. Instead, our 
thought is that for semiosis to be actual, it will have to be treated as a co-
occurring measurement of action and the theoretical account of choice that 
gives rise to the semantic closure. 
As such, we can have both a minimal model of semiosis, that is, an overview 
of the least complex bundle of elements possible for accounting for sign action 
to its simplest degree – and characterized as sign enaction –, and a differential 
unit of analysis that is compatible with Peircean extensions to some degree and 
with augmentative models of semiosis in more complex systems.  
The fact remains that even a simple formulation of semiosis requires a 
number of metaphysical commitments as well as an actual degree of comple-
xity. The applicability of such a model depends on how much we are willing to 
assign to less teleonomic processes in organisms, but we depend, ultimately, on 
the external ‘measuring’ of their possibilities. We do not wish to account for 
internal states nor for internal forms of interpretations. In our view, we have 
interpretation as action, grounded and of relevance within the described system. 
That is, in positing our minimal model, we have tried to stay in as limited a 
framework as possible while allowing for our possible explanations to include 
the elements that comprise a semiotic theory of sign action in living systems.  
                                                          
158  A non-committed response would state that given that ‘object mapping’ is dealt within 
the physical and that informational expression is organizationally physical at least in its 
reference, then there’s no problem in accepting even internal regulation as behavioral 
assets that can pertain to P-Semantics. 
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Finally, we may have a word regarding the self-confirmation given in 
theoretical commitments when describing a model of analysis to a unit that it 
already pertains to its concepts. The point I wish to make here is that, while the 
minimal model is apparently applicable only to living systems that we have 
already observed and whose behavior has already been catalogued to some 
degree, the abstraction of the model does not rule out other potential 
applications it may have. That is, the minimality-type constraints are so for any 
possible system in which we may want to observe sign action. We cannot rule 
out certain systems because they do not exhibit he traits we have confirmed in 
our previous objects. This means that we cannot rule out post-biotic physio-
semiosis altogether, but rather, we can approach the possibility through both a 
minimal and a robust model. What the model cannot tell us, though, is whether 
these processes we can describe as sign action have any form of internal effect 
beyond that of implemented fuzzy choice. Biosemiotics deals with biological 
organisms, certainly, but the relevance of a biosemiotic perspective should 
always have a central focus in General Semiotics. 
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 9. CONCLUSIONS 
In this work we have explored the entailment of semiosis from an openly 
philosophical perspective on biosemiotics. While the task is solely conceptual, 
it is taken in different dimensions necessary for an argument and model to work 
as a cohesive hypothesis. That modeling is a task of biosemiotics is the essential 
presupposition we have made, and as such there have been a number of things 
guiding us towards the specific model we have worked out in this work. The 
minimal expression of semiosis as we have tried to elucidate it depends on what 
we assume our concepts of semiosis need to deal with. That is, if we take se-
miosis to be a serious process of meaning creation throughout the biological 
world, we need to substantiate our models within both a specific threshold and a 
specific competence of our concepts for making our models of semiosis work 
out within the scope of a scientific semiotics.  
 
 
9.1. Discussing minimality 
Is such a notion of minimality desirable for biosemiotics? The task of finding 
the exact spot where the cluster of complexity is simple enough to allow 
semiosis while being complex enough to actually be semiotic is a problem that 
certainly shares boundaries with the discussion on semiotic thresholds (Eco 
1979; Nöth 2000; Kull 2009), but what we have dealt with is articulated outside 
this issue. Instead, we have taken steps to hypothesize on specific conditions to 
be met rather than levels of complexity to be afforded. That is, it does not 
matter to our view that the specific complexity of a cell allows us to have the 
information talk, but rather, that semiosis can be accounted for within a number 
of parameters, and that the phenomenon of signification that we can describe 
within those parameters can be achieved by multiple means. But the idea of 
parsimony depends on how we frame these parameters. Much like the condition 
of irreducibility in Peircean theories of sign relations, our conditions of 
minimality have been set against the backdrop of conceptual necessity. That is, 
the conditions to be met are twofold, we need our intuitions on sign action to be 
grounded on a specific paradigm – the biosemiotic paradigm working within a 
realist framework and the attempts at naturalizing sign action – and we need our 
concepts to reflect that semiosis is an effective phenomenon that can be 
analyzed. But this analysis depends on how we frame our units of analysis as 
well. The attempt at modeling semiosic capabilities in their minimal aspect is 
dependent, clearly, on our background theory, but its expression has to end up 
in an analytical aspect, that is, by formulating the conditions in which the 
phenomenon we have described can be understood. In other words, the unit of 





9.1.1. Formality and expansion 
Minimal semiosic capabilities in this way are not an attempt to exclude evolu-
tionary theories of semiosis, but rather to put a frame to their development. Yet, 
we have tried to maintain an informal account of the elements in the model. The 
reason behind this decision has to do with the difficulties of coming up with a 
formalized framework to work within semiotics. Considering a semiotic 
calculus has been but a distant project without effective realization, and that the 
methods of reasoning within the borders of biosemiotics are held in constant 
conflict between verification and model assumption, an immediate formali-
zation is undesirable as it does not have a clear basis for its standing. On the 
other hand, retaining an informal approach to the description, or as informal as 
we have allowed ourselves to be in the description of the model, allows us an 
important deal of flexibility. The less defined elements in our theory can have a 
robust constitution without assuming they have to present either a specific 
biological correspondence or a specific descriptor for a certain function. What I 
mean by this is that there is no fixed matrix for application and derivability. 
Instead, the model limits its applicability by means of initial assumptions.  
Let us take, for instance, the specific case of a memory function in biological 
systems. While such a function plays a central role in certain analyses of 
potential semiosic activity (Barbieri 2008; Kull 2009a; Scalambrino 2013), we 
have not provided a descriptor for a proper memory function. However essential 
it may seem for providing a continuous referential apparatus, the expression of a 
memory function is subsumed by an implementational framework that doesn’t 
require storage to have continuity. In fact, if we use the example of slime mold 
using spatial ‘memory’ for navigating in complex environments (Reid et al. 
2012), we can only account for a memory function in a very vague manner. 
What could be conceivably called memory here is a spatial recognition system 
that does not draw from internal storage of information but from an extensional 
operation of the bodily constitution of the organism. That is, even if this 
externalized ‘memory’ can be seen as a precursor of internal memory as sug-
gested by Reid et al., we do not need our model to include a fully realized 
memory function so much as we need to have a consistent organization.  
When it comes to specifying functionality beyond the bare minimum of 
organization for mechanisms of interaction with the environment, the idea is to 
account for the fact that non-specific organization is necessary, but specific 
organization is variable. That being said, this particular framework for mini-
mality displays robustness without function correspondences because it does 
present a limit to its applicability. These limits could be bypassed through an 
extension of sets to be considered semiotic, but it would still require some 
reworking. For say, if we were to attempt an analysis of physiosemiosic 
capabilities in a chemical system using this model of minimality, we could at 
first sight state that a chemical system defined as such has a structural confor-
mation that allows its reaction towards the environment, and that in 
combination with its environment it could cause reactions of sorts. This would 
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be missing the point though, as implementation in the way we have described it 
rules out the sufficiency of physicality as it is. The discretion of a chemical 
system may extend the discussion, but we can object that even an input-output 
type of interaction does not entail any distinguishing enactive feature. It may 
well be that chemical systems could entail fuzzy choices, but these cannot be 
attested and as such would not only be conjectural, but also highly improbable. 
More importantly though is the fact that the possible enaction that we can 
observe is cashed out in a teleonomic view, thus requiring external confirmation 
of complexity while also explaining that a physically structured interaction 
system is simply not sufficient for sign action.  
 
 
9.2. Constructing the argument 
The fact that to reach that hypothesis we do need to have some background as-
sumptions is not surprising. We started our exploration focusing on the inter-
action between metaphysics and biosemiotics, working out the main kinks of 
this complicated relation. The scientific endeavor of biosemiotics cannot be 
consolidated as such without the recognition that scientific enterprises take 
metaphysical stands, no matter if these are clear or not. The pragmatic answer to 
this discussion is simply not enough to apply semiotic concepts to biological 
phenomena. Even within a fiercely deflationary perspective on the metaphysics 
of biosemiotics, theory cohesion depends and eventually expresses metaphysical 
commitments.159 In trying to clarify these, we can observe some of the crucial 
elements that can serve against our specific theories on semiosis. We identified 
some of these in the framework of physiosemiosis as it allows a form of semiosis 
that we can see as necessarily guided as a fully fledged precursor to biosemiosis. 
This is particularly concerning because the consequences to accepting physio-
semiosis as the cornerstone of semiotics causes a differentiated metaphysics 
contrary to the accepted forms of scientific biosemiotics. And it is not that the 
arguments for physiosemiosis do not support an eventual biosemiotic addition, 
because they are easily extensible, but rather that they constitute a basal law that 
as such constitutes the most basic of semiosic potential. Instead of that, we have 
followed the line invested in the naturalization of semiotic concepts, even if in 
metaphysical thinking, something that does have some consequences for the way 
we look at semiotics as a special science.  
We follow this idea trying to give some characterization to this description 
of semiotics, that with its naturalized flavor can provide strong definitions for 
application in the biological realm while finding some necessary limitations to 
how much it can say past such a threshold, and it is because of that that we can 
enter the discussion of emergence, a mainstay as it is in the discussion of 
semiogenesis. This is a point that requires some fine-grained distinctions in 
                                                          
159  A discussion on metaphysical commitments in the sciences can be found in Andersen 
and Becker (2016). 
120 
order to be applicable for semiotics. As shown in the division between strong 
and weak emergence, both ontological positions have important and interesting 
consequences for biosemiotics, but the viability of strong emergence is called 
into question. Weak emergence, tacitly the most prevalent view in current 
biosemiotic research, is seen as a more feasible solution to find a basal account 
of semiosic capabilities, creating a robust set of constraints while being flexible 
enough for the tenets of biosemiotics.  
The metaphysical discussion on emergence was complemented with a 
discussion on what it means for a naturalized biosemiotics to deal with scien-
tific models, their relation to semiotic models and the guiding aspects of parsi-
mony for coining a hypothetical minimal model of semiosic capabilities. Mo-
deling semiosis to reflect minimal requirements for its constitution depends on 
what we can say about models as much as what our ontology allows us to say 
about semiosis. More generally, when dealing with the modeling of semiosic 
capabilities we still need to inquire as to what are the conditions for minimality 
in models.  
Past that we set the constraints necessary for talking about the organismic 
inclusion in our view of semiosis, introducing the concepts believed to be 
necessary to take semiosis seriously. This lays the groundwork for developing 
an individual model of minimal semiosic capabilities in the vein that we have 
already discussed in the conclusions.  
 
 
9.2.1. Is semiotics metaphysically disinterested? 
A question that is worth asking, after dabbling in the problems of constructing a 
minimal model of semiosic capabilities, is whether semiotics as a discipline is 
metaphysically disinterested. That is, can we truly have a metaphysically 
neutral sign relation, and is that even desirable? If anything, the coining of the 
sign as part of our analytical view leads us to establish certain metaphysical 
assumptions about the world, and even the most pragmatic view of sign 
application can recognize that our theories make background assumptions. One 
may wish to declare the neutrality of the sign relation and defend this within a 
Peircean framework where it can be argued that the sign relation is a logical 
consequence of some sort. The eliminativism, however, of background 
assumptions can only act in that way if we provide robust options that are 
already naturalized. This, I believe, is an ongoing work for biosemiotics that 
may follow the spirit of pragmatism, but which cannot be applied by the sheer 





9.3. Semiosis, after all 
We have tried bringing a consistent view of semiosic capabilities from the 
bottom, that is, by qualifying the modeling practice of semiotics with our 
assumptions on the ontology of semiosis and what we can appreciate as possible 
candidates for the minimal requirements for semiosis. The results are not, as is 
the case with musings of a philosophical nature, univocal, but the perspective 
presented here is, I believe, a contribution to the conceptualization of the basic 
units of analysis for biosemiotics from a philosophical perspective. This is of 
some relevance as the constitution of the field and its constant change depends 
on making certain philosophical positions clear and accountable, with the 
current work being an attempt at modeling semiosis without relying on a strong 
Peircean framework while feeding from its concepts. In this, I hope, we have 
cleared a path for an alternative for naturalized biosemiotics that can still be 
understood as relying on biosemiotic premises instead of separating from the 
field altogether.  
The claims our model can make about biosemiosis in a general, yet simple 
level can be seen, following the idea that semiotic models present a more 
general form of scientific models, as an attempt to make scientific claims, or at 
least nuanced claims that aim for naturalization, regarding the standing of sign 
action in simple organisms. The specificity we have presented certainly requires 
metaphysical claims, but we do not shy away from them. Instead, we have tried 
to make the point that the constitution of a semiotic paradigm makes very 
specific claims about the standing of relations and signification, but these do not 
need to limited to the scope of relational ontologies inasmuch as we can try to 




9.3.1. Remaining questions and prospects 
While we have remained outside of formalized systems, the idea of developing 
a more strict formalization of P-Semantics could open a number of research 
avenues regarding sign types to some degree. While the accounting for signs 
does not, in our view, depend on sign types – as they cannot be specified exter-
nally at this level –, there can be a systematization to the expression of signs 
within the described system. This would be an arduous task in the same line of a 
semiotic calculus, that is, a pretension that seems contrary to the expectations of 
biosemiotic descriptions (considering for instance the value of logical contra-
diction for biosemiotics).  
The explicit application and development of tight units of analysis will also 
demand a more thorough observation of the compatibility of current biosemiotic 
terminology with that of our view. In fact, the (assumed) incompatibility 
                                                          
160  In a Peircean vein, a processual view of ontology can be found in Gustafsson (2015). 
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between internal coding and behavioral expression as basic units of analysis 
implies a divide between the usability of semiotic terminology within the diffe-
rent positions in the field. If there is a middle ground, it remains to be found.  
Finally, one of the most prominent elements to be developed is that of com-
patibilizing the different branches of semiotics within the naturalistic frame-
work of biosemiotics. While this is a more general discussion belonging to 
general semiotics, However, I wish with the present work to have at least 
provided a limiting account of the scope of biosemiosis as well as a small 
contribution to the issues related to the evolution of semiosis at different levels 
or organization and complexity. For if we wish to preserve the idea of a 
naturalized semiosis and its conceptual compatibility throughout the endeavors 
called ‘semiotic’, we may of necessity have to complement our analyses with 
the assumptions made at the most basic level of semiosic interaction with, 
eventually, those that underlie the activities of complex sign systems, cultural 
activity or mental functions as many of the branched semiotics have tried to 
describe with the particular tone of this particular discipline. It is here thus that 
we can hope to achieve a more balanced relation between the biosemiotic 
aspects of the whole of semiotics and the rest of the field, resulting in a more 
concrete expression of general semiotics towards its own systematic, ever-
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134 
SUMMARY OF THE THESIS 
The present work opens a discussion on the prospects of modeling minimal 
semiosis following a naturalized biosemiotic perspective. Setting hypothetical 
assumptions from the metaphysical problems given in the treatment of semiosis 
from biosemiotics, the thesis tries to account for the relevance of a constrained 
ontology when developing theories of semiosis. This leads to a discussion on 
what the role of modeling is within biosemiotics as a scientific discipline and 
the implementation of a parsimonious view on semiosis as it may potentially be 
modeled.  
We start by asking what exactly metaphysics does in biosemiotics. The 
scientific disposition of biosemiotics as a general research endeavor appears to 
sanction all possible metaphysical musings, seen as either not informative for 
theories that deal with biological processes, or as appended definitions without 
causal roles in biosemiotic explanations. There is a number of things that we 
must first take into consideration, in any case. While the potential role of 
semiotic explanations should, in theory, have a strong basis in naturalized, 
scientific assumptions, biosemiotic theories hinge on their metaphysical back-
grounds. The metaphysical background of a theory is comprised of the assump-
tions made by the theory that are not spelled out except as the initial definitions 
and assumed elements that do background work at the larger scale. That is, 
metaphysical assumptions in theories of biosemiotics deal with the nature of 
signs, relations and the fact that we can use them in our theories of semiotics.  
Peircean concepts do, in fact, a good deal of work in biosemiotic theories, 
with the concept of semiosis taking primacy as the main (conceptual) reason for 
the usage of a semiotic approach. The emergence of semiosis, universal evolu-
tionary scales, semiosis as a base level law – these are all forms in which the 
more philosophical inclination of biosemiotics appears patently, despite its 
more scientific view of semiosis. In order to make these aspects form a more 
coherent perspective, we need to understand that the role of metaphysical 
explanations serves as a way to ground our concepts of the sign. In the case of 
Peircean semiotics, we have a number of possibilities that may result in 
different settings for semiosic phenomena, such as assigning a causal role in the 
form of universal law to semiosic triads. In order to prevent our metaphysical 
background from expanding and monopolizing explanations, we need to set 
some specific constraints based on our understanding of the role of semiosis, its 
definitions and the relation of semiotics to other scientific explanations. The 
naturalization of semiotics, that is, the process of coalescing theories of 
semiotics with scientific explanations outside of the field, provides us with a 
way to consider how we may set ontological constraints to our explanations in 
semiotics.  
Having a parsimonious view of the causal role of semiosis helps us in 
avoiding a theory of semiotics with too many elements determining the outcome 
of other theories. The constitution of semiosis must strike a balance between 
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being causally effective and not covering all possible bases of scientific 
research. For we may be able to explain (assumed) non-semiotic phenomena 
through triadic explanations, but that may simply incur in a haphazard organi-
zation of elements in order to provide semiotic explanations where there is no 
need for them. We prefer a deflationary view of ontology, that is, removing as 
many elements from our ontology as possible while still asserting that meta-
physics has a valuable place in biosemiotics, gluing our theories together. In 
this way we can account for some minimal elements in our view of semiosis 
and model them accordingly.  
One example of what we assume to be an ontologically expansive perspec-
tive that causes argumentative problems for a naturalized biosemiotics is the 
idea that sign relations can be entailed by physical systems without any form of 
cognitive intervention, even if our concept of cognition here is wide enough to 
include behavioral reaction instead of symbol manipulation. This is the idea of 
physiosemiosis, where object, representamen and interpretant can take a phy-
sical expression in one assumed causal triad.  
The reason to consider this problematic is twofold: First, if semiosis can be 
implemented by purely physical systems – under a loose definition of system – 
our theories on the minimal requirements to have semiosis as a working concept 
become dependent on a prebiotic understanding of the sign. Second, if we assert 
that semiosis acts as a causal power before the emergence of cognition we can 
construe our theories of semiotics as a case of a basal universal law. The first 
aspect we mentioned is problematic because it allows the setting of triads as if 
they were proper signs without any specific distinction to make them so except 
as a putative role assignment for each element of the sign relation within the 
physical system we have decided to describe with semiotic terminology. The 
second aspect is problematic because it moves the goalpost of semiotics in 
general, making the requirements for semiosis predetermined in the physical 
constraints of the universe while also making the same phenomenon a universal 
law, much like physical laws. This, however, is hard to argue for and requires 
an extensive ontological machinery that seems extremely expensive to afford in 
theories of semiosis.  
With this in mind, we move on to discuss the role of naturalization in 
semiotic descriptions. While semiotic terminology is rather idiosyncratic in the 
way concepts are used, the core assumptions of biosemiotics – that living orga-
nisms use signs and that meaning is a relevant factor for biological processes – 
are generalized in their anti-reductive perspective and call for some form of 
complementarity in order to account for biological meaning. We argue here, 
however, that the scope of biosemiotics must be limited to generalizations about 
meaning instead of fully-fledged universal laws, as we have seen in the oppo-
sition of the example coming from theories of prebiotic physiosemiosis. At the 
same time, committing to biosemiotic views can also have a positive impact in 
general theories of semiotics, as naturalizing semiotic functions of any general 
sort will inform views of branched semiotics further about the underpinnings of 
the theory.  
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This leads to the question of the basic principles on which we can talk about 
semiosis. If we assume that the basic form of sign action comes from a bio-
logical ground, then it is relevant to ask to what degree it emerges from physical 
or biological systems. The concept of emergence is quite fruitful in the philo-
sophical dimension in that it gives us terminology to analyze the degree in 
which we can account for emergence. Here we make the common distinction 
between strong and weak emergence. Strong emergence refers to the non-
deducibility of an emergent and its potential bringing about of new causal 
powers. Weak emergence, on the other hand, refers to the unpredictability or 
unexpectedness of the emergent while still being subject to the principles that 
govern the level from which it emerges. Now, both characterizations of 
emergence can tell us something about semiosis, but it depends on how we can 
characterize it as an emergent with respect to some specific level. Both possibi-
lities can be developed, but in order to move this discussion forward we must 
surmise what exactly it means for semiosis to be an emergent. A semiotic emer-
gent can thus be thought of as either the emergence of the process of semiosis or 
of any of the specific elements of the sign relation.  
When thinking of semiosis as a strongly emergent phenomenon, we charac-
terize it as not deducible from the assumed initial conditions. As we have tried 
to stray away from the argument that signs can be entailed by purely physical 
means, we need to see how a complex biological system – following the Sebeok 
thesis – can have sign relations. In this, however, we characterize semiosis as at 
least partially entailed by the elements in the relation, such as an object and its 
perceiver. If we try to assume the elements of the sign relation as individually 
emergent, we cannot see anything special about, say, an object having the 
property of being an object in a way that it would not be deducible from the rest 
of the elements we have at our disposal. We can repeat this observation on the 
other elements of the sign relation without reaching any certainty about the 
status of these elements as strongly emergent.  
By moving to weak emergence, we have a different characterization of a 
possible semiotic emergent. Weak emergence is closer to the study of comple-
xity, a field that has had a relevant impact on biosemiotics. Biological meaning, 
by allowing semiosis, can be seen as weakly emergent in that the complexity of 
biological systems and their environmental interactions do not need to cause a 
limited number of interpretant-like reactions. On the contrary, we assume that 
meaning is not limited to simple correspondences. Another important thing to 
note is that weak emergence does not expand our metaphysical assumptions in 
the same way that strong emergence does.  
Weak emergence seems to provide a clearer form of establishing a meta-
physical background for biosemiotics without resorting to more complex onto-
logies while giving a more concrete picture of the elements necessary to make 
semiosis “work”. This being the case, we can try and model semiosic pheno-
mena with a more limited scope and background assumptions that may have a 
specific impact in our modeling methodology. This specific impact can be 
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spelled out as a more constrained ontology, a desirable outcome as we have 
proposed earlier, and a frame for our possible descriptions of semiosis.  
After this, we proceed to analyze the concept of minimality – the parsimo-
nious approach that we have targeted from the beginning – in both the con-
ceptualization of our objects of study and semiotic methodology, that is, 
modeling. In our view, this is a relevant thing as coming up with a form of 
understanding of the basic components of biologically grounded semiosis 
depends on how we frame our modeling practices and understand the pre-
conditions for avoiding an expansion of objects that must be covered in the 
basic structure of our theory. In understanding modeling practices we can 
observe differences in the treatment of scientific and semiotic models, but 
ultimately we may find a middle ground in order to make relevant claims about 
the world through semiotic models when framing some of the possible senses of 
scientific models under some semiotic terminology.  
The objects of our theories of semiotics, when avoiding the expansion of 
concepts, can be treated with certain sense of parsimony. We try to reinforce 
this point by appealing to the naturalization of semiotic concepts as an essential 
task of biosemiotics. This view is further developed in trying to account for the 
actuality of semiosis in simple organisms. Having a concept of model at hand 
allows us to see the necessary structure for our theories to be implemented. We 
further expand on the idea of model organisms in order to exemplify the earlier 
talk on models and try to account for a first concept of semanticity and its 
implementation. As issues of semiosis and semantics are intertwined, we cannot 
exactly separate one from the other. However, we can distinguish that seman-
ticity is a process of semiosis and not the other way around, as our concept of 
semiosis deals with organism interaction and its environment.  
However, the assumption of both semiosis and semanticity in simple orga-
nisms has to be made more concrete in how we build our own hypothesis on 
minimal semiosic capabilities. In order to do that, we propose a simplified 
layered model. We wish to account for semanticity as the final part of the 
meaning generating operation within semiosis. In order to do that, we set the 
layered model in a way that would give rise to this semanticity by taking into 
account the most basic elements needed to ground a sign relation.  
As we are reminded that for meaning to arise there must be a sort of comple-
mentarity between matter and symbol, as it has been described, we need to find 
the elements that comprise this complementarity to begin with. The idea of 
complementarity here is essential as a manner of summing up the fact that our 
naturalized view depends on a realist view of physicality as a basis on which we 
can build other elements, even if we allow the idea that higher order elements 
cannot be reduced to their physical aspects. The way this is encapsulated in the 
idea of complementarity helps us in understanding how to make a model work 
if we want to address the minimal components necessary for sign action.  
We set the model in layers in order to have a more precise view of comple-
mentarity. First we start with a physical layer, part of the complementarity 
required for meaning to arise – the world out there, as a manner of speaking –, 
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but insufficient in that having only a physical topology in our model cannot do 
enough to create meaning. Instead, complementarity must depend on a com-
bining factor, and as it stands, physicality is certainly insufficient. For semiosis 
to be effective, we need a way to put into effect relations, and this is what 
comprises the implementational layer. For a sign relation to hold, it needs to be 
mapped to the elements of a sign relation, such as a physical object, in corre-
lation with a certain perceptual structure. This structural need is grounded on 
the physical, but it is differentiated because of its specificity. Yet, having a 
perceptual apparatus structured in some way is not enough to be able to talk 
about meaningful relations. This insufficiency comes from the fact that having 
the possibility of meaning does not actually equate to having any form of 
meaning for an organism. What we need, finally, is a way to combine the pre-
vious layers in a dynamic system that can be accounted for. Behavior is an 
indicator of this and we can assume it being causal enough to provide us with a 
sense for the third and final layer, the enactive layer of the model. While the 
concept of enactivism is a rather loaded one, the point here is that we can 
observe some fundamental patterns of cognition in simple biological organisms 
that allow us to see in behavior a form of semiotic result. Given a combination 
of all three layers, we have a basal assumption for the entailment of semiosis in 
a minimal aspect.  
The consequences of such a model may be rather modest, but in following it 
we can coin a specific unit of analysis given in not just the individuation of a 
sign or the black-box like processing of the sign, but rather in the systema-
tization of organism and environment. This allows us to reformulate comple-
mentarity as a form of semanticity based on simple constraints and without a 
specific formulation of content. This we call P-Semanticity, a realization of 
biological meaning within semiosis characterized as the non-deterministic 
implemented mapping of relevance for an organism within a given environ-
ment.  
This research has to do with, finally, the metaphysical constraints we can set 
when discussing the simplest expressions of semiosis and how biosemiotics can 
model them. Our perspective has taken us from the background assumptions of 
the theories of biosemiotics towards proposing our own model for con-
ceptualizing a frame with which to refer to semiosis in a reduced manner. In this 
way we hope we have fruitfully discussed both philosophical implications and 
conceptual applications of biosemiotic terminology while being aware of our 




SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN 
Semantika koht biosemiootikas: semioosivõimete  
minimaalse mudeli kontseptualiseerimine 
Käesolev töö analüüsib võimalusi modelleerida minimaalset semioosi, järgides 
naturaliseeritud biosemiootilist perspektiivi. Tuues esile hüpoteetilised eeldu-
sed, mis tulenevad metafüüsilistest probleemidest nii nagu need esinevad se-
mioosi käsitlemisel biosemiootikas, üritatakse väitekirjas põhjendada piiratud 
ontoloogia relevantsust semioosi-teooriate väljatöötamisel. See viib aruteluni 
sellest, milline on modelleerimise roll biosemiootikas kui teadusdistsipliinis, 
samuti kitsama käsitluse kasutuselevõtuni semioosist nii nagu seda võiks 
potentsiaalselt modelleerida. 
Esmalt küsime, milline täpselt on metafüüsika osa biosemiootikas. Bio-
semiootika kui üldise uurimisvalla teaduslik iseloom näikse keelavat igasugused 
metafüüsilised arutlused, kuivõrd neid peetakse väheinformatiivseteks bioloo-
giliste protsessidega tegelevate teooriate jaoks, või külge poogituiks definitsioo-
nidele, ilma põhjuslike seosteta biosemiootiliste protsessidega. Igal juhul tuleb 
meil arvesse võtta mitut asjaolu. Ehkki semiootilised seletused peaks teoreetili-
selt omama tugevat alust naturaliseeritud, teaduslikes eeldustes, sõltuvad bio-
semiootika teooriad ometi ka oma metafüüsilisest taustast. Mõne teooria meta-
füüsiline taust hõlmab neid teooria poolt tehtud eeldusi, mis ei ole selgelt välja 
toodud muul viisil kui algsete definitsioonide ja eeldatavate elementide kaudu, 
küll aga teevad taustal suuremahulist tööd. Teisisõnu, metafüüsilised eeldused 
biosemiootika teooriates tegelevad märkide ja suhete loomusega ning nende 
kasutatavusega semiootikateooriates. 
Peirce’i mõisted tõepoolest määravadki palju biosemiootilistes teooriates, 
kus semioosi mõiste rakendamine ise toimib (kontseptuaalse) põhjusena se-
miootilise lähenemise kasutamiseks. Semioosi esilekerkimine, universaalsed 
evolutsioonilised astmikud, semioos kui baastasandi seadus – kõik need on tahud, 
kus biosemiootika filosoofilisemad kalduvused selgelt esile tulevad, hoolimata 
semioosi teaduslikumast käsitlusest biosemiootikas teiste semiootika harudega 
võrreldes. Et need kaks aspekti moodustaksid koherentsema vaatenurga, tuleb 
aktsepteerida, et metafüüsilised seletused on üks viis märgimõisted põhistada. 
Peirce’iliku semiootika puhul on meil mitmeid võimalusi, mis võivad tulemuseks 
anda erinevad raamistused semioosilistele nähtustele, nagu näiteks omistades 
semioosilistele triaadidele põhjusliku rolli universaalse seaduse näol. Takistamaks 
metafüüsilisel taustal seletusi laiendada ja monopoliseerida, tuleb paika panna 
teatavad kindlad piirangud, mis põhinevad arusaamal semioosi rollist, definitsioo-
nidest ning semiootika suhtest muude teaduslike seletustega. Semiootika natura-
liseerimine ehk semiootikateooriate kokkuviimine teaduslike seletustega väljas-
pool tema enda valdkonda annab meile ühe võimaluse mõtestada, kuidas saak-
sime seada ontoloogilised piirangud oma seletustele semiootikas. 
Kitsam arusaam semioosi põhjuslikust rollist aitab meil vältida semiootika-
teooriat, mis oleks liialt üldine. Semioosi ülesehitus peab leidma tasakaalu, kus 
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ta on põhjuslikult efektiivne, ent samas ei hõlma kõiki võimalikke mudeleid. 
Võib küll olla võimalik seletada (eeldatavalt) mittesemiootilisi nähtusi triaa-
diliste seletuste abil, kuid see võib endaga kaasa tuua semiootiliste seletuste 
kasutamise seal, kus need pole efektiivsed. Eelistades deflatsioonilist arusaama 
ontoloogiast, ehk siis eemaldades nii palju elemente kui võimalik meie onto-
loogiast, väidame samas siiski, et metafüüsikal on biosemiootikas vääriline 
koht, kuna ta seob kokku erinevad teooriad. Sel viisil saame me anda seletuse 
teatavatele minimaalsetele elementidele meie arusaamas semioosist ning 
modelleerida neid vastavalt. 
Üheks näiteks sellest, mida me peame ontoloogiliselt ekspansiivseks per-
spektiiviks ja mis põhjustab naturaliseeritud biosemiootika jaoks vaieldavaid 
probleeme, on arusaam, et füüsikalised süsteemid võivad kaasa tuua märgi-
suhted, ilma et sellesse sekkuks mingitki tunnetust, isegi kui meie tunnetuse-
mõiste on siin piisavalt lai, et sisaldada käitumuslikke reaktsioone sümbolikasu-
tuse asemel. Niisugune on idee füsiosemioosist, mille järgi objekt, represen-
taamen ja interpretant leiaksid füüsikalise väljenduse mingis oletatavalt põhjus-
likus triaadis. 
Põhjus pidada seda arusaama semioosist problemaatiliseks on kahetine. 
Esiteks, kui semioos saab teostuda puhtalt füüsikalises süsteemis – olgu süsteem 
siin üsna laialt defineeritud –, osutuvad meie teooriad selle kohta, mida on 
minimaalselt tarvis kasutamaks semioosi kasuliku mõistena, sõltuvaks aru-
saamast märgist kui eelbiootilisest. Teiseks, kui me väidame, et semioos toimib 
põhjusliku jõuna enne tunnetuse tekkimist, siis me võime semiootikateooriad 
ümber tõlgendada üheks juhuks universaalsest baasseadusest. Esimene nime-
tatud tahkudest on problemaatiline, kuna see võimaldab esitada triaade justkui 
oleksid need päris märgid, ilma et selle aluseks oleks mingi konkreetne eristus, 
välja avatud oletuslik rolliomistamine märgisuhte igale elemendile füüsikalises 
süsteemis, mida me oleme otsustanud kirjeldada semiootilise terminoloogia 
abil. Teine tahk on problemaatiline, kuna see muudab semiootika eesmärke 
üldiselt, muutes semioosi tingimused universumi füüsiliste piirangute poolt ette-
määratuks, tehes samas sellestsamast nähtusest füüsikaseaduste sarnase univer-
saalse seaduse. Viimase kaitseks on aga väga raske argumenteerida ja see 
vajaks ulatuslikku ontoloogilist aparatuuri, mis pole aga semioosi-teooriatele 
kohane. 
Eeltoodu meeles, asume analüüsima naturaliseerimise rolli semiootilistes 
kirjeldustes. Ehkki semiootiline terminoloogia on üsna idiosünkraatiline selles 
osas, kuidas mõisteid kasutatakse, on biosemiootika kesksed eeldused – et elus-
organismid kasutavad märke ja et tähendus on bioloogilistes protsessides olu-
line tegur – üldistatud tema reduktsionismi-vastases hoiakus ja vajaduses mingit 
tüüpi komplementaarsuse järele bioloogilise tähenduse seletamisel. Siin me aga 
väidame, et biosemiootika ulatus peab piirnema üldistustega tähenduse, mitte 
täiemahuliste universaalsete seaduste kohta, nagu nägime vastupidise näite 
puhul, mis tuleneb eelbiootilise füsiosemioosi teooriatest. Samas on bio-
semiootiliste käsitluste aktsepteerimisel positiivne mõju üldistele semiootika-
141 
teooriatele, kuna ükskõik millise üldisema semiootilise funktsiooni naturali-
seerimine annab uut teavet semiootika teistele harudele teooria aluste kohta. 
See viib küsimuse juurde neist põhilistest printsiipidest, mille alusel me 
saame rääkida semioosist. Kui eeldame, et märgitoime põhivorm tuleneb bio-
loogilistest alustest, on oluline küsida, millisel määral see füüsikalistest või 
bioloogilistest süsteemidest emergeerub. Emergentsuse mõiste on filosoofilises 
mõõtmes üsna viljakas selles mõttes, et pakub meile terminoloogiat analüüsi-
maks, millises ulatuses saame emergentsust seletada. Siinkohal me teeme tava-
pärase eristuse tugeva ja nõrga emergentsuse vahel. Tugev emergentsus osutab 
emergentse mittetuletavusele ja selle võimele tekitada uusi põhjuslikke jõude. 
Teisalt nõrk emergentsus osutab emergentse ennustamatusele või ootamatusele, 
alludes samas endiselt printsiipidele, mis valitsevad sellel tasandil, millest ta 
emergeerub. Mõlemad emergentsi iseloomustused võivad öelda midagi semioo-
si kohta, aga asi sõltub sellest, kuidas me seda iseloomustame emergentsusena 
mõne konkreetse tasandi suhtes. Mõlemat võimalust saab edasi arendada, ent 
esmalt tuleb täpsustada, mida tähendab, et semioos on emergentne. Semiootilist 
emergentsi võib niisiis mõtestada kas semioosiprotsessi või siis mõne märgi-
suhte konkreetse elemendi emergeerumisena.  
Täpsemalt, kui mõtestame semioosi tugevalt emergentse nähtusena, iseloo-
mustame me seda mittetuletatavana eeldatavatest algtingimustest. Kuna oleme 
üritanud liikuda eemale füsiosemiootilisest seletusest, tuleb meil näha, kuidas 
keerukal bioloogilisel süsteemil – järgides Sebeoki teesi – võivad olla märgi-
suhted. Sel juhul me aga iseloomustame semioosi vähemalt osaliselt kaasnevana 
suhtes olevate elementidega, nagu näiteks objekt ja selle tajuja. Kui üritame 
eeldada, et märgisuhte elemendid emergeeruvad individuaalselt, ei ole mitte 
midagi erilist näiteks selles, et objektil on omadus olla objekt niisugusel viisil, 
et teda ei saa tuletada teistest saadaval olevatest elementidest. Me võime seda 
tähelepanekut korrata teiste märgisuhte elementide juures, jõudmata mingi-
sugusele kindlusele nende elementide staatuse osas tugevalt emergentsetena. 
Liikudes edasi nõrga emergentsuse juurde, saab võimalikku semiootilist 
emergentsi iseloomustada teisiti. Nõrga emergentsuse käsitlus on lähemal 
komplekssuse-uuringutele – teadusharule, mis on biosemiootikat oluliselt mõju-
tanud. Bioloogilist tähendust, mis võimaldab semioosi, võib pidada nõrgalt 
emergentseks selles mõttes, et bioloogiliste süsteemide keerukus ja nende inter-
aktsioonid keskkonnaga ei pea põhjustama piiratud arvu interpretandi-taolisi 
reaktsioone. Vastupidi, me eeldame, et tähendus ei piirdu lihtsate vastavustega. 
Olulise asjana tuleb veel märkida, et nõrk emergentsus ei laienda meie meta-
füüsilisi eeldusi samal moel nagu seda teeb tugev emergentsus. 
Nõrk emergents pakub selgema viisi sätestada biosemiootikale metafüüsiline 
taust, ilma et vajataks tuge keerukamatest ontoloogiatest, andes samas konk-
reetsema pildi elementidest, mida on tarvis, et semioosi mõiste oleks produk-
tiivne. Kui nii, siis võime üritada modelleerida semioosilisi nähtusi kitsamas 
sfääris ja vähemate taustaeeldustega, millel võib olla konkreetne tagajärg meie 
modelleerimise metodoloogias. Seda konkreetset tagajärge võib täpsemalt 
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kirjeldada piiratuma ontoloogiana, mis, nagu eelpool märkisime, on soovimis-
väärt tulemus, nagu ka raamistikuna meie võimalikele kirjeldustele semioosist. 
Lähtudes eelnevast liigume edasi analüüsima minimaalsuse mõistet ja parsi-
moonilist lähenemist, mille poole me oleme algusest peale rihtinud – nii oma 
uurimisobjektide kui semiootilise metodoloogia ehk modelleerimise kontsep-
tualiseerimisel. Meie seisukohalt on see oluline, kuna käia välja viis mõista bio-
loogiliselt põhistatud semioosi peamisi komponente sõltub sellest, kuidas me 
raamistame oma modelleerimispraktikad ja mõistame eeltingimusi, mis aitavad 
vältida nende objektide rohkendamist, mida meie teooria põhiline struktuur 
peab hõlmama. Modelleerimispraktikate mõistmisel on erinevusi selles, kuidas 
koheldakse teaduslikke ja semiootilisi mudeleid, kuid võime leida kompromissi, 
eesmärgiga esitada semiootiliste mudelite abil asjakohaseid väiteid maailma 
kohta, kui raamistame mõned teaduslike mudelite võimalikud tähendused 
semiootilise mõistestikuga. 
Kui me väldime mõistete rohkendamist, võib semiootikateooriate objekte 
käsitada parsimooniast lähtudes. Peame seda tarvilikuks, apelleerides semioo-
tiliste mõistete naturaliseerimisele kui biosemiootika jaoks olulise tähtsusega 
ülesandele. Seda vaadet arendatakse edasi püüdega seletada semioosi olemasolu 
lihtsates organismides. Me arendame edasi ka mudelorganismide ideed, ees-
märgiga näitlikustada varasemat arutelu mudelitest, ning üritame selgitada 
spetsiifilist semantilisuse mõistet ja selle rakendamist. Kuna küsimused semioo-
sist ja semantikast on omavahel seotud, ei saa me üht teisest otseselt lahutada. 
Kuid saame siiski teha eristuse, mille kohaselt semantilisus on semioosiprotsess, 
ja mitte vastupidi, kuna semioos on seotud organismide interaktsioonidega ja 
nende keskkondadega.  
Siiski tuleb eeldust, et semioos ja semantilisus on olemas lihtsates organis-
mides, konkretiseerida selles osas, kuidas me oma hüpoteesi minimaalsetest 
semioosilistest võimetest üles ehitame. Sel eesmärgil formuleerime lihtsustatud 
tasandilise mudeli. Meie sooviks on anda seletus semantilisusest kui viimasest 
osisest tähendust loovas operatsioonis semioosi sees. Sel eesmärgil püstitame 
kihilise mudeli üles nõnda, et see annaks tulemuseks semantilisuse, võttes 
arvesse kõige põhilisemaid elemente, mida on tarvis märgisuhte põhistamiseks.  
Kuna teadupärast on tähenduse tekkeks tarvis mingit komplementaarsust 
aine ja sümboli vahel, nagu seda on kirjeldatud, tuleb meil leida elemendid, mis 
selle komplementaarsuse õigupoolest moodustavad. Komplementaarsuse idee 
on siinkohal määrava tähtsusega, kuna võtab kokku asjaolu, et meie naturali-
seeritud vaade sõltub realistlikust arusaamast füüsikalisusest kui alusest, mille 
pinnale muud elemendid rajame, ja seda ka siis, kui võtame arvesse seisukoha, 
et kõrgema järgu elemente ei saa redutseerida nende füüsilistele aspektidele. 
See, kuidas eelnev on komplementaarsuse idees väljendatud, aitab mõista, 
kuidas luua toimivat mudelit, kui me tahame kõne alla võtta minimaalsed kom-
ponendid, mida on märgitoime jaoks tarvis.  
Mudeli moodustame kihiti, jõudmaks täpsema arusaamani komplementaar-
susest. Me alustame füüsikalisest kihist, mida komplementaarsuse osas on 
tähenduse tekkeks tarvis – maailmast “seal väljas”, ent mis on ebapiisav, kuna 
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pelk füüsikalise topoloogia olemasolu meie mudelis ei suuda üksinda tähendust 
luua. Komplementaarsus peab sõltuma mingist kombineerivast tegurist, ja antud 
olukorras on füüsikalisus kindlasti ebapiisav. Et semioos saaks olla efektiivne, 
on tarvis võtta kasutusele suhted, ja need moodustavadki täidesaatva [imple-
mentational] kihi. Märgisuhte kehtimiseks tuleb see kaardistada märgisuhte 
elementidele, korreleerides füüsikalise objekti teatava tajumusliku struktuuriga. 
See struktuurne vajadus põhineb füüsikalisel, kuid eristub sellest tänu oma 
spetsiifilisusele. Siiski ei ole teatud viisil struktureeritud tajuaparatuuri olemas-
olu piisav, et võiks rääkida tähenduslikest suhetest. See ebapiisavus tuleneb 
asjaolust, et tähenduse võimalikkus ei ole sama kui see, et on olemas tähendus 
mingil kujul organismi jaoks. Mida meil viimaks tarvis, on mingi viis eelnevad 
kihid dünaamilisse süsteemi kokku kombineerida, mida oleks siis võimalik 
seletada. Käitumine on selle indikaatoriks, ja me võime eeldada, et see on 
piisavalt põhjuslik, andmaks meile mõista kolmandast ja viimasest kihist, 
mudeli jõustavast [enactive] kihist. Ehkki mõiste enactivism on üsna laetud, on 
mõte siin, et meil on võimalik vaadelda teatavaid fundamentaalseid tunnetus-
mustreid lihtsates bioloogilistes organismides, mis võimaldavad pidada käitu-
mist teatavaks semiootilisuse tagajärjeks. Kui on antud kombinatsioon kõigist 
kolmest kihist, on meil käes peamised eeldused, mida on minimaalselt tarvis, et 
kaasneks semioos. 
Niisuguse mudeli tagajärjed võivad olla üsna tagasihoidlikud, kuid seda 
järgides saame sõnastada konkreetse analüüsiühiku, mis on antud mitte ainult 
märgi individuatsioonis või märgi musta kasti taolises töötlemises, vaid pigem 
organismi ja keskkonna süstematiseerimises. See võimaldab meil komplemen-
taarsuse ümber sõnastada teatud semantilisuse vormiks, mis põhineb lihtsatel 
piirangutel ja ilma et määratletaks konkreetne sisu. Selle me nimetame P-
semantilisuseks, bioloogilise tähenduse realiseerimiseks semioosis, mida iseloo-
mustatakse organismi jaoks antud keskkonnas olulise mitte-deterministlikuna 
täidesaadetu [implemented] kaardistamisena. 
Antud uurimus tegeleb lõpuks ka metafüüsiliste piirangutega, mida me 
saame paika panna arutelude tarbeks semioosi kõige lihtsamate avalduste üle ja 
selleks, et biosemiootika saaks neid modelleerida. Meie vaatenurk on viinud 
meid biosemiootika teooriate taustaeeldustelt meie oma mudeli esitamiseni, mis 
kontseptualiseerib raamistiku, mille abil osutada semioosile redutseeritud viisil. 
Me loodame, et oleme viljakalt arutlenud nii filosoofiliste implikatsioonide kui 
biosemiootika terminoloogia rakenduste üle, olles samas teadlikud tehtud 
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